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'RUSSIA has a t  last spoken ! After ycars paticnlly spent in 
Jxor l i rg  t l~c  dcscr , slrc reachccl in 1584 thc bordcrs of the 
promised land. Her first act on arriving there was Lo ol~jcct o 
the fronticr uhich J.orc1 Granvjlle had proposed in Oclobcr, 
1872, whidi she, by the despatches of her Chancellor, dated 
respectivcIy in I)ccc*nber, 1872,and January, 1873, had acceptecl, 
and which in Russian ancl English Innps alikc has, cvcr sincc, 
bccn n n r k d  xs thc frontier. Yielding, in a wcnk monwnt, to 
an objection posed solcly for the purpose of dcriving sonle 
practical advantagc from the rc-opening of n sct~1c:l clucstion, 
J.ord Granville arranged with Rossla that Conlnlissioncrs 
shouId be sent f ~ o m  both countries to thc spot, to fis there thc 
exact line of demarcation which was to bc the limit of Russia's 
advance towards India. In conscquencc of this agreement an 
English Commissioner, of clist~nguishcd service in India, pro- 
ceeded witho~tt dcIny to the point agreccl upon. He found 
Lherc the ~alleys. the rivers, thc mountains, the peoplc, but no 
Kussinn Cotn~nissioner ! The Russian Comn~issioner was. 
indeed, conspicuous by his absence, but, to counterbalance that 
: absence, parties of Russian soldiers crossed the line' which 
sinie 1872-71 had been accepted AS the boundary of the coan- \ 4 'try, and seized psitions, useless far comn~crcinl, most impor- 
.:$ tant for str~tcgical, prlrposes-positions \vllicl~, sincc the year 
53, ancl cvcn hrfore that year,liad paid tribute to Herilt-the 
rth-western province of tlie dominions of England's ally, the 
~ f r  of Aigl~dniskin ! 
I'r) show the nrrcssity, if  we wish still to hold India, of the 
. ::fgntion, by ari ally of England, of the positions Russia has 
d 
seizcd ; to demnustrate lhc absolutc right of tlie Amir to t l~osc 
positions, and the la\vlessncss of the act of Russia in seizing 
them ; to- set clearly before thc public the chcrished ultimate 
rh 
aim \vllich promplctl Russia to thc conqucst of the desert ; an;; 4 
to point out how the displ:~y of an iron resolution alonc c<A# 
nvcrt from IHcrBt ancl India t l ~ c  tllrcatcncd clangcr, I have 
writtcn the pngcs that follow. I I~avc written then], not as a 
party man, but as an Englishman. Not as a party man, first, 
T 
l~ccnnsc, lxlieving that t11c two great partics in the State havc 
nlikc blt~ndcrecl, I hnvc pointccl out with impartiality the ~nis- 
takes of both. Not a s  a party man, secondly and spccia"~*, 
bccnr~se in a n~atter alfecting the lnaintcnance of an Em-- 
thc voice of patriotis111 should silence the sclfish contention, d 
party. For, in very dcetl, it is an Elnpire which is now :r, 
st;tke, and it is by patriotic efforts alone that the splendid crea- 
tion of our fatllcrs and our fi~tl~crs' Others can bc ~naintained. 
The form in whicl~ this little book is publislled will 1na1:c it 
accessible to all classes. It will tell those classcs thc trut11, 
ancl, telling then1 thc truth, will impose upon t11-m a sacrcd 
duty. That duty is, above all things, to insist that the Minis- 
ters of England shall maintain, with respect to our Indian 
Empirc, the old historic:~l policy of England; that the Ministers 
of England shall compel lii~ssin to withdraw her unjust prc- 
tensions, to rctire behind thc frontier which ?.he has violatctl. 
If thc pcople of Great ISritain fail to perforln this duty, they 
will become partners in a policy, born of infirmity of purposc 
ancL cowardice, which will lose (or us our Indian Enlpirc ! 
In my oi~tspokcn criticisms I lnag have struck at cl~erishecl 
p~ejuclices and wo~mclcd personal valiities. In  dealing with a 
crisis which is partly the consccpencc of mistakcs in the past, 
it was inlpossible absolutely to avoid doing this. But to those 
@- wl~o may be aficcted by my criticisms, and to all, 1 s o ~ ~ l d  <* 
thus appcal, using the words of the greatcst of English writers i 
Who is hcre so base that would he  a l~ondsman? If any, 
spcak ; for him hnvc I offcndecl. Who is Ilere so rude that 
wo~~lcl not bc a Briton ? IF any, speak; for him llav 
offended. Who is here so vile that will not love his 
If any, spcak ; for him h a x  I offentletl. I pause lor 
I 
C O N T E N T S .  
CIIAI'TER 111. 
TIIE I?II:ST CONNECTION I I E ' ~ U ~ E E N  ENCLANII A N D  I IEIL~T . 20 
CIIAPTER V, 
0 
CI-IAPTER VI. 
RUSSIA'S LAST MOVE AND ENGLAND'S REPLY , . 9s 
CIIAI'TER IS. 
l'lrn ~\n!drl:s ox nour SIDES . . . . 
CIIAPTER S. 
Russrn's A w m c  ON PANJ-DEII, A N D  1'1,s NOTIVE 
THE 
RUSSO-AFGI-IAN OUESTION. 'Y 
CHAPTER I. 
AFGHANIS'I'AN, the land of the Afghdns, is the borderland, 
the frontier bulwark, of the empire of the Mogols, as that 
empire was constituted when the earlier princes of that 
race ruled I n c h  I t  is bordered on the east by thc Panjdb, 
on tlie south by Balilchistin, 011 the \vest by Persian 
K1~or:lsLn and the desert of Eaksu, on tlie north and 
north-west by a line drawn fi.om Snrnkhs, just above Iiobnt- 
Abdullah Iihin and Andkhoi, to Khoja Snleh on tlie Oxus, 
nncl from the latter to a point on ils tributary h e  I<oktcl~a, 
beyond Fnizkbbd. Speaking roughly, the terrilory p a y  be 
' divided into five distinct parts ; to the north-east, is 
I<dbulist:in or jfgl-iAnis~An pro'per, the country of ~vhich 
I<dbul is the capital, betwcen the Hindu Kush to its north 
and Ghazni and the SaGd Koh to its south, and from the 
, diaibar Pass to the Koh-i-Bnba; to the north of that 
niain, sloping to the Oxus nncl its tributary, is Bndnkslinn, 
wit; its dependent district or Vnlthan, from tlie Snrikul 
on the east to the junction of the Koktcha river with tlie 
Oxus, the latter forming the northern boundary of this 
10 T h  X ?/SSO-A fghm Q~~c~tiqu.  ,- 
-- - -- 
ATglilin provincc tllrougll its entire estcnt; lo lhc west of 
Bndnltshnn, Afgliin 'I'urkist:in, comprising llie districts mf. 
Kunduz, liliulm, and Ualkh; fur~licr wcst\vnrd still, t hc  
districts of Akshn, Scripul, Maimen6, Silibbcrjun, and And- 
klioi, the latter of which i:; the cstrenlc Afg1i:in fsonticr 
possession to the north-west ; to the wcst arid south-wcst, 
Khordsbn or Znbulistdn, comprising Herit, tlie land of thc 
upper AllirgIiAb, Cdrdistdn, t l ~ c  I-Iazbreh moul~tnin lands, 
the Innds watered by tlic Helniund nncl the desert of 
Sihtdn. The natural bonndnry to the north is the ningni- 
ficcnt range of the Hindu ICusli, sloping northmnrds 
Lo\vnscIs the Oxos, which, in n inilit:~ry sense, forms its 
ditch. Separntccl from the Hinclu I<LIS~ by tlie famous 
Bnmih Pnss, but continuing its course westwq& rises the 
cver snowbearing Koh-i-Baba, spouting irom its southern 
slopcs the water which forms the Helin~~ncl, which runs a 
course of about four hundred niiles to the south-west. TO 
this lofty rangc are linked on likewise, Lo the westwnrd, 
two pardlel ranges, the Snfdcl Koh and tlie Siah-Kohl 
which enibrnce the valley of the Heri-rfid. The first of 
these is equally well Icno\\-n as the Pnropamisan range. 
Between 1ler:it and I<dbul, rmining soutl~nnrds as far as 
Lhc Argnnddb, n tributnsy of the Hclmund, the lofty peaks 
and chains of the Sinh-Koh, separnted iron1 cnch olher by 
slrenlns issuing froin its southern slopes, form the unex- 
plored coitntry of the IlazCLreh. To the east, running ' 
almost directly north and south, is tlie great Sulaiindn range, 
almost at  right angles with the Snf;.'d Koh, which strikes 
off froin it westward nt a point below I<dbiil. This 
Sulaimdn range, which reaches as far as Balilchistdn, f o r k  
a natural boundary between India nnd Persia. The stony, 
barren nature of tlie country as the ir~ountain slopes tocthe 
latter, affords n striking contrast to the richness and 
fertility of the \dleys on the Peslia\mr side. It is through 
- -  - - -~ 
this range that the ILibul river, forcing its way, has formed 
t% famous IChaibar Pass, the pass which forms the ro:id 
of communication be~ween 1Lll)uI 2nd thc Indian frontier. 
* I t  offers liltcwise n mode of communication betwccn 
Eastcrn Afghhis~dn and Sindh by nienns of the Gomal 
Pass. Ectwcen Lhese two grcat ranges, the Sulnimin and 
the Paropamisan range, which alnlost inclose in a right 
angle the high lands of Afghdnistin proper, thcrc run in a 
dingonal direction, from the north-east to the south-west, 
several distinct mountain ranges, amongst which those 
which rise to the east of Kandnhar are the most con. 
' siderable. T o  these natural uprisings to the north-east, 
the depressions to the south-west form a complete con- 
trast. I-Icr6, at a height of about 1,350 feet :ibovc the sca, 
is to be found the I-Ianlun or SGstnn lake, from tcn to 
thirty miles broad, and more than eighty lnilcs long, 
surrounded by deserts, but showing many traces of former 
ivealth and cukivation. Of the rivers, it may briefly be 
said that the largest, the I-Iclmund, aftcr running, as I hnvc 
stated, a course of 400 miles, empties itsclf into the Scistan 
lake, which reccives also the waters of the Aclrasl<an from 
thc north, and of the Farrah-rud from the east. The  princi- 
pal contributaries of the I-Ielmuncl are, the AlgAnddb, \\lhich 
rises in 01112 of the ranges between Icdbul and Kandahar, 
and flows in n south-westerly direction, and the Dori. The 
Kdbul rivcr pierces the mountains between Jellalabad and 
l'eshdwar to increasc the waters of the Indus. 
The climate partakes the character of the country. The 
extreme cold of the high ranges runs pnrnllel with the ex- 
h 
trenle heat of the valleys. There prevails in many parts 
likewise a mediunl climate, extremely pleasant, and very 
mdch resembling that of the highlands of South Africa. 
The country is rich in natural products. Iron and lead 
abound in all the mountain ranges, especially in the slopes 
ml~ich enclose the valley of the Heri-rud : there, too, are- 
to be found in abundance the willow, the poplar, -%& 
olive, maize, ricc, saltpetre, and every variety of fruit. 
The fertility of that valley has caused the city which is ..* 
its emporium to be styled the granary and garden of 
Central Asia. " \ire ascencled," wrote Arthur Conolly 
from Herit, in 183 I, " by one hundred and forty steps to 
the top of the highest minarct, and thence looked down 
upon the city, and the rich gardens and vineyards round 
and beyond it-a scene so varied and beautiful that I can 
imnfiine nothing like it, except, perhaps, in Ital'y." But, 
though the valley of the Heri-rud is the most fcrlile, it is 
not the only spot in  Afghanistan favoured by nature. 
Vegetable products abound everywhere. Appks, apricots, 
figs, plums, and gmpes are plentiful all over the country. 
The tobacco of Kandahar is famous. In the slopes in its 
vicinity coal, and more recently gold, have been dis- 
covered. Hemp, cotton, rhubarb, the .castor-oil plant, 
orange trees, citrons, maize, roses, tulips, are likewise 
abundant. 
To this brief outline of the couritry and its productions 
I mu[-  add a few lines regarding its people. The Afghdns, 
in this respect resembling the children of Israel, from whom 
they claim, though it is considered without sufficient 
Icason, direct descent, are an aggregation of many distinct 
r tribes, each of \vhich. possesses its own chief, Western 
Afgh5nisldn is the headquarters of the Duranis-to which 
the family of the reigning Amir belongs-and the Ghilzais, 
the most numerous of all the tribes. To  the east are thc 
Berduranis, counting amongst them the Uussufmis, w ~ o  
have come niostly in contact with thc Uritish. Eetween 
these two principal divisions are smaller tribes, each Gith 
its own laws and its own clinracterislics. I t  is calcihted 
~ h n t  whilst the population of IGibulistin or Eastern 
Afghinistdn numbers ~oo ,ooo ;  that of Scistdn 280,000; 
of'&mduz 400,oo ; of Kh61n1 300,000 ; of Balk11 and 
the city which 11as supplanted it, Takhtnplil, 64,000 ; of  
&' Andkhoi and Shibberjan 60,000 ; of Aksha ~ o , o o o  ; of 
Maimend ~oo,ooo ; of Badakshan and Vakhan 300,000 ; 
that of the valley of the Heri-rud amounts to r,r7o,ooo. 
I t  is worthy to be noted that the vast majority of thcse last 
are either pure Tadschiclts (aboriginal inhabitants) or men of 
miscd Persian and Turki blood. Uut there are, likewise, 
the men of HazAreh, numbering nearly 200,000, who are 
distinctly of Turanian origin ; and the IG~zilbdshis, pure 
Persians by descent, who number some Go,ooo. These 
constitute the Muhan~n~aclan population, and if we add to 
them 600,oog Hindus and Jfits from Indin, who consti- 
stute the mnin industrial portion of the community, and a 
sprinkling of Armenians who bclong to thc same category, 
v e  shall ol~tain a very hir  estimate of the actual number of 
the inhabitants. . 
The estimates regalding their character do  not always 
agree. Mountstuart Elphinstone, whose insight into 
Asiatic character was remarkable, k s  probably right when 
he pronounced the Afghdn to be a. lover of libcrty, bmve, 
devoted to his family, true to his friends, but envious, 
avaricious, obstinnte, and merciless. The best of all the 
tribes arc the Duranis and Ghilznis. Originally shepherds, 
~ p a s t ~ ~ r i n g  vast flocks in their native hills and valleys, these 
have preserved to a great extent their patriarchal custon~s. 
But however calm and stolid they may be ordinarily, it is a 
iact that they too, when roused, display to the full the 
wost qualities of the national character. 
Of all the provinces acknowledging the rule of the 
Xinibof Rabul Herit is the richest and most fertile. In- 
portant as is the part which it has already played in 
Central-Asizn history, the future which is before it is more 
imporlnnt still. I n  this pear, or in the years immediately 
following this peal; thc city of I-Icr:It will he consLitq[ecl ' 
e i ~ l ~ e r  L11c strong barrier which will stop Lhe appronch of 
Rnssiil towards India ; or it will bccome the gatc through 
which thc Russian army, preceded by holdes of Turkolnan 
cavalry, will attempt to follow in the steps of Alcxanclcr the 
Grcnt, of Cbcngiz Khbn, of Taimdr, of Nadir Slldll, and 
of Ahmad ShAh. To Hcr:it, then, I propose LO devote n 
scparnte cllaptcr. 
CHAPTER 1T. 
THE IChanate of which thc city of Herdt is the capiial, 
. ,
forniccl from wcst to cnst like n n.edgc, strctclics from tllc 
slopcs of {IC Paropnmisan range to the marshy lake of 
SEistnn ; on the west it is bounded by Pcrsivn I<hor;is:in; on 
thc cast and south-east by thc provincc of Kandahar and 
thc Siah-Itoh. .Iklnecn the s p r s  of that mountain and of 
thc Pnro~)amisus, and even morc to thc north, thc I-Icri-rlicl, 
which flows iirst west\vnrd and takcs nftemards n northerly 
clircction, watcrs n tableland which, fertile bcyoncl fcrtilily 
even as  it is knovn in the East, conslitutes an oasis sur- 
rounded by stony riclgcs, sandy wastes and by stcppes. 
l'his favoured district covers an arcn of 120,000 square 
miles, and supports ncnrly n million and n linlf of inhabi- 
- tants. I n  thc nortl~crn portion d ~ c l l  the I<azilbashis, 
Sliinhs in rcligion and Persian in origin; thc Aimnks, 
S~inis in faith and the descendnnts of ~ h c  Iraninn Tnd- 
schicks ; and thc Haz4rchs, n Turaninn mcc, spenBing the 
'1Nrlti Inngungc and Shialis by religion, klorc to the south 
the l m q d m r e  allnost all Tadshicks, with n sprinkling of 
AfLJidns, of T~ukornnns, and of Hindds. 
The cily n.hich gives its name to this fertilc region lies' 
four miles north of n point of the Heri-&I, \rlicre that river 
is spnnncd by n bridge with twenty-six arches. I t  is a b o ~ ~ t  
420 nlilcs to the mcst of thc Afghlin capital, KAbul, about 
2 0 0  south-east of Meslicd, and 20s rides south-cast by 
south of Sardihs. It forms a kind of irregular pamllclo- 
grmn ~urrounclccl by n thick mud wall from twelvc to 
cightccn fect high, backed by n brick wall ten feet 
high and providcd with thirty Lowrs iund livc well- 
fvrtificd gatcs. Her i t  has greatly fallen from Lhc high 
position it held when it was described as the Pcarl of Lhe 
\\'orld.* Thc ruins in  its vicinity tcstify to its fo rmr  
greatness. I'rom that position it fell, partly perhaps in 
consequence of thc rivalrjr of nleslicd, supported by the 
\vealth and influence of Persia, b u ~  mainly because of the 
constant \KITS and thc long-continucrl oppression which in 
thc course of n hundred and filly ycars have caused the 
dccrcase of the population from a hundrcd thousand to a 
littlc IIICI~C than onc third of that number. ~eriit,.'how- 
cver, Llie capital of thc fcrtilc oasis \ v h  covers Lhe 
approaches to lntlia, tlic ccntrc point for the caravan routes 
of Ccntral Asin, must crc long rcsumc licr lost position. 
Again will slit bccomc, \\:hcthcr undcr English auspices or 
under the auspiccs of Russia, tlic granary and girden of 
Ccntml Asia. The  crucial women1 has nonr arrivcd to 
dccidc wlietlicr hcr splendid resources will be used for the 
invasion of India by Russia, or for the defence of India . ,- 
against that aggressive power. 
A glance at the past history of Hefit wit11 be sufficient - 
to prove the vitnl importance of this qoestion. The Mog01 
rulcrs who preceded Lhc British in the occnpation of Ingia 
d\vays recognised thc necessity of guarding in their own 
lmnds the key of that portal. When in the decny of their 
e q i r e  they lost that key, two invasions from the north 
speedily followed. T h e  invaders destroyed and retired, 
but the clestruction they effected so weakcned the  hfogol 
dynasty that it fell an easy prey to the first invader fi.0111 
beyond thc seas. 
But it was not the Mogols alone who recognized the 
importance of HerCit as the outlying bulmarlc of Indin. 
With one solitary exception, that of Bdbcr-to be presently 
noticcd- every invader from thc north has deemed the 
conquest of .HerClt as the first necessary preliminary to nn 
attack upon India. So thought Alexander thc Grcnt 
(327 B.c.) ; SO thought Chengiz K h i n  (1219-za AD.) ; so 
thought Tainylr (1381 AD.). I n  thc time of Edbcr indeed 
H e l i t  was thc s h ~ ~ ~ t l c c o c k  betwecn the Pcrsians and thc 
Uzbeks, and l3;iber, \\rho possessed ICtbul, solvcd LIE clies- 
Lion whilst thcy were fighting by cutting into the Her6t line 
. a t  Kandahar (15%~-ZG AD.). At a later period, 1731, t11c 
conqueror of Persia, the KhorasClni Nadir Shfih, did not 
dare to drcnnl cven of the conqucst of India until he had 
conque~ed both I-lerit and Kandahar. H e  did not grudge 
the four months \vhich he found necessary to take the first, 
nor the ~!lirken rcquired to subdue  he opposition of the 
sccond. His successor in thc career of conquest, Alimad 
Sh:ih, a Durnni Afghdn, follo\vccl the samc lines (1747-61); 
.and, by his success, crushcd thc vitality out of thc ruling 
dynasty of India. An AfghAn, cherishing the snowclad 
, hills of his native country, he conquered, plundcrccl, and 
retired. Under sinliliar circun~stances, n European invader, 
who*to gain a similar result should have travcrscd sandy 
deserts and crossed rocky steppes, would conquer-and 
rcmailf ! 
The conqucst of Ddlhi by Ahmad Shih,  May 1757 ; his 
C 
I S  TILL' RIISSO-A fghw Q U C S ~ ~ L I M .  
or thc Impct'inl city thc year follo\ving 
and the cro\~ning victory o f  P;hipat (January 1761) &alt 
tllc rciglling clyllasty of I~lclin a blo\v under \vhich it rccled 
and from \~hich it  nevcr recovered. T h e  vcry same year 
\yllicIi sonr the 6rst conqwst  of Dilili witnessed likewise, 
on plain of I'lasscy, n victory which plantcd Lhc British 
firmly in Gcngnl. \\%ilst Ahmad Slidll rctircd, satiated 
\\.it11 slaughter and with plunder, the 1:ritish rcmnined a n d  
pushcd iorxwcl. The  ediEcc o i  klogol dominion was 
rotten to Lhc core. I t  fell, less Tronl the ciiorts of thc  
British than from the decay which Iiad sapped its founda- 
tions. Until 1857-S Inclia hacl ncwr, in the true sense of 
thc tcrnl, becn conquered by the ~ r i t i s h .  The  nntivcs of  
Indin \yho prefcrrcd the yule of law to the rrle of anarchy 
and spolintion, had ionght urider the British banner for the 
principles whicll sccured to tliem the possession of their 
own lands, the safety of their wivcs and children. Fighting 
on tlicsc li~ics,--the figlit nlniost invnrkl~ly. forced upon 
~hcm--tile British advancccl steadily till t h y  rcnched ~ h c  
fronticr linc of thc Sutlcj. 'l'he country beyond that frontier 
linc, tlic country of thc Five Rivers, Lhc Pnnjib, was rulccl 
at tlic tirnc: by onc of tlie most astute sovereigns who has 
cwr sat upon an eastern tlironc. But in  1836-7 Ronjit 
Singh was growing old. I n  thc mountninous country 
beyond his northern frontier Dost Muha~nnlnd, n young 
ruler of the Barockzyc clan of  the Dnrilni tribe, was rising 
into noticc in tlic castem world. Herht, which hnd not 
bccn heard of since Ahmad ShAh had sacked it, on the 
clcatl~ of Nadir Sliih, in r1/49,  but which during tlie long 
0 period had been declining under the rnisrr~lc and oppres- 
sion of its foreign masters, came once lnorc to b e  talkccl 
about. A Prrsiim army, it was runloured throughot~t the 
bazaal-s of India and Central Asia, was marching against 
the capital of the fcrtilc country mlcred  by the Hcri-rlid, 
anU with that army, controlling its movements and inslruct- 
ing its soldiers, marched 1iltcn.ise Inany Russian officers and 
' somc hundrccls of Russian soldiers. l'he rumour spread- 
ing onwards rcnched thc Govcrnor-Gencml of India in 
Cnlcuttn : it m s  pnsscd on to thc Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs in T,ondon. l'hat nlinister recogniacd a t  a glance 
all its significance, all its importance. Thc  nnl-uc of thnt 
ministcr was Lord Palmerston ! 
CHAPTER 111. 
THE keen vision of Lord Palmerston had detected, I 
have said, at  a glance, all the significance, all the 
importance of the news that a Persian army, guided and 
controlled by Russian officers, was marching on Herdt; he 
had recognized that, should that march be suwessf~~l, Hertit 
would become a Pcrsian Herkt controlled by Russia. The 
armed intrigue must be met and baffled at all hazards. 
The issues which were so quickly discerned by Lord 
Pdmerston in London \\,ere not, unforhnately, so clear 
to the ~ i s ion  oi  the: Governor-Gcneral of India and his 
Council. The most obvious method to accomplish the 
desired end would have been to lend efficient support to 
the ruler of Afglidnistdn. It was certain that Dost 
h4ulianimad desirccl as little as Lord Palmerston the 
occupation of the second city of his dominions by a Russo- 
Persian army. 
That there esistcd rlificillties in the way of a course so 
pointed is true. The greatest of these difficulties lay in 
the fact that whilst Dovt hl~~liammad exercised supreme 
authority in Krlbulistdn, or eastern1 Aiglidnistdn, his infln%nce 
in Kandahar and K e d t  was little more than nominal. I n  
the former his brothers held sway, and his brothers, jealous 
of his authority, were very much  dispose^ to accefi the 
SkQh of Persia as their suzcrain : thcy hnd even made 
advances to Russia. 
Ti 
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In  Herdt tlic position was still lcss favourable. There 
ruhd Prince ICLinl~m, son of the ex-Shill of Afghhistbn, 
hlahnlud Shili, a monster of wickedness and debaucl~cry, 
r virtually as nn independent prince. He, too, disliked the 
idea of being conquered by Persia ; but he hated still more 
the prospect of being relieved by Dost hfuhnmmad, for he 
had murdered the eldesl: brother of that chief, and eflicient 
aid from such n sourcc would nlcan death to himself. 
Such, thcn, was the position, .as it presented itself in 
1837, to thc Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, 
and his advisers. 11 niust be admitted that is was beset 
mith difficulties; for efficient aid to the ruler of ICiibul, an 
aid sufficient to enable him to march to the relief of Herdt, 
would tlirowpt once that city into thc hands of Persia, 
For it was clear that Prince IGimran would make t e r m  
with the Persians rather than ~ L l b ~ i t  to Dost Muhalnmad. 
Lord Auckland despatched at  that timc an embassy to 
Dost Muhainm,ql, on, what mas termed, a co~nmercial 
mission. The chief member of this embassy was 
Captain Alexander Burnes, an officer of the Bombay army, 
posscssing rarc ability, n colloq~~ial knowledge of the 
Ianguagcs of Central Asia, and a, thorough acquaintance, 
acquired by travelling aIone drcssed as a, native in the 
countries beyond the Osus, mith the habits and modes of 
thought of the children of the soil. Hurlies reached I<ibul 
thc 20th of September, 1837, and was cxtre~ncly well 
reccived by the Amir. He found him, however, more 
intent upon the recovery of Peshdwar, which had been 
filched fro111 him some years before by Ranjit Singh, than 
on*the rccovery of E-Ier5t. Brlrnes, whilst holding out to 
him no hope that his views moulcl be regarded mith favour, 
forlhrded repdrts of his interviews with the Amir to the 
Governor-General. Before he could receive a reply mother 
agent appeared llDOn the field. 
Tllis nc\v ngcnt was a young Russian ofliccr nanied 
Vil;tevic[l. Viktevich was n Lithuminn, n,lio, exiled f o r ~ h i s  
sllarc in a l>olish Conspiracjr, lind spcnL his time in travel 
in Cerltrnl Asia, had gained Lhe pardon of his Governmcnl, c 
and \vho wns now enlployed to undertalte a secret mission 
to l<.ibul. T h c  objecl of his mission was to  counler,2ct 
and render nugatory the influence of Burnes. 
At tlle first it appeared as though the young Lithuanian 
would fail. Dost Muhammad, still hopeful of a favourable 
rcply from India, scarcely noticed him. But whcn, o n  the 
~ 1 s t  February, a reply came from the Governor-General ' 
intininling courteously but plainly, that whilst lie was ready 
to treat with the Aniir on niatters affecting the lJersian cx- 
pcdition, hc would not aid him to recover$esh81vnr, he  
changed his tone. Turning to the Russian agent, the Amir 
obtnincd from him all tlie promiscs hc desired. I n  rcturn 
Viktevich oblnincd his sanction to concludc an alliance 
betn.ecn tlic l<nndaliar brothers of thc Aplir and Persia. 
On the zGth April, Burnes, uttcrly hopeless of success, 
turncd his back on Kibul. T h e  failr~re of his endeavour 
to mnke a friend and ally of the then n'cr f i z &  ruler of 
Afglidnistin matlc I~orcl Palmerston resolvc to supplant 
him by z sovereign who should be nothing clse in his 
foreign policy than a tool and agent of thc Illritisli. Under  
his instructions, thcn, Lord Auckland brorlght n royal 
member of the family of ShAh A h m d ,  the ex-king Shiih 
Shuja, from his enforced esile a t  LudiQnd, and dircctcd the 
assenlbly of a considerable army to replace him on  the 
thronc of Kdbnl. 
before the arnly could bc  fully assembled, the o b e c t  
which Lord Palmerston had most a1 licart had beell 
accomplished in an unforcscen and  uncx$&ed mdlncr. 
A YolW Englishman, Eldrecl Pottinger, had entered 
the Bo~ubay Artillery in the year 1827. Active, illdus- 
-- 
trious, eager to gain kno\vledgc and quick in acquiring 
it, .young I'ottinger had carly obtainccl n political staff 
appointment in Sindh under his uncle, Coloncl, afterwards 
1 Sir Henry, Pottingcr, Anxious Lo csplore the countries 
and to make himseif acquainted with thc habits and 
manncrs of the pcople belwcen the Indus and the Osus and 
beyond the Inttcrriver, Eldred obtained, in 1837, his uncle's 
px'mission to visit thosc lands as an independent travellcr. 
Tlisguising himself as a horsedenler from l<achh, young 
Pottinger crossed Llic Jndus and, travelling in a manner 
the lenst likely to atlract attention, tool; the road Lo 1Libul. 
From that capital he resolvcd to proceed to I-Ierdt, but, 
a\vare that in the disguise of a saintly cllnrnctcr his nation- 
ality would b: still less likely to be cliscovercd, he threw off 
thc garb of n horseclcnlcr and assumed that of n Snincl or 
Holy man. After many adventures, including a dangerous 
detention by a Hazireh chief nhich promised at  onc time 
to put a forcible,end to his wanderings, Pottinger rcaclled 
H e r i t  in safety. This was on the ~ S t h  August. H e  was 
still there wllen, n 1nont11 Inter, information reached the 
city that n IJersinn army was marching against it. On the  
arrival of this news the ruler, Prince ICirmran, was at  his 
wits' end. His prime ministcr and factotum, Ydr Muham- 
mad, sho\wl,  however, a resolution worthy of the occasion. 
Not  only did he announce his deternlination to defend the 
city to the last, but he took all the means of which h e  
was master to strengtl~en its defences and to increasc the 
garrison. 
Never was a danger more real. T h c  Russian minister 
at"l'ehernn, Count Simonitch, had not only advanced fifty 
thousand tomaunns to thc Shhh, but had promised that 
potentate tllatif he would take HerAt the balance of the 
debt due by Persia to Russia should be remitted. H e  
went even fi~rther. H e  gave him, to aid in the attack; a 
24 ~ / l ~  X l r s s o - A f g h  Qlrcstiou. , 
I<ussinn gcncml, General Barolski; encouraged him to 
crlll,loy Genel.aI Snmson, a Russian in the Persian service ; 
n n t l ,  ,,-it]l tllat gcncral, two thousand Russian soldicrs \\rho, 
to E ;~ \ . c  appearances, were ollicially described as deserters q 
fro111 tllc Russian arlny ! 
~ ~ ' 0 1 1  ]<Idled Poltinger the information that a Pcrsinn 
anuy so c o ~ ~ l ~ l ~ n n d e d  and so assisted was advancing against 
JIer;it I~sotluced an electric effect. A British officer, pos- 
sessing skill, energy, daring, and that self-reliant chmacter 
the disl,ln). of which by the sons of Great Britain has made 
t l~c  llritisln eunpire, he fell that the time for disguise had 
I':~~s"d, that Ile must avow himself and take his part in the 
c l c r c l l l ~ ~  of the threatened city. H e  did avow himself to 
thc minister, nns well received, \\.as presentgd to P h c e  
K;[nlran, and was authorized by both to assist in the 
dclence. 
l'hc :ic;e began the zznd November follo\ving. I t  
13stt.d Inore than nine ~nonths-till the 8)h of September, 
I S ~ S .  Of that siege Eldred l'ottinger, tlw only English- 
man within the walls of the city, was the hero. True 
it was that the earthwork defences were cru~nbling and 
in disrepair : true, that the parapets were so rottcn that 
t l q  fcll like timber beforc the fire of the light guns of 
rhc lmicgers : true, that the Russian allies of thc Persians, 
furnisl~ed wit11 the modern appliances of Europe, inspired 
thc garrison with the fear that they were mining under the 
walls. This was all true, but the indomitable English~nan 
was l ~ ~ e n t  ever to repair bl.eaches, to lead a rallyillg 
~ ) x t y ,  to m e t  mine wi1h countermine. During the siege 
he, at the request of Prince ICBmran, visited the PersFan 
camp with proposals for accon~modation. These, 110\17- 
e\'cr, were refilsed, and the attack reconnuenced Elore 
furiously than before. But the steadlast purpose of the 
P-rison was not to be shaken : they repaired every l ~ ~ e ~ ~ l ~  
and repulsed cvery assault. On  the rgtli April, Major 
D'Arcy 'l'odcl, an oflicer of the Bengal Artillery, who liad 
been Tor many years employed in the Persian army and 
I liad won the rcspcct of all with whom Ile had come in 
contact, entered the city, under a flag of twce, wjth a 
liicssage from t l ~ c  Shih. H e  was tlic first Englishman 
who had ever appeared in HerCit wearing n Dritish 
unifornl, and his tight-fitting clothcs, contrasting with tlic 
loose garnients of the Asiatics, rouscd tlie most vivid 
curiosity. Major Todd came lo announce that tlie Shdi  
was ready to acccpt Hritish ~i~edint ion.  He returned with 
the message that Prince IGimrtui was equnlly agreeable 
t o  such a course. Not for n moment, ho\\~ever, did hos- 
tilities ceaje in consequence of that agreement. T h c  
siege wns conducted as vigorously as  before. Shortly ali-er- 
wards, ho\vcvcr, the Shill withdrew from his offer Lo acccpt 
tlie arbitration of Lhe British. 
Month follo~vecl month, and  thc Russo-Persian army 
still plied the city with shot and shcll. Every clay, ho\r- 
ever, brought fresh niiserp to the besieged. Food became 
very scarce; thc stench caused by the want of sewers or 
a n y  means of drainage almost unendurable ; in the nionth 
of May famine and pestilence stallced hand in hand through 
the  streets. Under the influence of these dread twin- 
sisters the defence bcgnu to flag, and the breaches re- 
mained unrepnired. Everything presaged a n  early and 
fatal termination of the siege. 
I t  is under such circumstances that a great lnnn is 
redly divine. I t  is not too much to say that a t  this con- 
'Juncture Eldred Pottinger became, in tlie eyes of the 
Herdtis, the object of their trust, their veneration, their 
every hope. 3 H e  was to them what Gordon was in 1854 to 
t h e  people ofI<liartoum. These feelings were specially mnni- 
fested on thc aqth Junc. On that day the besiegers made a 
~vcll-planned and vcry clctennined attack on four parts of 
L I E  city. At tlirce of tlicsc thcy wcre rcpulsecl. Gut at  
tlie fourth, they had almost carried tlie breach when tlie 
Vizier, Y;ir hluliamnied, a c c o m p ~ i i e d  by Pottinger rcached 0 
tlic spot. Y51. Muhammccl was a h a v e  man, bnl; he was 
c o ~ c d  by thc sight which met his gaze-the sight of the 
garrison giving way before tlicir adsnncing foe. H e  
urgecl tliem to rally, but h e  was too owrcomc hinlself to 
giw tllcni the csnniplc. Thcn was I'ottinger's oppor- 
tunity. H e  made a despairing appeal to thc Vizi'er, 
inspired him wit11 a portion of his own rcsolntion;  the^^, 
\ \4h his aid, Ile rc-fornicd thc now e n c o u r a p l  defenders 
nud forccd l m k  llle foc. 
'Thc month of July passed without any jenewal  o f  
activity on the part of thc besicgers. 011 the I rth of the 
following month tlie Shih receivcd in his camp a n  English 
officcr, Coloncl Stoddart, deputed to inform him that the 
continuance of tlic siege meant war with I$ngland. Little 
less than onc wont11 later tlie Persian amiy retired behind 
its own frontier ! 
Tlic conclusion that, bccnuse tlic Persians after a siege 
of tcn months' duration werc in the end repelled, IIercit 
\\as thcrcforc impreg~ial)lc, would be entirely fallacious. 
Eldrcd l'ottioger dclibcrately dcclared that Muhammed 
Shbh might havc taken tlie city by assault within twenty- 
fotlr hours after his appcaraiicc bcforc its \sails if his 
troops had bccn efficiently comniandcd. We may go 
f~irthcr and add-to use the language of tlic historian of 
the cvents of that period-the late Sir John Kaye-that 
but for the hcroism of the young Eonibay Artilleryma~F; 
Herbt would tundcr h e  actual circunistances have fallen ! 
With the raising of the siege of Rcrdt tllecnecessity (or 
Ellglisll il~terWlltion in the affairs of AfghBnist$n had dis- 
appeared. The object originnlly contemplated . by Lord 
Pnlnicrston had bcen accomplisliecl. Russia Iiad I-eccivcd 
n chcclc in h ~ r  cndcavour to use l'e~si:~ as n cnt's paw to 
filch away the nlost important of 311 the posi~ions covering 
w .India. If England, on the rctirenlcnt of the Persian 
army, had entered into an arrangement with Dost 
34uhammad, an arrangement for which he was then eager, 
the relations between India and the inountninous country 
which is nnturally its frontier redoubt, would have l~een 
scltlecl on a firm bnsis. But, unfortunalely, before the 
raising of the siege of I-Ierit had lrecomc Itnowli, Lorcl 
Aucklnnd had pledged liilnself to S h i h  Shuja, and it n.as 
dctermined to carry out the policy of substitnting for a 
ruler of doubtlul fidelity n prince who in all his forcign 
relntions m~uld  bc the tool of England. 
I t  is not necessary herc to do more than record the fnilurc 
of that unfortunate policy, After nearly four years of des- 
pcrate venture, it resulted in the restoration to suprenlc 
sway in ICdbul pf the prince whom we had expelled. 
Embittered as he naturnlly was against the 'people who 
had @q)elled him, Dost h4uhamn1ad returned to ICdbul 
\\tit11 a far higher idca of the resources of the I3ritish nation 
than he had held before his enforced esile. H e  had visited 
Calcuttaand seen their ships, their arsenals, their fortresses, 
and, thougl~ many years elapsed before h e  ,entered into 
friendly relations wih  his old enemies, he mas resolved 
from the first moment of his return to do nothing to tempt 
them to renew their attack upon himself. It is true that in 
the death-throes of the struggle for the Panjdb, he allowed 
one of his sons to lead a cavalry brigndc to assist the Sikhs 
i? the battle which consun~mated their overthrow ; but after 
the British frontier had been permanently ad \mced  beyond 
th? Indus, hmemained for a time quiescent. The renewed 
intrigues of Persia for the recovery of I-Ierdt forced him at 
last to renew friendly relations with his old enemy. 
I n  that year, 1854, his son Ghulam Haiclar visited 
l'csh:i\wr for that purposc. H e  \\.as met tlierc by the late 
Lord Lawrence, a t  the  time plain John Lawrence, Chief 
Commissioner of the Panj ib.  On that occxsion the 
famous agrcemcnt was signed in whicl~ the h n i r  of 
PIfgI1Bnist;in covenankd to be  the .f~icncl of the Sricncls, 
and the enemy of the  enemies of thc I-Ion"'". East Inclia 
Company." 
If we rcflcct for n moment. upon this most important 
agreement, we shall arrive a t  the inevitable conclusion that 
it nccomplished litlle Inore than the carrying of political 
relations back to thc point a t  which they \ \we  when Burnes 
visited Kbbul in 1837-8. It blotted out the intervening 
events. T h e  first Afghdn war hacl, in x word, lost for us 
eighteen years which might have well been ~ m p l o y e d  in 
cementing relations necessary for the safety of the British 
empire in India. 
Doubtless the political aspect which pron~pted the Amir 
r to send his son to Pcsh;har, had ninny po~nts  o i  si~nilarity 
wit11 the political aspect of 1837. O n  both occasiolis Herkt 
was threatenecl by the same Asiatic power, stirrcd up by the 
salne European po\wr. But  if the English had grown 
miser, so likemisc h c l  nos t  h.Iuhammad. E-Ic no longer 
talked of reco\wing Pesh:iwnr. H e  saw the full signifi- 
cance of the movement about I-IerAt, and he wantecl the 
support of the English to baffle it. 
I n  1854 England \\m at  war with Russia; that power 
therefore, only eserciscd a legitimate right when, the 
barriers of a n  independent Caucasus still existing, she 
incited Persia to renew hcr attempts upon the fortified ciCy 
which 11nd repulsed her in 1838. 
The incitations of Russia produced corresponding action 
on the part of Persin. She sent an army in the autumn of  . 
I 556 against Herit ,  a n d  that city, no longer defended by 
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an Eldred Pottinger, surrendered to her in the month of 
Octobcr of the same year. 
But Lord Pnlnlerston was Priine Minister of Englnncl ; 
and Lord I'almerston was firnlljr resolved that I'ersin should 
not hold the city, and with the city the province \ ~ h i c l ~  
would constitute n new base for an army hostile to British 
Icdia. Herht had, I have said, fallcn in Octobcr rSj6. 
On the 1st November, Lord Palmcrston declnsd war 
against Persia, and despatchcd an army to nttack her on 
her most vulnerablc side, in the Persian gulf. 
Ncver hns an expedition been better planned or better 
esecuted. Never certainly has energetic action obtained 
nlore promptly the desired result. U7ar was declared, I 
11ave said, t& 1st November, 1856. Peace was signed the 
4th March, 1857. In the interval, Persia had been dereated 
in two battles. By the terms of the peace she agreed to 
restore Herlit to the Afghbns ! 
Before the signature of the Peace, the British acting by 
the mouth of Mr. John Lawrence, had signed another 
ngrcelnent with the Amlr promising him a monthly allow- 
of Aro,ooo and arranging for thc pern~ancnt residence of 
n British agent-n native of India-at ICbbul. In  the 
course of the years immediately following, Dost Muha~l~-  
mad brought Western AfghLnistiin, including Herdt, more 
completely under his own personal sway. 
On his death, in 1863, a civil war ensued for the sncces- 
sion. That war lasted, with varying fortunes, for five years. 
I t  was only in January 1869, that the most capable of the 
sons of Dost IvIuhammad, Sher Ali, obtained over his last 
r&mining rival, the present Amir hbdul Rahmnn, a victory 
so crushing that from that moment all opposition ceascd, 
an8 AfghdnistAn with its borders as they are described in 
the first two pages of the first chnpter became united under 
one head. 
CHAPTER IV. 
THE PROCRl$iS O F  RUSSIA TOWARDS INDIA. 
IN 1854 Nicholas, Czar of all the Russins, struck his long 
]meditated blow for the possession of Constantinople. H e  
failed, and he died. His successor, Alesander II., maclc 
11eace with the t\vo great westci4n powers who had baffled 
his father, and announced oslentntiously t h q  it was his 
intention to devote hirnself to domestic reforms. As an 
carnest of his sincerity 11c nbolisl~ed serf don^. 
But whilst hoodwinked Europe waspraising thc sagacity, 
the pudcnce, nnd the moderalion of the young Czar, that 
astute prince was straining his empire to break down Lhe 
nlountain barrier \rhich barred his free accps to thc stcppcs 
of Central Asia. The  very year that witnessed the signa- 
:nre of the Pence of Paris (April 1556) saw him hurl an  
army of 150,ooo mcn against the passes of tlic Caucasus. 
Fiercely did thc heroic mountnincers resist. But numbers 
prevailed. At the end of three years the strongholds of 
the Caucasus had bcen storn~cd; the hero who had led 
the resistance, the illustrious Schan~yl, was a prisoner 
( G  September 1859)~ and the mountaineers, \\~ho had for 
so many years successfully defied Russia, had abkndoned 
their native fastnesses to seek refuge within the dominioEs 
of the Sultan. 
The  Caucasus conquered, Kussia, who for soine y!ars 
had been working her way across thc low undulating plains 
which lie between the Alatan rnngc and the Jasartes, made 
:~P~wgwss of Russin toaunt-& I~rdic~. 
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her spring across that river. The IChanate of IChokand, 
having a population of ~ h r e e  millions, was the first object 
of her attack. For the moment she spnrccl it to effect the 
* capture of the city of ' I ' c I I c I N I ~ ~ I ~ c I .  This caplurc brought 
her into collision n,ith thc troops of Rok11;Era-a collision 
which resulted in the clcfcnt of the i h i r  of that place and 
the occupation of the town of Turkistan, two hundred and 
twcnty miles from I<lio!tand. 
To  allay the apprehensions of England thc 12ussinn 
Priny Minister, Prince GortscIialioK, proceeded (Noveml,cr, 
18G4) to issue n ltincl of mnnilcsto. I n  h i s  ren~arkablc 
document the Pr ink justified the permanent occupation of 
the two t o w s  I havc.mcntionecl, on the plea that hos~ilities 
ngninst theq had been rcnclered necessary by L-lie predatory 
instincts of the populations bordering the Russian frontier. 
Hc proceeded, then, to imply, thou,nh lic was careful not 
to state absolutely, that the final point of Russian advance 
had bcen renclpi Russia," hc declared, " was now in 
the presence of n nlore solid and compact, lcss unsc~~lcd  
and better organized social state ; h i n g  for us  wi!h 
geographical precisio2 the limit up to n~hich we i n ~ ~ s t  
aclvancc, and at which KC must halt." 
The ink with which this manifesto was penncd was 
barcly dry, when Russia clelil~~rntely departed from Lhc 
pacific programme which it slcetchcd o:lt. Under the pre- 
tence that son~e of 11cr officers whom she had dispatcl~ecl 
to Bokhdm to negothtc, l i d  been ~ ~ n d d y  ?tained in that 
city, she rcnewecl her hostilities with the Amlr. Tasl~kend, 
an important town in the valley of the Chirchik, with a 
$oopulation of So,ooo souls, the grcnt emporium of Central 
Asia for cottcln and rice, some ninety miles from Khoknnd, 
fcl? before IRr troops (June 1865). Eut no sooner was 
she assured of this conquest than she again appearccl 
before Europe with protestalions ancl- excuses. Again did 
3 3 ?'/re Rum-Afp.hn~c Qc/cstimc, 
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slle decl.irc (Septcmbcr 1865) by thc voice and despatcllcs 
of the Prime Minister, that the Czar "had  no desire to 
acItI further to his dominions." Scarcely, again, was the 
ink o l  the despatch dry, when (186G) lhc troops of the 
Czar lnncle a spring upon and captured llie wallcd town of 
Khojerld, tlie key of the Jnsartes, seventy miles from 
IJtokand, like 'l'ashkend, a great rnanuhctory of cotton 
goods, and possessing a population of 20,000. Bcforc 
Europe could learn even of this ncw conquest h s s i a n  
troops lind overrun the provincc of Kllolzand, lrnown also 
as Fcrylinnn, Ey n ukasc dntcd July 1867 tlie Czar 
formally nntlcscd one Inlf of this rich and fertile province 
with an area of more than 2S,ooo square milcs to the 
Russi:\n cnipire. 'The remaining half he conferred for the 
nioment, and only for the moment, upon a native chieftain, 
to be hcld under thc suzerainty of the Russian crown. 
The time 11.~1 now arrivcd when Russia conccived it 
necessary to tiinke a still more impor ta~ t  step. Cok- 
llrira had bccn snubbcd and humiliated, but in the n~incls 
of tlic populations of Central Asia the influence of the 
po\vcrful Amir of that independent state was still prc- 
ponderant. It  \\.as necessary to cause that influence 
visibly to diminish. I t  is always cnsy to pick a quanel.  
Gcncral I<aufnm, the new military cornnlander in Central 
Asia, proceeded then to establish n fortif ed post in clangcr- 
. ous contiguity to the fanlous city of Sarnarlchand, a hun- 
drcd and thirty miles to the east of the capital. T h e  
insult was resented and war ensued. T o  a war between 
forccs so unequally matched there could be but olle result. 
Russia occupied and annexed Snmarkhand. I t  was tlfc 
most important conquest she had till then acliieved. I t s  
immediate result wns to force the most venfiated &ieP of  
Ccntrnl Asia, the Amir of Bokll:tra, to become a tributary 
of the Czar ! 
These events happencd in ISGS. I was in  India at the 
I timc, and I can wcll recollect tlic profound impression 
whicli the capturc and annexation of the famous city of 
Samarkhand produced in the bazaars of that country. 
The I;me of Samarkha~~cl had spread ovcr all Asia. I n  
thc imaginations of it's several populations it was the I sccond city of tlie world, scarcely inferior, iT at all inferior, 
to the R h - t h c  Constantinoplc-of the Caliph of the 
h1uhammadan faith. And now Snmarkhand had fallen ! 
What wonder if thc mind of the untrnvellcd Oriental could 
scarcely grasp thc greatness of the pcoplc who had cap- 
tured it ! 
The reader will do wcll to bcar in nlind that thc annesa- 
tion of Sainnrkhand mas almost synchronous with the ter- 
mination of the five years' civil war in AfglirinistAn. 
During that civil war the relations between India and its 
mounlainous borderland had not improved. For whilst 
thc Viceroy of IncGa, Sir John Lawrence, had cncleavourccl 
to maintain a rigid i~nparliality betwecn the contending 
rivals, tlie victor, Shcr Ali, loudly complnincd of tlie little 
friendliness which had bcen clisplayed towards himsclL 
\Vhilst thcn the year which witnessed Slier Ali solc rulcr of 
Afghbnistrin found the relations between that country and 
13ritish India extremely st~ainecl, it saw Russia plantcd on 
the castern Oxus and its tributm.ics, within striking distance 
of the north-eastern portion of the dominions of the ruler 
of ICdbul. 
I t  mould appear thnt this near approach of Kussin 
attracted the attention of the Bri~ish Government. For- 
gettiifg that Russia is really an Asiatic powel; and thnt 
, 
those who deal with her in diplomacy sl~ould always bear 
in niintl that deczption, or excellence in the art of dccciv- 
ing, is regarded as the chicfcst virtue in  an Asiatic politi- 
cian, Lord Clarendon, enrly in 1869, suggested to Princc 
D 
34 Thc Xzmo-Afghraa Questiort. . 
Gortschalioff the desirability of constituting Afghrinist:ln n 
ncutml zonc. T h e  astule Chancellor of the Russian 
cmpire caught the idea with en~l~usinsm. He  hasteried Lo 
declare that his mastcr the Czar, ( ' looks @on A&/rhishin 
, 
ns coru)fefe(y orr ls id t  tAe s p h e r e  7c1it'hin whirh h k s s i n  NlOy k 
nrllcd ujolr to txo-cise her ~@~ILWCC."  l\~Ieanwllile, howcvcr, 
the Govcrnmcnt of India had objected, and very properly 
objected, to Lord Clnrendon's proposal. Afghhistdn, said 
the Governor-General in so many words, can .never be n 
ncutrnl zone for India-: it is bound to Indin geographi- 
cnlly and politically, and must continue so to be hound. 
And in that light it is necessary that Afghdnisldn s110~1ld be 
rcgnrdcd by Russia ! 
Upon this question Lhe negocialions with Russia were 
prolonged for two years, the Biissinn ~overr?mcnt continu- 
ing to protest throughout that period that '( Russia had no 
frirthcr intention of going south" and that "estension of 
territory was extension of wenkncss." Ultinlately it was 
decided by the two Powcrs that the bo~u~dary of i~fgllinis- 
t in should be fixed, and it was agreed that a11 the co~mtrics 
in the cffcctivc possession of Shcr Ali, and those which 
hnd previously nckno\\~lcdgcd tllc rule of Dost l\4uhnmnlad, 
sliould be comprised within that boundnry. I t  was further 
nrrangcd that tllc meinornndn and pnpcrs on this subject 
shoulcl bc submitted to General ICaufil~an, as thc person 
nearest the spot capable of judging thc question, in order 
that he might report to the Russian Government what 
were the actual boundaries. Thc matter drifted on. 
General Kaufiunn sent no report. Finnlly, on Octobes, 17, 
1872, Lord Granville wrote a dispatch Lo Lord August~is 
Loftus, for conmunication to the Russian Government, in 
which he stntcd that the British Goverru~lent, not Jlnving 
received any inrormation from Rnssia, had been obligcd 
to define the frontier in  the inode they considered most 
just. Lord Granville the11 mnrkcd out the scvcral lincs of 
dcmarcalion ns I Iinve slated thcm in thc first chnpter. 
'J'his fronticr nrns acccptcd by Russia, and thc acccptancc 
notificcl by Prince Gortscl~alioff in dispatches datcd the 
71h (19th) Deccnlbel; 1872, and the 19th ( ~ 1 s t )  January, 
, 1873. Mean\vhilc Russia had becn perlina.ceously 
maturing the plans mhich she had long nursed with respect 
to 1Chiva. T o  enablc the render to undcrslnncl this suhjcct 
thoroughly I must digrcss for i~ ~noment from thc conl.in- 
uous course of the story. 
Even so far back as the time of Peter tlie Great, Kliivn 
had been an object of Bussinn greed. The clisastrom fale 
llo~vever, wliich atlenclcd an cspcdilion, clcspatclicd in 1716 
by that famous m o n x d i  had for long aclccl as n clcterrcnt. 
Threc nttcrn$s to csplnrc were subscc~uently mnclc, prior 
to the ascension oS thc Empcror l'aul ; ~ l i c  first by n simple 
ngcnt in 1731 ; thc scconcl by a survcyor ten ycnrs Ialcr; 
and thc third by an  oculist fnvourccl by the Empress 
Catherine, nn~ned%lnnkcnagnl, i n  r 793. Elanltcnagnl on his 
return wrote n narrative of his trawls, in nhich he paintccl 
in  terms so glowing tlie wcnlth of Khiva. and its importance 
as n commcrcinI centre that it inflamed the Emperor Paul, 
--who though murdered because his murclcrers called hiin 
mad, hncl ever a nlethocl in his maclncss-to re-open tho 
iclen so long held in nbcynncc. I-Ic actually despn~cl~ccl 
Count Orloll' at the head of a considcrxble forcc in 1301 
Lo carry out his vicws. Orlolf h;id rcnchccl Irgiz, now 
known as Fort Uralsk, whcn Ilc I~card of the nssnssination 
of his mastcr. He returned, and during the vast Europcan 
co~lylicntions which follo\~ecl thc ncccssion of Alcxmder 
I., the subject was laid on the shelf. I t  was Laken up 
again& 18x9, yhen Captain Mou~nvieff was despatched 
from the arniy of Lhe Caucasus to reconnoitre the cnstern 
shores of the Caspian, to sclccl therc n spot for the erec- 
I-) ? 
tion of n fort, and to procccd Llicncc to Kliivn. Escortecl 
l,y fricnclly 'I'urkon~nns AIoumviefl' rmchccl Khiva in 
safety. l 'hcr~.,  howc\~er, he was seized by order of thc 
]<]l,i~l, inlprisoned, nncl detnincd ior ncmly seven wecks 
1,cforc 11c was allo\vcd to return. I t  wodd  scem that his 
l>rescncc in I<.lli\.a cscit-cd the strong suspicions of the 
]<h.in nnd his advisers, for, subscqucntly to  his return,, the 
'I'urkomans of the desert innugurntcd a system of pillage 
\\,it11 rcspcct to the Russimn cnmvnns such 3s lliey llnd never 
rlrenmt of bcforc. Possibly their action was stinlulatcd by 
the r~n\vontcd nl)l)cnlnllcc of Russim solcliers nt various 
p i n t s  in the steppe, avo\vcdly wit11 the purpose of affording 
~irotsction to their trading countrymen. 'I'hcre is littlc 
reason to doubt that cvcn thcse nomads sppec ted  that 
:;rn~ed pnrlies who occnpicd military iorts on the steppe, 
nominnlly to protect R ~ ~ s s i a n  caravans, might grndually 
tnkc root therc, and even advance furtlicr. 
Thc system of plundcr innugnratecl ,by the Iil~iunns 
bcca~nc at last SO 1111b~nmblc that, in 1839, Gencral 
IJcrovski was despatchcd from Orenburg, with 5,235 men 
and trrcnty two guns, to punish the Klidn, The intcnse 
cold of the winter, the difliculties and inhospitnlities of 
thc stcl)pc, f o u ~ h t  hnrcl, h o \ ~ \ ~ c r ,  for Iillivn, After losing 
onc h i rd  of his forcc bcfore nccomplishing half thc dis- 
t:uicc bct~vccn Orenburg and the threatened city, Pcrovski 
ws conlpelled to sctmcc his steps. The suficrings of l ~ i s  
force during the retrcnt were cxtsemc. 
IVith thc esccption of  thc dcspatch of two minor 
missions in  1841 and 1842, 110111 nbortivc in their results, 
no further serious movc with respect to Khiva was n h d e  
by Russia for ninctcen ycnrs. I n  the menn\vhile howcver 
two English officcrs, one Captain (now*General) james 
Abbott, who has written a most interesting nccount- o i  his 
nlission ; the clllcr, the late Sir Kich~!io~id Slial;espeare, 
hnd pcnchLctl to Kliiyn fro:n I-Tezit, m d  lincl pcr:il~adcd 
tbe Klilin Lo rclcnsc L ~ I C  l<rlssinrt prisoners still languishing 
I c a t t y .  hftcr that thcre followed the lull of ninctecn 
ycnrs. Eub, in I S ~ S ,  nl ~ h c  very time, bc it rummbcrcd, 
when, nftcr thc Crimcnn wnr, the Ixmier of Caucasus wns 
bcing nss~iletl, Gencml IgnaticK, suhscquently the well- 
laiown ambassador a t  Constnnlinol)lc, was dcspatcllcd on a 
spccinl mission to I<iii\rn nntl Jhlillh.n, l'he mission of 
Ignnticff a n s  outmnrclly one mercly of compliment, rind it 
led t o  no result. 11: may in f:tct bc pronounced a fnilurc, 
for, nolmithsl-:lnding.istnding his grent pcrsunsivc pon.cra, thc astute 
Russin~i  neither s~~cceeclcd in persuncling the KIi;fn of 
Khiva to sign the trcnty whicll h e  had j n q a r c d  and 
brought with diim: nor ill inducing him to put  n stop to the 
raid on thc I<ussi;un cnrnvnns. 
Russix dctcrmincd at Icngth to put a Iin:rl slop to tllcse 
outrngcs. I n  ISG~J slic coniplctcd n strong fort and nnv:d 
station nt KI-nsnogoclsli on the Caspian. Shc  supplemented 
these the ycnr following hy erecting another fort and 
anothcr nnvnl station at Tcliikisbr, tlie point where the 
Atrelc flows into the se:l. Able now to dcspntch espcdi- 
tions from n new base resting on tllc Caspian, she prcpnrccl 
in 1871 and 1872 to take clccisivc action. 
T h e  rnmour of thesc prepnrntions rcnchcd tlie Klxin of 
Khiva and frightened him not a little. As lie still rcfrlsed, 
hornever, t o  accept the terms offered by Russia, or to 
receivc n Russinn envoy in his capital, dreading them ct dona 
fcrsnles, 1:~issia resolvctl to strike the blow s l x  had been pre- 
paring. I n  July 1S72, tlien,she fitted out a n d  dcspntched nn 
c rp~di t ion  ~ ~ n d c r  thc commnncl of Gcner n 171 1 nrliazoff. Thnt 
officer, setting out from Tchikislar, easily renched Igly, on 
the o%l bed of'the Osus, and just within the borders of 
the ICarn I<hm dcscrt. At this point began the nntuml 
dificulties of his route. The  Ttrrkomans came lo nugmcnt 
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at St. ~~~~~~~~~~~~g and at London; nclive nggrcssion by its 
agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions 
succccd locally, tlic St. Petersburg Government adopts 
them ns n fnil nccovtpli whicl~ it did not intcnd, but cnmlot 
in honour recede from. If tlic local agents fail thcy arc 
disavowed and recalled, and thc 1:qunge prcviortsly hcld 
is appealed to as a proof that thc agents hnvc overstepped 
tlicir instructions. l'his was cscmplified in thc Trcnty of 
Unkiar-Skelessi, and in tlic exploits of Simonivitch nncl 
Yilctevitch in Persin. Orloff strccceded in extorting thc 
Trcaty of Unkiar-Skclessi from thc Turks, and it was rc- 
presented as a sudden thought, suggested by the circum- 
stances of the tinlc and placc, and not Lhc result of any 
previous instwctions; but having been clonc, it could not 
be undone. On the other h:und, Sinloniviich and Viktc- 
\.itch failed in getting possession of K e d t  in consequcncc 
of our vigorous luensures of resistance ; nnd ns they hilcd, 
and when they ,had fnilcd, they w r c  rlisavowed and rc- 
callccl, and the languagc previously llelcl at Pctersburg 
\\.as nppealccl to as a proof of the 'sincerity of the disnvo\wl, 
although no Ilumnn being with two idcas in his llcad could 
for n moment doubt that tl~ey had acted under specific 
instructions.-July g r, I 853." ( VLit Lord Pnlmcrston's 
Lii'c, Vol. II., 273, 121110. ed.) 
I now return to the datc wlwm I cligrcssed to deal wilh 
tlic earlicr dcalings of Russin wit11 Khivn to t l ~  close of 
the pcriocl of the two years n.hicli follomed Lord Claren- 
don's unfortunntc proposition that Afghihistdn should bc 
regardcd as'a neutral zonc, and the reception of the reply 
of Russia that she looked upon Afghhistin as completely 
outside thc sp1lcl.e within dlich Russin might be called to 
exer%se her influence. That lull  of two years had bccn 
spent by Russia in prepnring an expedition n4ich should 
clcnl finally, " once and for cver," nrith Khiva. Reports 
from their agents at Persia and clsewllerc that: such an 
expedition was preparing had, during that period, reached 
the British Governmer~t, and that: Government had in- 
strncted its ambassador at St. Petersburg to ascertain the 
exact state of the cxe .  The Russian Chancellor always 
denied Lhat any especlition was in preparation, and his 
words on this point were so forcible, so explicit, and so 
absolute that the Critish Anlbassador could not but accept 
thcm. The scales, at last, fell from his eyes. Towards 
the close of 1872, Lord A. Loftus infornicd his Govern- 
mcnt that he had gained Lhe conviction that such an ex- 
pedition had bcen decided upon, and would take place as 
soon as weathcr and circunlstances would permit. Still 
the Government of the Czar and the Russian Anlbnssador 
in London continued to  evade and to deny. Forced a t  
lnst to admit that there was to be an  expedition, they 
pleaclcd pathe~ically thnt it: urns to be on a very snlall sc;~lc, 
that it would consist oC but four and a half battalions, 
and that it was designed nlcrely to l~unisl?ncts of I~rigand- 
age. Thcn followed the memorable declaration which I 
citeci in a preceding paragraph, and which I here 
repeat-n declnlation typical of the value which it is 
almays neccssnry to place on the words of Russian Czars, 
Russian Cliancellors, and Russian a~nbassadors ; f i r  
froin il bciirg z'hc iderztiort of the C z n ~  lo  z'nke possession (f 
Khivtr, jositinc orders h v c  heil iss~ttd to jorc.ve,at i~." 
What follonecl ? The echo of the words I have italicised 
had scarce died away, wl~en-not n merc " four and n half 
battalions," but five columns, numbering upwards of 
12,000 men in all, started w d e r  the commancl in chief of 
General Kaufn~an, severally from Orenburg, from Tchi- 
kishlnr, from Alesanclrovskj~, from ICa7,alo, and Crom 
Jaznkh, to converge on, and assault, Khiva. Yct, so great 
still were the natural difficulties of the route that the bulk 
of this army was saved from c l e ~ t r u ~ t i ~ i ~  l y  the meresl: 
accidcnt. 'I'hc Tcl~ikisl~lar column had to fall back from 
Igly-the cxtrcme point rcaclled by hlarliazoff in the pre- 
vious expedition ; two of the other columns, :\.it11 one of 
which was Kaufn~an  hi~nself, united, only to find them- 
selves, a few days later, in thc heart of a sandy desert, 
\\.ithout supplies, without transport, without water. I n  lhis 
extremity they were s n \ u l  from annihilation by a son of 
t h c  desert, a ragged Kirghiz n ~ h o  disclosed the vicinity of 
wells containing abundant supplies of the precious fluid. 
T h e  difficulties of the two remaining colun~ns were Inore 
easily surmountable. Directed by the senior officer, 
General Vercvltin, they reached Khiva, and took the city 
by assault. il'he natural result follo\ved. Russia imposed 
her suzerainty upon the Khin ,  and annesecl the whole of 
the Khivan territory on the right bank of the Osus ! 
,f 
,. The capture and practical annexation of Khiva sccured 
to Russia possession of the central point in the curvcd linc 
which threaten& the frontier of India. T h e  l d t  of that 
line was covered:on its front by thc Osus and its confluents, 
and was flanked by Samarkhand ; its centrc was at Khiva, 
communicating with the Icft by the Osus, and threatening 
alike Merv a n d  Sarakhs ; the right, based on the Caspim, 
would naturally crecp along the northern frontier of Persia, 
subdue the 'Turltomans of the desert, then halt a t  a place 
n.ithin striking distance of Merv and Sarakhs ; until, 11av- 
ing neutralized or made n vassal of Persia, she shoulcl 
pounce upon those salient places, and prepare for the f nnl 
spring which should land her in Herht.* $ 
* Thesc me not prophecies nfter the even[. In his n.01~1~ on I-lcrnt, 
pul)l@d in Jnnuary, ISSO; in his specches after his visit to India in 
1880-1 ; and in t& articles enlitled "12ossinn Conquests in the East," 
publislie~l in rhc Ar.tt<y n d  A71791 A / c , p i n c  in 1882, the nrithor did his 
utmost to warn his corln!rymen of the incvitnlde issnc. 
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But, not even the capt~lre of Ichiva, efCectecl in spite of 
the denials and solemn assurnnccs of the Czar and his 
ministers, c o d d  either rouse the British Govelmnient to a 
sense of the actual danger of the position, or wenlren its 
faith in the promises of Russian diplomacy. The Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Granville, not only 
declined to esaminc (' too minutely how far these armnge- 
rnents "--the annexation of Khiva-" were in strict accord- 
ancc with the assurances given in Jnnunry by Count 
Schouvaloif,'' but, hopeful still, hc again addressed the 
Russian Chancellor on the subject of the two Governments 
arriving at  a clear and frank understanding regarding thcir 
respective positions in Central Asia. There is a sul)limc 
irony in thc tone of the reply of Prince Gatschnkoff to 
this confiding overture. Having obtained, first,. by hood- 
winking thc British Government all that he required, or 
mthcr, all that for the moment he was able to obtain, in 
Central Asia ; and having in the second plnce obtained the 
forgiveness of thc British Government for the violnlion of 
his plighted faith-a forgiveness accompanied by the es- 
pession of a. hope that no such violation wonld occur in 
the fiiture-Princc Gortschakoff expressed, in reply, his 
" entire satisfaction :' with the "just view Lord Granville 
had taken ! " 
The conquest of Khivn left Russia face to face with the 
'Turkomans. Thcse hardy sons of the desert, kinsmen of 
the Osmdnli who all but conquered Europc-for it wns thc 
grandfather of Osil~dn who, in the reign of Chengiz ICh5n, 
emigrated w i t h  his tribe of Turkomans to Asin Minor from 
Northern KhorAsdn-lived a wild and predatory life on the 
dcsert bordering Lhe northern frontier of I<horLsbn. 
Herdsmen, they were likewisc slave-clealers,*nor s ~ ~ o u ~ c i  Lhe 
fact be nttributecl to tllenl as n crime. To  c?ptureand sell 
slaves had been thc custom of the clesert from time im- 
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memorial, and the sild, uninstructed Turlco~nan was in that 
respcct not one \\hit behind his more  cultivated rival the 
KhorAsAni of Persian I(lior,?s;in. ?'he Turkomans had the 
reputation of being the most skilrul, the boldest, the most 
dashing horsemen of Central Asia. Nor  was their martial 
record at all a blank. The fathers' fathers of the Turko. 
mnns of the present day had responded to the call of 
Nadir Shdh and had led the \my for Ahmad Shdh .Durdnl 
to India. They had been foremost alike on the Iield of 
Panipat and in the sack of Dihli. Sons of fmdoni, 
ilnpatient of restraint, they had taken no root in the land 
which they had liclped to conquer, b u t  had evcr returned 
to the illimitnble spaces of that sandy desert, the soil of 
which few h t  they ever cared to trend ! 
With men such as these, Russia, 'after hcr conquest of 
Khiva (June 1872) had Lo deal. H e r  policy, as usual, was 
direct. No notions of sentinlent of of mercy w uld allow 
it to deviate a skgle hair's breath from its absolutely straight 
course. That policy niay be summed up in six words. I t  
was simply '' to conquer, that she might use." Realizing 
the enormous advantage which might accrue to her in the 
years that were to come by the employment as her vanguard 
of a whole nation oi  "the finest horsemen in Central 
Asia" she yet felt the necessity o f  first dominating their 
spirits, of curbing their fierce love of independence, of, in 
a certain sense, breaking their spirits by the display of 
reniorseless cruelty ; that nccomplished, the dcserl: warriors 
would obey the power which would thus have subcluetl 
them, as implicity as their htlicrs' fathers lxtd obeyed the 
orders of Nadir ShAh ! 
F;roralists may lallc of the c iv i l iz i~l~  mission of Russia, of 
the a d ~ a n t a ~ e ~ v h i c h  must accrue t o  thc world from the 
extension of her sway in Central Asia. They  forget thc 
great truth which every English politician ought to repeat to 
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himselr cvery clay attcl all day, the truth that I < ~ ~ s s i a  hersclf 
is  in all esscntinls an Asintic power, and sl~oulcl I)c tscated 
diplon~atic:dly as onc is accustomcd to treal diplomntically 
every avowed Asiatic powcr. 
I must ask now thc moralist nnd the diplomat to 
accompany me into the great dcscrt after the absolutc sub 
mission of Klliv;. had been securcd. There nlas a tribe of 
Turkomans, callecl the l ion~i td  Turl~otnans, inhabiting tllc 
Hnzdvat district. Thc Yomuds were a Nomad people, 
~vhose  S O I C  \ ~ c a l t h  consisted in Lhc-ir flocks :~ncI herds ; 
Lhey hacl no rcady cash. I t  was impossil~le for Lhcm to rclise 
money by thc snle ol' their caltle or  heir corn, or even 
of thc jcwcls and ornmnents of L.heir wives ancl daughters, 
for in the desert thcrc wcrc no purchasers. &w General 
1Cnufinan had bccn cngagcd during thc campaign in no 
actttal bn~tlc. 1Vitho;tt n fight hc could not obtain the 
covctcd Cross of St. George. H e  lool;ecl, Llleil, to the 
dcscrt for victims, and lixcd his eye u p o ~  the Yomuds. 
Having a s c e t 6 n e d  all particulars regarding Lhem, he im- 
posed upon them Lhe payment yitltin tcn days of n line in 
moncy which he 1;ncw thcy could not pay. Vainly did 
tltey offer their jewcls, Lheir nooks, and Llleir 11cl.cls. T h e  
moncy was wanlcd, and they had it not, nor could they 
obtain it. Thcn, Lo punish their clefault, I<aufrnan in~mdatccl 
their country with his troops, ordcred his gcnerals to destroy 
their settlement, and to confiscate their hcrds and their 
property. His orders mere obeyed wit11 n refinement of 
mercilessness such as has ncvcr bccn surpassccl in the 
records of crime.* The reign of terror was innuguratcd ! 
From that time Lhe warfare of Russia \\fit11 thc dcscrt 
tribes \\!as intermitlent-. I t  \\.as not, howcvcr, till 1879 that 
C CI 
Xo one will suspect Schuylcr of :lught lmt s y m p t h y  with Russia : 
yet it is from his pages, ant1 horn the conlirmnlory lcttcrs of hIacCahm, 
Lhat I h n w  drawn ~ h c s c  facts. 
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thc colossal Power of thc North judged that the time had 
arrived to mnke an attcmpl to establish a permanent settle- 
~ n c n t  in Turkomnn territory. The  point they selcctcd for 
this purpose was K i d  Arvat, a place above, but slightly to 
Lhe east of the higlmt point of the frontier of Pcrsia, a ~ l d  
not far south of the borders of the liara-ICdm T h c  intcntio1.1, 
plainly mani'fested, of thus cslablisliing thcmsel~~es per1lia- 
ncntly on their highway ws  not at all relished by the dcsert- 
born warriors. Thc  chief of tlic tribe of Aka1 Tclclies, Nur 
Verdi Khdn, mho till that time had I~een disposed to re- 
ciprocatc t l ~  friendly overtures of the Russians, a t  once 
took thc alarm. No sooner did tlie leader of the Russian 
force, General J.o~unkin, attempted to arrange lor a pel% 
n?nncnt occu,palion, thnn Nur Vcrcli assailed him at the hcad 
of all the warrior horscmcn of his tribe. No details ofthis, tlic 
first struggk for the possession of the dcsert, cver reached 
tlie Europe which is outside of Russia. But this, a t  least, 
transpi,red : Lomaltin was cvcntually besicged in his camp, 
and was so I~r&xl tlierc thnl lie \ms forced to abandon 
his guns and relreat in disorder, pursuccl by crowds of 
horsemen to Kmsnovodsk. I-Ie was even bcsieged there for 
several \veelcs ! 
Again c ~ J d  not Russia afford to allow this check to 
remain unavenged. In August I S ~ S ,  shc despatched a 
larger force from Tchiltislilar under the ordcrs of the same 
general. This  t i m  Lolnnlcin rcached IChojri ICnln, a few 
miles to t l ~ c  south of I G l  Arwt, in safety. But there he 
was ns~ailcd by thc same enemies led by the same daring 
\\rarrior. I l e  and his Russians mere drivcn out of Klioji  
Kala and  were literally chased back to Tchikishlar, from 
uilder the vcry guns of wl~ich place the pursuers carried off 
hundreds of hiri camcls ! 
h third expedition then became necessary in  1879. 
General Lazareff, who had greatly clistinguishecl himself in 
the campaign in Armenia against Mukhtar Pasha in the 
prcvions year, was sclectcd to command it. With Lomaltin 
as his sccontl in conimand, Lazareff sct out at the hcacl of 
his force-a forcc greatly in excess of that which had started 
in 1877-from Tchikishlnr on the 18111 June. His plan nfas 
to inflict a selwe clcfeat on, and to dominate the spirit: of 
the Turkomnns bcfore alte~npting to make n. settlement. 
Rut at 'l'chdt-i-Atmk, about midway to K i d  Arvnt along the 
Pcrsian frontier, Lazareffsickenecl and died. Lomnkin, who 
succeeclecl him, and n~ho shared his views, pushed on then 
to K i d  Arvnt, and thencc bcyond R h i ,  to a point within 
six miles of Dengli l'epd, a square built fort occupied by llie 
Turkomans with their whole available force. On lhe 9111 of 
Scpte~nber Lomalcin mnrchcd against that not very formicl- 
able place. After n desperate battlc, ahich lasted all day, 
and in wliich up to 5 r.ar. they had all tlic advantage, the 
Russians wcre rcpulsed, and fell back, benten, baffled, and 
li~imiliated, to thc Caspian ! They were unable even to 
reach that bnse beforc Ikcember had wel1t;et in ! 
Eut beaten: bamecl, nntl liumilitatecl though she had 
thrice been on this line, Russia acllierecl to her.piuposc \villi 
n steatlfnstness and pcrtinncity charnc~eristic of hcr \~ho lc  
policy Russia n e w  surl~cnders a firmly-rooted idea. In  
ISSO she made preparations, 011 a still larger scnlc than 
before, to renew the attack on thc line between Ak11nl 
and Askabncl. ':, ,To cotnmancl the new- expedition she sum- 
moned,he ninn wlio enjoyed the highest reputation i : ~  
her army, n man who possessed a European reputation for 
dash and daring, the lender of her wnr party, the famous 
Sliobeleff. 
Skobeleff posscsscd advantages which had been denied 
to Lomakin. In  the spring then of ISSO, -the Tur l tpnn  
chief who had lccl his countrymen to victory after victory, 
\rho in the course cf  his I~rilliant carccr had defeated threc 
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nations, the IChivnns, the Persians, and thc Russians, thc 
illustrious Nur Vcrcli K!iAn, had dicd. Hc had lcft no 
sacccssor nL all cqual to himself. W i l s t  thercfore, in 
18S0, the Russians, alike more numerous and niorc 
cxpcricnced in Lllc \varfnrc of tlic desert tlia~i in 1S79, 
wcrc Iccl by the best gcnernl of whom their country could 
boast, the Turkonians had 110 lcader \die inspirccl thcnl 
with Lhc conficlcncc \diicli, in 1879, had goric far to cnablc 
thcm to repulse their focs. 
The plan devised by Skobcleff provcd that hc liad com- 
plctely lnnstered all the intricncics of tlic task which had 
bcen comn~itted to his hands. Joincd by n smnll body of 
men \vho marclicd from IChiva, to tlic nestcrn border of the 
Tekkc oasis, hc marched with a selcct division, of wliich 
tliosc mcn fornied n part, from tlic iitlrcl: to the Xkhnl 
oasis at G h i ,  about ISO miles from tlic Caspian and about 
So froin thc spot wlicrc tlic TorLo~nans lincl congrcgntcd, 
n fort cnllcd GcoB TcpL:, somewhat to the north of thc scene 
of the disaster oPthc previous year. I Ie  thcn procccdcd to 
fortify this post, covcring it  with intrencl~lncnts, with the 
idca of making it thc base for a furthcr advancc. l k  r ~ ~ n d e  
of it in fact whnt \\lcllington mncle of thc lines of Torrcs 
Vcdras. Within tlic lines thus formed Skobclef pro- 
ceeded to store provisions and supplies, turning a dcnf ear 
LO the solicitations of those who pressed him to avengc 
without iurthcr d c h y  the defeat of his predecessor. Thcsc 
supplies camc from ~ l l c  Volgn, from tlic Cnucnsus, nnd fronl 
Persia, andmercconveyed by camel trninsfro~u lirasnovodsk. 
Scvcral months were employcd by Skobclcff in thcsc 
necessary preliminaries, At  Icngtli, in January 1881, he 
advanced, attackcd the 'children of tlic desert in theb 
intrylchmcnts ,at Geok TepC, stormcd their position, 
slaughtered thousands o i  the defenders, and pursucd t l ~ c  
remainder beyond Asknbaci. This ti~iic the rule of tcrror 
-- - -- - - - -  - 
did its work. Tt cowed the survivors into nbsolutc and 
coniplck submission. 
'l'l~c ~ ~ s u a l  politicnl consequelices foll~\\~ccl. I n  thc month 
of  hTay of the  snnlc year thc Czar issued nn uknsc by 
which Iic dcclnrcd that thc Transcaspinn territory, the 
al~odc of the Xkl~al  Teltltcs, wns nnnesed to Russia. 
Nor w s  Russia wp-se scrvccl by hcr ndministmtors than 
by her gcncmls. l f n  an incredibly sl~ort space of  time, 
lines of mils, intended during the Russo-Turkish war for 
tlic use of the  army of the I)nnubc, and which had  since 
Lmn lying idlc in Southern Itussin, \\!crc transported to 
the cnstcrn sllorc of the  Caspian and \\we at once utilized 
i? thc newly acquired territories. S o  thoroughly in carnest 
were the oflicinls, that I~cfore tlic conclusion of 1881 the 
line hnd bcen completed as  far as  K i d  Arvat, 144 ~niles 
from thc Caspian. I t  is a remnrlinblc Lxt, worthy of 
appreciation, thnl; a t  thnl very n~oment tlic Eritish Indian 
Government nrcre selling the rails which had been brought 
at considcrnble cxpense to Qi~et tn for t ~ i ? ~ u r ~ ~ c ~ s e  of con-
necting Sibi . r ~ i t l ~  that important frontier fort, and that fort 
~ ~ i h  I<nnd:lllnr ! / 
I n  a Icclurc of rcmnrkablc clcnrncss nncl ability clelivercd 
nt t l ~ c  Royal United Scrvicc Illslitulion on the 1Gtl1 Map, 
1884, Sir Edward IInmlcy, nftcr describing tlic progress of 
Russia in the Transcaspinn regions u p  to tllc pcriod of 
Skobeleff's succcss a t  Geok TepC in 1881, proceeded to 
point out how the ltussians, never losing sight of the 
definite aim of their policy, had, whilst passing on [lie 
railway from the eastcm shores ol' the Caspian t o  K i d  
Arwt  and beyond K i d  Arvnt, been at the snnle time 
carefd to unitc to  thc empire by the same iron band the 
Caucnsinn s1101.c~ of  the same. After pqinting ou t r the  
advantages of Baku 011 the Caucasian shore, as  producing a n  
ineshaastible quantity o f  fuel for railway consumption, and 
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inforlning his audience that a t  the end of 1882 the milway of 
the Cnucasus mas continued froni Tiflis to Baku, with a 
branch to Ih tou~n ,  a n o r c  convenient and healthy port than 
Poti, Sir E d n w d  thw tlrcw the follo\\.ing conclusions as  
t o  the advantages to be derived from the new routc thus 
constituted :-" From Odessa," he continued, " troops can 
l x  conveyed across the Blaclc Sea to 13atoum in two days, 
from thence by rail to Baku i n  tment!4our hours, m o t h e r  ' 
twenty-four hours would see them landed at  K~nsnovodsk, 
transferred in lighters to the s l~al lon water to Micl~aelovsk, 
nnd the entrainment of then1 begun, when the journey to 
Kizil Arvnt, the present but by no means the fin21 tcrrninus 
of  the l'ranscnspian line, occupies twelve hours. 
" T h e  comn~unica~ion with Odessa, of course, ndmits of  
the rcinforccmcn~ of the Caucnsian army to any cstent. 
But the Caucnsus itsclf forms nn effectively inclcpenclc~lt 
territory for beginning a cn~npnign. I t  is no mild, barbarous 
region, but a couptry rich, well-watered, nnd now thoroughly 
Russian, and its capital, Tiflis, in the advantages of its site 
and climate, its public and  private buildings, nncl its 
establishment as the head-quar~ers of an army, mlp  stand 
comparison with nearly any city in the Czar's dominions. 
T h e  war strength of the army of the Caucasus is 160,000 
men. 
"The  cflicacy of the other channcl of communicntion 
between Russia and the Caspial~ l~ns  also heen largely 
increased of late yenrs. Uesidcs four lines of railway to 
points on the Volgn, completc co~nniunication between the 
Neva and that river is afforded by the canal system of the 
country. And to obviate the interruption occurring in the 
winter months, a line of railway is projected fro111 a point 
\vherz many lirfes from Russia converge, in Cis-Caucasia, 
to  Petrorsk on the Caspian, and  thence along its shore t o  
Baku. You nil1 therefore probably agree that there is not 
I.: 
50 Tdc R ~/sso-A f$wc Q~icsh'ori. 
at l ~ c s u i t  IIIIICII dificulty, and ~ h n t  such ns tllcre is will 
sliortly disnl,penr, either in bringing rescwes and stores, to  
any cstc~it, on tlic lines from Nortllcrn Russia, nncl also 
from Soutliern Russin, to t l ~ c  Caspinn, or in coweying the 
nrnly of the Cnw:lsus with its storcs from that scn to the  
Transcaspinn rnil\my, nncl along t h t  line to I C i d  Arvnt. 
Tllat tcrniinus is 13 j miles from Aslinbnd, to \vliich plnce 
tllc rnilwny will cloubtlcss be cnrriccl. Asknbad is 186 
~liilcs fro111 Snrnklis nnd Enrnkhs is zo? from HerLt, only 
:I r c , ~  ~iiiles niore thnn tlic distance from York to London." 
T ninkc no apology for this quotnlion; for the words of 
\rhicIl it is coniposed present in [he fhircst 2nd clcn~cst 
light to the rcnder thc immense aclvnntages ~ r h i c h  
Skol~eleVs victory nt Geok Tep6, nncl the conscquent 
nnncsntion of the Tsanscnspinn territory, hns procured for 
Russia. 'I'liaL territory is unitcd now by thc speediest of 
dl modern modes of con~munication with St. Petersburg, 
wit11 Aloscow, and wilh nll the grcnt arsenals of Russin. 
1'11nt coliquest brought not an isolntccl nlrd outlying portion 
of Russia-but the \vliole Russian empire bound into one 
solkl mass by thc iron road, as near to Herdt, within n few 
milcs as the most ndvancec1 outposts of British Tndin !;s: 
2 2  1rc go 011 we shnll see that tllc cvil did not stop thcrc ! 
Nor wns the power to concentrntc an irresistible force 
up011 thc fw.hcst point of its Transcnspian territory the 
only nclvnntagc gained for his country by Skobelef! nt Gcok 
Tcp6. Leaving alxolutely out of considerntion the pres- 
tigc, the moral infl~~cncc-though that is n factor ~ ~ I l i c h  
 nus st cntcr largely into thc cnlculntion of n statesman \!!hen 
Ilc lins to den1 wit11 Enstern peoples-~licre remain two clis- 
tinct mntcrinl ndvantagcs, both of which mill affect very 
po\vcrf~~lly any struggle which may occur i n  Afgllbni&n o r  
on tlie existing British frontier, betwecn Russia a d  Great 
Britain. These are (I), the enormous influence gained by 
thc former over Persia; (2)  the employment as the van- 
p a r d  of her nnnies of thc conquered Turkonians. 
IVith rcspcct to tlie first I shall again quotc from the 
same cornpetcnt authority, to whose warnings in May of 
last year the country turncd a deaf ear. "Nest  to her 
resources for n campaign," said Sir Eclwnrd I-Iamley on 
that occasion, " Russia's relations with Persia arc of prinle 
importance." Describing then the various phases of the 
attitude of Persia towards Russia between 1876 and 1880, 
Sir Edwird thus continued : (' But, in the following ycar, 
aftcr Skobelelf l ~ a d  cstablishcd liimsclf at B h i ,  a remark- 
able change occurred in the attitudc of Persia. Ostensible 
orders to the contrary notwithstanding, he was allonfed to 
proci~rc vast supplies of provisions froni I<I~orMn ; and 
wlicn, after t!~e capture of Geok Tell$, he marched beyond 
Asknbacl in  prrrsuit, he was alloncd to violate Persian 
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tcrrito~y wilhout remonstrance, and lhe Turltonlans who 
escaped into what they supposed to bc tlie neutral territory 
of Persin were handed over as prisoners to the Russims. 
I n  fact how can Persia, without the strongest support, re- 
sist such a ncighbour ? The Bussian border is co-terminous 
with hers from Mount Aralnt to beyond Asknbad. The 
fleet on the Caspian and the new milway give Kussin the 
means of invading at a hundred points the bordering 
territory, furnishing a hundred good rcasons why Persia 
could no more oppose thc will of Russia than the mere 
linman being of her o w  tales could oppose the trenien- 
dous spirit \ ~ h o  rose in clouds from the sea, or descended 
on over-shadowing wings from the sky," Information 
which %as been received since the Iccture from which this 
passage is quotcd nras delivered, and since the Russian 
advacces to Merv and Sarakhs, therein foreshadovred, have 
E '2 
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become accon~plished facts, goes to prove that at  thc 
present moment Persia is an inert mass to be inouldcd at 
will by hcr powerful neighbour. 
The second advantage I have referred to-the incorpora- 
tion of the Turkoman cavalry in the Russian army has 
been also already accomplisl~cd. Thc rule of terror, always 
an initial factor with Russin when dealing with Oricntnl 
races, did its work, as I have already said, at Geok TcpC 
That crushing defeat and the unsparing manner with which 
i t  was followed, broke the free spirit of the desert-born 
warriors. Recognizing in their subduers their masters, they 
accepted their fate, and thcy are now ready to foragc, to 
fight, and to plunder for the successors to the empirc of 
Nadir ShAh ! 
1 return from this digression-a digression necessary to 
display the great results obtained by Russin from Skobeleff's 
triuunph at Geok Tep$-LO describe thc further progress 
made in the Transcaspian line or co~~quest. I left Lhe 
Russian army pursuing the Turkomans as far as Asknbacl, 
only 385 miles from I3erBt. I propose now to describe 
their further progress sincc that date. 
The victory of Geok Tep6 had subdued for ever, n vcry 
important tribe of thc Turkomnns, the Akhal Tekkes. 
But there were other tribcs scarcely less formidable. 
These were the Sarilr Turkomans, numbering 65,000 souls, 
lying along the Murghrib river between Merv and HerCtt ; 
the Tejend Turlroinnns, occupying the country watered by 
the river of th l t  name to within thirty miles of Sarakhs; 
and the Merv Tekkes or the tribe which pastured its hprds 
round about Merv. All these tribes were to be absorbed. 
The turn of the Tejend Turkomans came first. Terrified 
by the defeat of their brethren at Geok TepC and Its con- 
sequences, they offered, almost on the morrow of the victory, 
their sitbinission to the conquerors. That submission 
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brought into the possession of Russia the Tejend oasis, a 
territory, to use the worcls of Lieutenant, now, I bclievc, , 
Colonel, Alikhanoff, \she surveyed it-, "almost larger than 
that of Merv," nnd brought her within striking distance-go 
milcs-of Sarnkhs, and within 232 of Herit. The l'ejend 
river which waters that onsis is, in very d x d ,  the Hcri-rGd 
\vhich waters I-Ierdt, for, flowing northwnrds as it approaches 
the Persian frontier near ICuhsnn, i t  takes, jmt bcyond Pul-i- 
I<h5tun, the name of the smalnp in which it finally dis- 
appears. I t  forms then, if not a water road to Herdt, pet 
a road which supplies troops marching along its banks 
with one of the two primary necessities for an army. 
For a timc after that submission Russia rcmained appar- 
ently quiescent. Shc was ouly biding hcr time. l\'hilst 
the attenlion of Lhe politicians of England was fised upon 
the events passing in Egypt and in the Soudan, they rcad 
one m6rning in January, 1884, that Merv had bcen 
occupied. Some years before, even staleslncn who believed 
in the pronlises of Russia, had declared that her troops 
could never be allonwl to occupy Merv. Xrct in 1884, 
that occupation was allowed Lo pass ivith but a feeble pro- 
test ! 
The full significance of that inlportant acquisition is not 
evcn yet properly appreciated by the governing classes and 
the people of L-hese islands. I n  vain did two Englishmen 
and one foreigner attempt to rouse them to a sense of the 
danger it involved. One of these, Mr. Charles Marvin, 
whose services in' respect of the 1Cusso-Afghan question 
have been invaluable, and who, speaking and writing with 
absolute knowledge perso~lally acquired, can understand 
better than any living man thc feelings of the Cassandra 
of th; Hon~cric 'legend, published at once a pa~uphlet in 
" "Tile Russian Anncxnlion of hfcrv." W. 1-1. Allen 8 Co, 
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\vllicli lie dwelt empl~aticnlly upon the opporlunilies which 
s u ~ ~ ~  a movcnienl: gave t o  Russia. " T h c  conqucst or 
>lcrylJJ \\'rote Mr. h,lmvin, in February, I S S ~ ,  "is somc- 
tiling lllore than the mnesat ion of a mid-dcscrt oasis. It 
Inenns t l ~ e  co~nl~ le te  junction of tlie military forces of the 
Caucasus and 'l'urkestAn. I t  mcnns, \\.it11 tlie annesation. 
of i\khnl, the nbsorption of roo,ooo of the best Irregular 
cnvcllry in the world, a t  a wcek's ~narch  from the city of 
I-lcrit. I t  means thc meeting, for the first timc, of t11c 
C o s s d i  and thc Afghrin. I t  means thc complctc cnclosurc 
or ICl~ivn within thc Russian cmpire, and tlic reduction of 
11okh:irn from the independent position of n border stale 
to tlic tlepcndencc of nn incorporntcd province. I t  means 
tlie cnclosure of more Lhan zoo,ooo square miles of terri- 
tory, and the addition to the  Russian empire of a region 
as laryc ns Fmnce. It: means the  completion of the con- 
quest of the Ccntrnl Asian clcserts, nnd the commencement 
of the anncsalion of Lhc grcat ferLilc mcluntnin rcgion of 
Persia and i\fghdnistdn. I t  means the cleliberatc occupa- 
tion of a s1rntegic:ll point, fraught with political cntangle- 
111cn1s of s ~ ~ c l i  a wide-spread nature, that, whether Russia 
dcsirc it or not, slie will be inevitably led, unless forestalled 
or checkccl by England, to Meshed, tu I-Icrit, to Ballch, 
nncl lo 1Cib~1l. And slie will not rcmain there. She \\ill 
continue her swift advance until slic triumphantly lays 
clown her Cossack border alongside the Sepoy line of India." 
I t  m y  be objected by some that these are the opiniolls 
of Mr. Marvin, and that they d o  not care to listen to Mr. 
htarvin, I)ecause, when the Conscl-vati\.es \\ere in ofice he  
was charged with divulging in formntion which c011111ro- 
mised thc Government. I m y  remark, in pass in^ that 
that charge in no way affects thc credibilify of n nlan w h o  
has heard with his own ears the opinions expressed on t h e  
subject by Russian generals and Russian diplomatists, anc1 
-- -- 
who, for thc love of England, has spent his own moncy to 
warn England's pcople. Gut let us turn from Ur, Marvin, 
from this past-master of thc history of ~ r n i i s c ~ s ~ ~ i a n  
aggression, and read what thc greatest strategist of England 
has to say upon the subject. 
" Co~nmercially v iend,"  said Sir Ecl\vnrd EIa~nley in the 
lecture from which I have already quoted, dcli\~rc,d in 
May of last year, "Russia has gai~ycd in Rlcrv for thc pre- 
sent mercly a frcsh burthen. The Turlromans, dcbnrrcd 
frorn brigandage, and unfit for any sustained comn~ercial 
or ag~~iculturnl entcrpriscs, will bc but an in~poverished 
conlmunity, They posscss 110 towns nor iustitutions, nor 
territories which csliibit any mark citller of prospcrity or of 
the faculty of bcco~ning prosperous. 'Tlic onc :~dvanlnge 
of the possession is that the caravan route passing Cok1lira 
to Meshed and the interior, and that from India by I-lcrit 
to Ccntml Asin, lie through Merv. Eut that it was once a 
centre of great grosperity is proved by the fact that the 
remains of four grcat cities exist Lhere, the inhabilanls of 
the last of which wcrc drivcn out hy the present semi- 
barbarians about a ccntiiry ago. Uncler Russian rulc that 
prosperity will revive-the land will once Inore tecm with 
the crops to which nothing is wanting but good husbandry. 
And, when .once again bcco~nc populous and fertile, it will 
afford a secondary bisc against the Afghdn frontier. I n  
the mean\vhile it closcs thc gap n~orcsnicl, and as soon as 
Rr~ssia lays down her fronticr linc, Ll~c wholc of that vast 
e q ~ i r e  from the Baltic to the Danube, thcnce along the 
Black Sea, across the Caucasus to the Caspian, along Llle 
Persian frontier to Rlerv and Tulkistin, and so on to 
Siberia, will lic in :L ring fencc. 'This is the Power which is 
no\\~sscpamtccl fiom a frontier which, presumably, we cannot 
allow hcr to overstep, by a borderland which is a, barrier in 
no sense, and which I will endeavour briefly to describe." 
On the same subject, Sir Charles Macgrcgor wrote in 
1875 :-'I There is no  douht in my mind that the real 
danger lies in our permitting the Jiussia~ls to concentrate 
unopposed a t  hlcrv, which is quite within co/Q n% mni/z 
distance of Herit ; and it is in this fact, and in this alone, 
that the value of RIcrv to the Russians lies. Once place 
Hcrat beyond the possibility of a cu@ dc maill, and I can- 
not imagine thc astute statesmen .of Russia persisting in 
thc occupation of an isolated spot in the desert, thc main- 
tenance of which must cost n great deal." Thc forecast 
has been already proved true ! 
I t  will be observed that Sir Edwnrd Ilamley speaks of 
the new fronticr as one " which, presunlably, we ca~mot 
allow her (Russia) to overskp." But six months hncl not 
elapsed since the delivery of the lecture when Russia did 
take another step for~vard--a step, in 1ny opinion, thc most 
important of all subsequent to the victory of Geok 
TepC. In  the autumn of IasL year Russia advanced 
her outposts along the Persian fronticr ffom Askabad to 
Snrnkhs ! 
Russia \vould not have been Russia had she not accom- 
paniecl this most important move on\\wcl by the usual 
attempt Lo deccive the  gulliblc British public, and their 
lyorsc than gulliblc representatives in the Housc of Com- 
mons. 1 shall show more clearly further on why the I J ~ C ~  
was that there was an old Sarnkhs and a new Saralths, mas 
of all plez5 the most disingenuous. Russia gained the 
position on the hank of the Tejend most convenient to 
her for an operation against Her&, and the value of that 
p s i t ion  was, as I shall sho~v, in no way affected by the fact 
that she did not occupy t1.e fort as well ! Yet the excuse, 
Imle as it was, went down : it was accepted ; and Russia 
was allowed to remain at oldSarokhs without even a rc- 
monslrance ! 
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T h e  enormous importance of thij step has never been 
sufficiently appreciated. With all Iiumilily ancl with all 
earnestness I \vould beg my counlryn~cn to iurn for a 
moment from h e  selfish strife of parties, ancl devotc a fc\v 
minutcs'consiclerntion to a subjccl \vliich affects, and \,itally 
af lcls ,  tlie future position of  the British Empire. TIlc 
position occupiccl b ) ~  old Sarnkhs ought ncvcr to hnvc been 
nllowed to fall into tlic hands of 12ussia. l'hnt she was 
nlloned to take it is a proof of tlie statc of vassalage to 
which Persia has been reduccd, for nev: and old Sarnkhs 
constiluted a frontier post of that country. Lct  us, for ii 
niomcnt, examine their position. 
l;ortul~ntcly, we arc able, on  this subject, to witc  "from 
the book." I n  1875, o11.e of tlic nblcst ancl most nccom- 
plislied oflicers \vho \ \cu.  the Ihitisli uniform, the present 
Qunrlermastcr-Gc~icrnl of H e r  hIajestyJs nmiy in India, 
Major-Gencrnl Sir Charles MncGregor, visited Saraltlis. 
l'licrc is no unqptninly in Llic opinion he gave regarding 
its valuc. " A  glancc at  lhc map will show," he ~ r o t c ,  
" that in thc complication whicl~ nlust arise erc the liusso- 
Indian quesliol~ can be dec~ncd  scttlcd, ils fulure-'thc 
futurc of Sarnkhs '-is likely to be a stirring one. Plnced 
a t  thc junction of roads from Herrit and Meshed, by the 
I-Ieri-rild and Ab-i-Mcshcd valleys rtspcctively, and at tlie 
best cntrance to the province of I<lior;is;in from the ~iorlh,  
i t  cannot fail lo escrcise n very scrious influcncc 011 the 
monlentous issue of tllc above question. 'l'liis must 
I~appen, ~vliether it fa11 into the hands of thc friends of 
England or into those of her foes. \Vl~ctlier 12ussia use 
Sarnklis as a base Ibr offensive measures against Herit, or 
England use her as a defensive outpost to d d c a t  any such 
ope;?ations,  ha? positicn will be I:card of agai~!. A I ; ~  if
111y feeble voice can eKect a wrning,  ere it is too lale let it 
hcre be raised in these words :-fl Zn@td /l'ocs ?rot r m  
Snrnkhs for d~ fencc  Russia 71cvX nsc it f o r  ofl~.trcc."* 
I am no alarmist. 'l'he vords I have quoted are the 
words of a very able man who has spent his life on the 
Indian frontier, n.110 can speak the language of the 
Afghdns arid the I<horisinis, a man \vho Iins ever kept his 
eyes and his ears we11 open. Tlic journal of his travels 
teems with evidence that even in those days Persia was 
being Russianizcd. There is not a soldier living who 
knows MacGregor who would not ncccpt as an absolute 
truth his nlarning words about Snrakhs, And yet, the 
English Government allowcd Russia to take quietly and 
without ren~onstrance the plains commanding that most 
important place-a place wl~ich is nn eye to see and an 
arm to strike. When n faint voice was raised in Parlia- 
ment upon thc question it was sileilced by the disingenuous 
plea, already referred to, that there were two such places 
known as Sarakhs, and that the Snrakhs oscupied was not 
the fortless but the old town ! 
Is there an  old town of Sarakhs? There was indeed 
in earlier days an old Sarakhs, but there is but one forti- 
fied town now. Let the reader follow the description 
of Sir Charles MncGregor :-"The sccne that mct my 
eye" he writes,describing his survcy of the country from 
the north tower of the only csisting Santkhs, "is easily 
described. T o  the north stretched one vast plain, which, 
except for a few mounds and a ruined mosque marking the 
site of one of the forn~er to\vns of Samkhs, nas unbroken 
by tree, bush, mound, or undulations as Lnr as the eye 
could reach. The 'l'ejend, it is true, winds round to :he 
* T h c  italics arc Sir Chnrles h1ncGregor1s. Vh$ I '  Nnrrntivgof n 
Journey :hro~tgIi thc Province uf I<llorassnu m d  thc N.\V. Frontier of 
Afghniiislan in 1875." London : IV, H, Allcn & Co., ~Syc).  
north-west, but its bed is low, below the level of the plain, 
and so nothing can be sccn of it. I t  \vas a strange I'ccling 
to look out 011 this wild interminable cxpanse, and think 
that for an arc of Soo, there \\?as not for 300 miles perllnps 
one single drop of water, or one human being T o  the 
north-cast lay the roacl to Nerv stretched out beyond the 
dark tamarisk foliage in the bed of ~ h c  'l'cjend. To thc 
cast all was clear : to thc south-enst wcrc undulating 
rounclcd ridges (covcrcd \\.it11 l i~t le  black dots which Lhcy 
told tne were " pi st:^ " bushes)?* extending to\vnrds tllc 
MurgllLb. 'Yo the south was ~ l l c  Milzciuran ridgc we had 
come through, and  a little way north of west was n con- 
fused mass of rugged ridges, among which I \\Ins inforo~cd 
lay the famecl stronghold of the great Nadir." 
This plain on the Tejencl, then, is really the position 
of Samlths 'r' 'I'hnt position Kussia has taken and ICussin 
holds. I t  is idle to argue that the position is vducless 
becnusc s h e  doss  not hold also the fort of Snrakhs. T h c  
fort of Snrakhs "has n garrison" ( I  quotc again from 
MacGrcgor) "of one battalion of infantry, numbering 
somc scven l l ~ ~ n d r e d  men, eleven guns, good, I~acl, and 
indirferent, a n d  n few horsemen ; but thc dimensioils of the 
fort are such that it would take ten times this number to 
man the \rails, even in the most incflicient manner." I n  n 
word, the Russians can walk into it \vllenever they may 
choose to d o  s o  ! 
XlIacGregor gives us, lilccwisc, n plan and description of 
the fortress. H e  then adds :-" Were the 'l'urkomnn ques- 
tion for ever at  rest "--Russia has settlcd it since he penncd 
those words-"I see no reason why Salxkhs should not 
becpnlc n place of coilsiclerable importance as n Inrge 
m 
* Thc Pistncllio nut. 
population could easily be  supported Ily agriculture alone, 
and its convenient position nfitli reference to B,Ieshed and 
HerAt on  [lie south, and Khiva and Bokhira on the north, 
mlrks it out a future probable entrepBt of commerce." 
I%~rt l~cr  on, he adds : " Commercially, it is adn~irably situ- 
ated for drawing to it all :he trade between Turkistanon 
the  north and Khol~nsdn on the south; and it has every 
advantage of soil and water and climate that would bc 
necessary for these purposes." 
On the same subjcct-the position of Snrnld~s--let us 
study tlie description of tlic position as given by the 
correspondent of the IL/~ts/;l.crfed Loncl'u~j 11+70s, in tlic issue 
of Lllot paper of the 14th March :- 
"Samkhs, which the Russians were permitted to occupy 
soon after their conquest of Mcrv, and from whicli thc 
understood line of Afghan boundary was to have been 
drawn eastward to the Oxus by thc Joint Commission, con- 
sists of olci and new Sarnkl~s, tlirec nlbles and a half 
apart, situatcd on oppositc sides of the I-Ieri-rud, the bed 
of which, at that particular place, was dry nt tlie scason 
when the Critish Commission arrived tlierc. This place 
belonged to Persia, L~ut old Snrnkhs, on the eastcrll side, 
was handed over to thc Kussinns by the Persian Governor. 
\\'I~en o w  Special Artist visited old Sarnkhs, h e  Russian 
Governor-General of the 'l'mnscaspian .I'rovinccs, General 
lio~nnroff, was there, but only a few Russian troops, who 
were Akhal 'I'urkomnns recently enlisted in the Russian 
army, l'llc sketch now given shows the remains of tlic 
o ld  city, wliicll is entirely deserted ; to the east and north 
tlierc arc n number of reed hu[s nith n few people living in 
them. Old Saralths, as the slcetcll will show, is n ~ e r e p  a 
square mound, rising high above the present Icvcl of the 
dcscrt, and this mound is no doubt nn accunlulation of 
rubbish fosmccl by the destruction of houscs and the rc- 
building of them during a long course of time. T h c  
ruincd walls of onc building arc all that stands of  he old 
town ; the rest of tlie space is a mass of bricks and wecds. 
T h e  walls are of burned brick, but are in a w r y  crumbling 
state. The  town itself evidently has not had a n  inhabitant 
for many years. On the north and east arc the rcmains of 
crumbling mud walls, which luny have Ixen inhahitecl since 
the old city was left to clccay. l ' h e  old tomb seen to thc 
right of this view is cnllecl Uaba Ogle ; but thcrc is n 
tradition that it is tlie tomb of Abel, the tomb of Gain 
being at  new Sarakhs. 
' I  New Sarakhs, which is still occupied by the Persians, is 
on the western 1,anIc of the Heri-rud, 300 yards from thc 
river bed. I t  is of latc date, and is posscssecl of the usual 
iuucl n~alls, with toners. T h e  wall cncloscs a spacc of 700 
yards diamctcr. T h e  governor, Ali Mardan IChnn, who has 
to den1 with the whole of the frontier of this part of Persin, 
lives in the t o h ,  and has four or five h ~ ~ n d r e d  troops. 
Although the walls cover a goocl amount of ground, thcrc 
are very few people in the place. I n  thc sketch, thc 
mound of old Sarakhs is just visible in the distance ; in the 
foreground is one of the usual towers of refuge, Mr. 
Simpson ~ u a d e  n separate sketch of the Meshed Gate of 
new Snrakhs, w l ~ i c l ~  shows the character of the crenelated 
walls and the towers. TYhere are only two gates to the 
town-this gate, and another towards the north, callecl the 
13okhira gate. ,Inside of the Meshed gate is the Arg, or 
citadel, where the governor lives, and thc garrison havc 
their quarters. A mall separates this from the other part ot 
the town. There is a ditch ,perhaps 10 feet or 12 feet deep, 
and nearly 2 0  fjxt wide, round the walls, with a covered way, 
or chcmin cle ironclr, between the wall and the ditch. Tlicre 
are six sniall brass guns placed at  various points, but lhe  
mud walls could offer no defence to a regular attack. 
''A curious feature of the river above Samlths is the dam, 
or ' bunci,' as  it would be lermed in India, a t  I < i d  Koi, 
by which LIE water is diver\ed into slreams for artihcial 
irrigation. Iiizil-Koi is eight miles higher up the river, 
bctwecn Sarakhs ancl Pul-i-Khitun. This dam, which is a 
very primitive affair, bcing made of wattles and earth, fills 
n water-course, which supplies old Sarakhs; and new 
Samkhs ~ w e i v e s  its supply of water 'on the other side of 
the Hcri-Kud from a point- not far distant. All cultivation 
in this region is done by means of irrigation dcrived from 
rivcrs and Streams ; and the protection of "water supply" 
is an important part of the frontier question. On the ordin- 
ary maps it mill be secn Lhat the Heriserai is on the Persian 
sick of thc bridge, slnncling o n  Lhe r i g h ~  bank of the Ker- 
shef-Rud. T h e  datc of its erection is given as in Timour's 
time. Thc view taken by m e  is looking south, and the 
high I d l s  forming the backgi-ound are all an thc Persian 
sick. Thc I<ershef-Rud is n small stream which cnters the 
Ilcri-Rud on  its left bank only a few yards bclow the 
bridge." 
Let tlic readcr renlizc lhe conmercial and military 
advantages of this position ; f ~ ~ r t h e r ,  that llle fortress resting 
on that position I~elongs Lo a prince who is virtually a vassal 
of Russia ; further still, that the position, capable of a large 
development, lies by thc valley of the I-Ieri-rdd, 2 0 2  miles, 
by the alternative route along the Murghdb valley, a 
somewhat shorter distance, from I-Ierit : ~hal:  it is aboul. 
Go miles from R'lcrv, and f h i  Ihc routes j5.m Ihc flun plnccs 
to Hcnff, by thc i%rrrrg/r(lb ?:alley, r o n v c ~ p  nf Pm@ic/r : 
let him rcalise all this, and then ask witl~surprise wader 
what blind infatuntion has the Eritish Government per- 
lnittcd the occupation of tllesc t\vo threatening positions, 
h.le1.v a n d  Si~rakhs, by a colossal po\ \w which is advancing 
towards Indin, \vithout making n corresponding forward 
movement from the I n d u s ?  
l ' hc  considcration of this infatuation will fornl the su11- 
j e c l  of the nest  chapter. 
TI4E INFATUATIOX OF GREAT BCI'I'AIN. 
Tm Ministers of the Crown of Great Britain a ~ i d  Ireland 
are, or are supposed to bc, the eseculors of the will of tlie 
people of those islnnds. However culpnbly ignorant and 
culpably hcff.icient n ministry may be, i t  is unfair then abso- 
lutcly to condc~nn them if the people whom they represent 
absolve thcm. If the people of these islancls are mis- 
governed, if ~ h c y  sanction a policy which tends to the loss 
of Inclix, they hnvc mainly tl~emsel\~cs to blnnw. 111 de- 
scribing "tlie infatuation of Great Britain" I shall describe 
a coursc of conduct n~hich, tllo~igh initiated by the minister, 
has bccn sanctioned by the people. It isLto the people that 
I appeal. I tell the111 that that policy which Lhey have 
sanctioned is risking thc loss of  heir greatest dependency. 
I implore then1 not to he I~linclccl by oratorical platitudes, 
but to look facts sternly in the face. I make this appeal not 
as a party-man, for it \ \ f i l l  be seen I blnnie both partics, but 
a s  an Englislmian who loves his country and who feels that 
tlie empire \\phich has been created by the vdour, by the 
energy, by the skill, and by the devotion of our forefathers 
can only be nlnintninecl by the display of the same 
qualities by their descendants ! 
At the close of the third chapter I brought the action 
o r  the Eritish Government up to the year ISGY, the year in 
which, Samnrkliand having been anncxed ancl Bolchdra con- 
trolled by Russia, Lord Clarendon made his famous pro- 
position for constituting Afghdnistdn as a neutral zone, ancl 
rcccived in rcply Prince Gortschnld~'s nssumncc, that his 
master, LIieCznr, "Ioolts Ilpon AfghLnistdn ns completely with- 
out h c  splierc in which 1R11ssia may be called upon to excr- 
cisc her infiucncc." I :~lclecl, that on tlie Government of 
India objec,ting to nn nrmngen.lent which \voulcl removc 
i1fgli;inisl:in complc~ely from tlie sphere of British influencc, 
thc negotiations with Russia were prolonged for two years, 
the Russian Government continuing to protcst, by the ~nouth 
of its Chnncellor, that L'Russia l1ac1 no inLenlion of going 
further s o ~ d i , ~ ~  and that (( extension of territory was extcn- 
sion of \veakness." I shewed further that.with these honied 
terms upon I~er lips Russia was, during those two years, 
preparing for the spring upon ICliiva which she made in 
1873. I now propose to rcsumc the history of the recent 
negotiations of tlie (';overnments of Grcat Britain and 
Indin from the period, January ISG~, when Slicr Ali, having 
o\;crconie all his rivals, became unqueslioned ruler of 
Afglidnistin. 
In Llie autu~i~n ' im~i~cdi i~te l~  precccling his dccisive vic- 
tory in January 1869 over his relative, Abclul Rahman, thc 
vic~orious Aniir, Slier Rli, bclicving his authority to be per 
manently established, requcstcd tlie TAieutenant-Governor of 
the Punj311, Sir Donald Mncleod, to inrorni the Viceroy- 
~ l i c  late J,ord Lawrence-that, in order to concert a good 
~ndcrs~anding between tlie two Governnicnts it \vould be a 
salishrtion Lo himself if the Viceroy would meet him at 
I'csl~d\\wr or solne other place on tlic frontier. The Vice- 
roy was willing Lo grant the interview, and would have 
armngccl it, but, beforc preliminaries could be se~tlecl, there 
occurred that invasion by Abdul Rahman, the repelling 
of which demanded all t.hc energies of Sher Ali. 
l'wo n~onLl~s after tlie decisive battle \vhich confirmed 
Sher Ali on his throne Lord Lawrence left India. His suc- 
cessor, the Earl of Mayo, possessed the rare and difficult 
P 
gift of n thorough knowledge of his felIo\v-mcn. I-Ie ' 
was quick, bcgonrl all men \vhom I 11nve mct, in rcacli~~g 
character, This gift, joined to great decision and cncrgy, 
\vould have lnndc him under any circumstnnces n stror~g 
man. But, added to it, and gilding, as it were, all his 
nctions, tI1c1.c was a singulnr charm of manner, which im- 
pressed cve;yone with whom he came in contact, and 
which was sure to csercise, and which did exercise, a 
remarkable influence over an 0rient.al people. 
One of ~ h c  first acts of the new Viccroy was to esanlinc 
thc rclnlions existing bclween Inclin, ancl the ruler of thc 
mountainous region on ils north-wcstern border. Renliri- 
ing n t  once the importance of thc interview ndiich Shcr 
Ali liad solicited from his predecessor, Lord Mayo at o11cc 
forwarded to him an invitation to meet him at Ambala. 
'The invitation was nccepled. 
,., Shcr ?Zli came to Amlxila in the spring of 1869. Had 
the l~nncls of Lord Mnyo been free, it is quite possible that 
. 
an arrangement might have been arrivcd at which \vould 
hnvc prcvcntcd the second Afighnn war and hnvc rendered 
ilnpossiblc Ki.~ssinn aggression. But Lcrd i\ilayc\'s hands 
werc ticd \wy ~iglitly indeed. Shortly after his acceptance 
of tlie~office of Viceroy, llie Minister who hnd rcco~iimel~ded 
him for that office had bee11 displaced ; and there liad come 
inlo poner a h'linistry upon whom a phrase invented bj7 
I Lord L.nntrence, the phrase '' masterly inacti\~it)~,";exe~.cised 
a f:lscination which its very victims would find it now difli- 
cult to explain. The rcnl meaning of this phmse, as in- 
terpreted by 1-he action of those who adopted it, was h a t  
Ihssin might do as she pleased in Ccntrnl Asia, provided 
sllc did not touch Afg1i:inistdn; whilst British India 
should retnain inactive, not eiicunlberi~g herself with an 
offcnsivc alliancc with a power bejrond i ~ s  aclual frontier, 
least of all with AfghiuistAn, and taking care to give 119 
- 
pledge to support thc dynasty of tllc actual ruler of that 
country. 
If \\lc bear in mind this fcttcrecl position of Lord Mnyo, 
we shall casily recognize the greahess of the clisnppoint- 
mcnt likely to accrue to the Amir Sher Mi. For Sher Ali 
had come to Ambdla full of h o p  of obtaining the support 
\vhich a dependent wler has a right to cspccl: from his 
suzerain. Sher Ali had. come to Ambdla hopef~~ l  of se- 
curing an offensive and defensive alliance with the Govern- 
ment of India. H e  desired n full assurance of protection 
against Russian aggression, Lhe prospects of which, ever 
since the fall of Samarlchand, had filled him \rill1 q )~ .ehen-  
sion. Re  wished to be assured, in a distinct and absolute 
manner, that the British ~voulcl recognize as his successor, 
in his own lifetime, the son \vho~n IIC was prcpared to 
nominate. Thesc were Lhc cardinal aims which had 
l m ~ n p t e d  him to solicit an intervie\v from Lord Lair- 
rcnce, and \vhich influencecl him to accept Llle invita- 
tion of Lord IvIaFo. H e  had come to ilmbila in the full 
hope that his wishes with respect to all of Lhem would be 
gratified. Even we, who arc I~ehind thc scenes, nnd \\rho 
know how conq~letely the hands of Lord Mayo were Lied, 
cannot realize the full inensure of the disappointment in 
store for him. 
Thc charm of Lord Mayo's manner won indecd the 
heart of the man, but thc spirit of his replies wounded to 
Lhe quick the soul of the An+. With respect to Sher Ali's 
cle~nand for a spccific promise of full l~rotcction against 
Russian aggression, Lord hhyo  could rcply only with 
the vague promise  hat " he would be strengthened from 
~ i ~ n c  to h i e  as circunlstances might sccnl to re- 
quire ; " Lhnt Fis applications for assistance \vould 
always bc receivcd " with consideration and respect." 
Nor, on the domcstic question, was the answer hc 
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received one whit more satisfactory to the Amir. I l c  
was not cvcn solaced \it11 n promise that lme wo~dd be 
supported against any nltcmpt \vllicIm his rivals mighl. ~ n a k e  
to unseat him. T h e  utmost he could obtain \vas a n  
assurance that any attempt on their p a t  \\could be regardccl 
by the Eritish Government with '' scvcre displeasure ; " 
whilst as to the recognition of his favouritc son as his 
successor, although, with respect to that, lie made-to use 
I,ord Milyo's esprcssion--" thc most urgent nncl prominent 
demancls ; " statcd his carnest wish that the GovernmenL. of 
Indin ' l  sl~oulcl acknowledge not only hiinself, but his lineal 
descendants or successors in hlood ;" and added that, if 
this wcrc accorded '' there .was nothing he would not d o  
to evince his gratitude," he was met, as  far as Lord Mnyo 
was conccrned, by a reluctant " 71on possumlts ! " 
Sher Ali returncd to 1iLbul a sincere admirer a n d ,  per- 
sonal friend of 1,ord Mayo, but utterly clisqlpointed with 
the political results of his journey. % all intents and 
purposes he was in x position, with respect to Gritish 
support, but littlc bettcr than that which he had occrlpied 
when h c  accepted the invitalion. I J c  ventcd his fcelings in 
tlw bitter rcnlark: "Thc English carc only for tllemsclves!" 
Yet-and it is a rcmnrltnble resalt of thc glamour eser- 
cised I)y those fital \vords '' ~nnsl-erly inactivity "- evcn the 
vague assurances of I ,ord Mayo had excited the alarnm of 
the Ministry in England. T h e  plmr+x i~sed by the Viceroy 
that any application for assistance on the part of tlme Amir, 
would be  received "with consideration and respect " was 
objcctecl to by thc Minister for India, on the ground that 
those words " mny sonmc day be  construed by tlme Amir or 
by his successors as meaning more than, with those cx- 
glanatiom "--i.c.,  the verbal cxplanaliolr; given by Lord 
Mayo to the Anmir-" they were intended to convey." 
T h e  same Minister even wrote a despatch t~ the Viceroy, 
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in whicl~, anlongst other matters, he objected to tlic term 
" rigli~ful rule " as applied to the rule of Slier Ali over 
Alghdnistin ! 
'Time went on. T h e  IZussinn Governnient, after nniusing 
for nrorc than two years the Critish Ministry wit11 vague 
and spccious proniiscs, struck at and captured I<lii\q in 
1873. 'l'lie nc\vs of this cnpturc rcached l<;il~ul in June of 
tlie same year. I t  lillccl thc mind of the Amir wit11 tcrrol: 
T h e  c n t a s ~ o p h e  which he l i d  secn looming in the f ~ ~ l r ~ r e  
at  Amblila had conlc upon him. ICllivn had folloncd 
Sanmkhand. 'I'l~e turn of Afgliinistbn \\.auld follonr 1'1111 
of tliesc apprelicnsions Ilc strctcl~ed out his hands Lo the 
Viceroy, tclling him \hat t l ~ e  vnguc assurances or h m b d l : ~  
were insuficient for the prescnt clncrgcucy, and desiring to 
kno\s how fnr lic niigllt rely upon l:ri\isli Iiclp I T  Iic shoulcl 
bc invaclccl. 
11 was, suldy, n i ,nlu~d requcst, this solicitnlion lrom 111c 
commnnclcr of tI;c outcr hul\\~n~.lc of I-lindusta~l to  tlie ruler 
of the coun(ry 1\711icli that bul\\wk covercd. I t  was a 
rcqncst \vllicli s l i o ~ l d  have rcceivecl n synipntllixing nnd IT- 
assuring reply. 
l 'hc Viceroy of India \\Ins no longer Lord Mayo. l'lint 
nobleman had been nssnssi~latecl in tlic Andmmnns by n 
convict scntencccl to penal servit~~cle for murder, and l i d  
been succeeded by Lord N ~ r t l ~ b r ~ o l i ,  n lnnn whose colcl 
unr;yinl~athizing manners nnd liarcl ullimnginnti~e nalr~rc 
were not calculated to concilinte. 
Lord Nortlibroo1c did not feel ernpo\verecl to reply to  tlic 
nicssoge of tlie Amir, I)ut rclerrcd it by telegram to tlie 
Ministry at Iiome, tllc snmc Ministry n.11icl1 had adopted with 
respect to Indin the fatal principle summcd u p  in tlie 
Lnwrcntian 111otic. 'l'hc reply Iic rewived is north rccord- 
ing as  n specimen of thc "masterly inibecility" which 
pervncled British councils in July 1873. 
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" C;tbinct thii~ks," so ran thc tclcgra~n, " you should 
inform Amir that n.c do not  a t  all share liis al;lrm, and 
consiclcr there is no cause for i t ;  but  you nxly nssurc 
him we shrill maintain our scttled policy in f~tvour 
or Afglidnistdn if hc abides your advice in cstcrnnl 
ah i r s . "  
'l'lic I<han,ite of Iiliiva anncxed, and no causc for 
alarm ! Surcly ihat w s  cold conifort for a ruler who, on  
the spct, posscssccl tlie best m a n s  for judging ! W e  
do not  share his alarm." Wc-who Ilnve bccn dripccl I)y 
this \.cry act of Russia ; \vho new told that thc espcclitiun 
n.as a \cry little one, that far from its being ihc intention 
of the Cznr to h k c  lihiva, positive orders Iind becn sent 
to prevent it ; me, who, after the' event, elo not. care to 
exnmine I' too minutely how far ihcse nlxtngcmcnts were in 
strict a c c o r d a ~ ~ e  with the assurances given in Jmiuary ; " 
wc, who hnce hcen duped at  every turn and who have 
been wrong in every forccast-we "do ~ i o t  a t  all sharc liis 
nlnr~u, and co~isicler there is no cause f d i t  ! " Cold com- 
fort Lliat, I repent, coming fro111 such n qunltcr, for an 
ansious nncl nlat.mecl rulvr ! 
Cold co~ilfosL i n t l c d  Shcr Ali found it. Such n mcssage 
w s  cnlculntccl to confirm lathcr tlim to rclno\,c his fcius, 
Rut lic did not evcn then tlespnil: I-Ic would placc bcfore 
tlie Governor-General, and, through him, bcfore thc British 
Government, Iicts \dlich should speak, and he ~\lould make 
a find appeal to thcir justice and to their interests. I n  this 
intent, Shcr Ali Lransmittecl frcsh instructions to nn agent 
wlio~n he hnil prcvionsly c1esp:~tclicd to Simla, the summer 
residence o f  thc Viccroy, n n o l h n a n  n,ho enjoycd all his 
confidcncc, S:iincl Nur  Muha~~imncl Sh:ih, urging him to 
press for certain dcfinite concessions OI.* thc t\vo ~nat tcrs  
which he himself hncl so strongly ~~rgecl  a t  Ambdla, viz., 
the absolutc assurance of suppor against Russia n7hcn h e  
l'h l / l f o f / m f i o / ~  of Gr-rat Briiizilt: 7 1 
should denland it, and the recognition of his hvouritc son 
as his succcssor. 
Nur Muhammacl ShAh carried out these instructions to 
the letkr. I-Ic had had one interview with Lord North- 
brook on the 12th July : a second was accorded to him on 
thc 30th. So far as related to the c.nlming of the appreben- 
sions or satisfying the demands of thc Alnir these interviews 
nwc absolutely unproductivc. 'I'hcir result may l ~ c  sumnled 
up in a letter addressed by orclcr of Lhe Viceroy to Lhe 
Amir. In that letter the Anir  nf3s informcd that whilst 
the Viceroy did not entertain any npprehension of clnngcr 
to his Highness's dominions from withoul, yet that " the 
the British Government will endeavour from time to time, 
by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen 
thc Government of your High l~cs~ ,  Lo snnblc you to 
csercise with equity ancl justice your rightlhl rule, ancl to 
tmnsmil to your clcscenclants all the dignities and  honours 
of which you are thc lawfi~l possessor." I n  LIE same letler 
the Avlir zilns ilzhi~jdcd of thc n s s ~ n ~ t s  g h n  by l h s i [ z  ns 
20 his co~mfiy bei/ly quite B ~ J O N ~  the sjhoa within ~ h i ~ i i  she 
7ems cnlM ?@on fo exwisc her iri@//c~trc. Easing his 
dccision on that assurance, Lord Northlxook "postpoaed 
to n morc convenient opportunity" the discussion of the 
mensurcs to be taken in thc event cE an attack upon 
Afglxinistdn ! 
I n  tllc n~ind of Shcr Ali this letter was a deathblow to all 
his expectations. Lct us for 3. moment rcalize his position. 
He ruled the middlc region between two colossal powers, 
lhglancl and Russia. Every reason, gcogmphical position, 
pcrsonnl fecling, his knowledge of the pmctical justice of 
hcr rulc in India, promptccl him to link his lot with the 
former. But Gussia was advancing \\lit11 giant s~ridcs. 
She mas wilhin striking clistnnce of his cnstcm ljordcr at 
Samarlihancl; thc cnpturc of Khivn hncl enstucd to her n 
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position wliicli musk sooncr or Intcr bring her on to his west- 
ern frontier; her agents wcrc busy tliroi~gliout Central Asia 
dwelling upon her power ;und boasting of lier intcntiotis ; 
he wished to I)e i n  a position to be able to clcfy alilre lier 
protnises and her threats. In reply to his denland to be 
placed in  such a position, hc rcceived only general assur- 
ances that lie had 11o ground for his alarm. 
That the Amir was right in construing as evasive tlie 
reply of Lord No~thbroolc is proved by tlic lettcr from that 
noblemari to tlic Sccrct-nry of Stntc for India espl:~ini~ig ts
nicatiing. 111 Lhat Ictter the Viceroy slated that thc envoy 
of the Amir had becn informcd that " i f ,  in thc event (f 
O / ~ I  U ~ ~ Y ~ . S J ' ; O / I  $ h / / 1  7ijiLh(1//L, fi/,iLi~h ~ V J I I C I ~ ~ T  ~ ~ U I Z  i / / t ' ~ h d ,  
njln'ftrikd hy j!ga/in/rbn /o E/%d n sn/is/;rc/my srtfZciim/, 1%' 
II'AS PROBAB.LB /hut lhc Brilish Go7~e7'n~n~'nt T C I O I / / I ~ '  
nJud the Aulir ~j iaich Z assisln~rcc i/i ?+/:iqy crn ~ I L Z J ~ ~ L ' I . ;  
but that such assist;~ncc \voulcl be conditional on the Amir 
following the advice of the British Government, and having 
hitiiself abstained from aggession." . 
Observe : the above is the TTiccroy's own interpretation 
of his om11 reply to the Anlir ! \\':is it a rcply calculated 
to reassure? \\hs it a wply wo~~tliy cf the occasion, 
worthy of a statesillan ? IIcrc mas tlie comnlander of tlic 
outlying bulmalk telling tltc Govcrnor of tlie rich city 
whicli it covcred that lie dreaded the sudden attack of 3 
sul~tlc enemy, and ixgging for n dcfinite nssilrance that lie 
would be protected. I n  reply the Governor refuscs to 
jwonlise him protection : tells him only that if hc were 
attncl~ccl negotiation \\~ould first be tried ; that thcn, if 
negotiation were to G d ,  thcrc was-not a certainty let it be 
notccl-but nprobnbih%y that lie would bc protected : nncl 
that only if lie nere to comply wit11 certaii~conditiot~s ! 
Mark these conditions. 'L'Iic first : that he should follow 
the advice of tlie British Guvernnicnt : truly a liard con- 
dition, for the British Government might have adviscd him 
to yield a I'ul-i-Khi~tun or a Panjdch in order to rclnin the 
remainder of his dominions. T h e  second condition wns 
harder still. lL ' rha t  lie slmnlcl himsclf have abstilincd from 
aggression." Nothing casicr in \\m-cls, nothing more 
diffict~lt, in the presence of Russia, in practice. T h e  stmy- 
ing of a few herdsmen across tlic I~order might be tcrmetl 
aggression. The  history of Russia, and her connection with 
the states she has swallo\\wl up, is n constant repetition of 
the story of the wolf nnd thc lain!) ! 
Looking back at  that unhappy episode, I cannot I~elirve 
that the most prominent British actors in it would care 
to defend it. 'I'he reply of the Viceroy \\,as ungenerous, 
~instntesm~nlike, and un\vorthy. I t  1.)roducccl the only 
possible result \vhicli a clear-headed man could Iiave 
ilnticilx~lcd from it. I t  alicnatecl 11ie hni i r  f m n  I~:ngl:intl, 
and clisl)osccl him to receive \\,it11 favour Llic adv i~ncc i  
of Kussia. His  scnsc of t l ~ c  un\\,orthy tone of Lord 
Nortlil~rool;'s letl%r, mith its iissllrances of probnblc nssist- 
ance in case lie sl~ould bc nttnckctl, found vcnt i l l  the 
sarcastic reply ~vliicli he  tmnsmittcd : "l 'he frirndly 
dcclaration of your Excellency," he wrote in November of 
thc smile year, " to the effcct that you w i l l  maintain to\vnrds 
mc the same policy wl~icli was followed Ijy J.ord Lawrence 
and by Lord &layo, lins I~een the causc of much grntificntion 
to me, My friend ! Undcr tllcse circumslances of the case 
it was not necessary to hold all tl;osc conversations with 
Saiad Mur Muhammad ShAh ! T h e  understanding arrived 
at  a t  Anib~lla is quite sufficient " ! From that moment his 
confidential correspondence with thc Viceroy ceased. " I 
arn dctermincd," he said, " to rcceivc no morc favours from 
the British Govc~dtmcnt !" 
Russia mea!~while was continuing her mole-like work 
in  Central Asia. T h c  fruit of this ~vork was ncxt seen in 
February 1S76, \vhen she absorbed the remaining moicly 
of Kholiancl, permitting only the principality of Ih-atigiiin 
to rctnin a condition of semi-independence. 
In  the spring of that gear Lord Lytton succeeded Lord 
Northhrook as Viceroy of Indin. The  ncw Viceroy cnmc 
out empo\vcred by his Government to repair, if it were 
possible, tlic miscliief which hacl been accomplished, by 
offering to the Amir the activc support a n d  protection, 
inclilcling thc formal rccogni~ion of his dynasty, \vhicIi hc 
had previously vainly cle~~~andecl  a t  the I~ands of the British 
(;o\wnment. Eut before Lord Lytton had been ablc to 
open conlmnnicalions with the Amir, ccrhin evcnts had 
happenccl \diich had confirmed that potentake in the llostilc 
attitude which he had assunlecl after thc mission of Saiad 
Nur l \ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ a r n r n a c l  Slidli in 1873. 
There 11x1 been a dispute of long standing between 
Afglxirlisthn and  Persia regarding certain lands in SSisl-An, 
tllc south.western province of the former state. I n  the 
cnil.bot11 powers had agrced to refer tRc matter to Lhe 
arbitration of England. Sllortlp bcfore Tmcl Lytton Ianclecl 
in India, thc arbitmtors had given a dccision very much in 
favour of l'crsia. This  result of a .diKerencc in which lie 
belicved tli;rt all tlic right \\.as on his side so cnibittelml [he 
A~ilir that, conling as it did after the S imh conferences, lie 
n~tributed it to n sc~L1ccI design on the part of Englnnd to 
humilintc, to weaken, and to insult him. 
l'lic action of h e  Government of India  in anollicr 
nialler oil which lie vns extremely sensitive still further . 
embittercd the Amir against the Critish. * 
7'hc son who had accompnnicd Sher Ali to A~nbdla  
in I S ~ O ,  and on whose Leli:~lT I:c had pleaded to Lord 
Mayo, \vns his youngest boy, Al~dilla Jh+, born to him by 
his favourite wile. Popular sympathy liacl howcver been 
excikc1 in AfghLinistbn and in India in favour of  an clder son, 
Yalcilb : t h i n ,  nt Llic lime govcrnor of I-Tcr:it, and n~ho  \vns 
believed to bc cndowed n-it11 more than orclinnry ability. 
This general i~nprcssion as to thc capacity of Yakill~ KhLn 
kncled, in the belief of h e  Amir, to thc d i spnmpuent  of 
his.favom.itc in public esti~nation. His first act, thereforc, 
on his rc2lurn from tlic Ambdln confcrc~ice, had becn to 
entice Ynhdb IChdn to I<dl~ul, nncl to thro\v him into a 
dungeon. This act was so far rescntecl by h e  Govern- 
ment of Indin thnt it ncvcr failed to press upon the Amir 
it's opinion of the inj~!stice and impolicy of his action, and  
to urge the release of the prisoner. This conshnl: I-emon- 
strancc, coming after d l  thc Amir's requests had bcen 
dcnied, had cngcnclered feelings which the dccision rc- 
garding SSistd~i increased to positivc linlred. 
T h e  Amir was umdcr the influcncc of this pnssion when 
Lord 1,ytton arrived in Indi:~. O ~ i c  of llie first political 
acts of the ncw Viceroy wns to despntch a native Aicle-clc- 
camp to Kibul  with a message of rcconcilialion, But  
t11c cvil had b&n clone. Sher Ali liacl already tnkcn his 
part. There wcrc at thc timc Kussinn agents in Iifibul, 
agents who rcadily pron~iscd what thc Iinglish had rcfi~sed, 
:uld mho llncl therefore cntire possession of his mil~cl. Sher 
Ali declincd then, os~entatiously, to reccive the messenger 
of the Yiccroy, ancl tl loi~gl~ the conciliatory langl~agc of 
Lord T.ytton rendcred it impossible fur him Lo refuse thn 
propo:inl that a c,onferencc between two duly-empo\vered 
envoyi from the two courts should take place at  Pesh;iwar, 
he took care Lo furnish his envoy with instructions \ r l ~ i c l ~  
s l~ould render the negotinlions fruitless. 
T h e  interview bctwcen the two negotiators took place at  
Pesh:i\vnr in the cnrly part of 1877. England was repre- 
sentcd on that. occasion by Sir J.ewis Pellg, a very dis- 
~inguishcd oficer, who, lincl some years before, mnde Lhe 
journey, alonc, wearing all the timc Rritish uniform, 
from 'l'el~eran to the Uritisli frontier, crossing n danger- 
ous comer of Afghanistan, and who wns thoroughly 
accloainletl with the habits, language, and moclcs of thought 
of [lie people. '1'0 that able oflicer it soon became 
apparent that, since 1873, Lhe d t s  of the negotiators had 
been invcrtcd. 111 Lhat year it had been the Rritish Vice- 
roy \die had declined all the propositions of  lie Amir : 
in 1877, it was the representative of ILibul ~ v h o  refused 
his assent !o the lerms of nccommodnlion and rcconcilin- 
tion set for111 hy the reprcscntativc of the Hrilish Govern- 
nient. T o  S L I C ~  ;In extcnt did this proceed, so unaccum- 
moclnting-even hostile-did thc lnngr~age of the l<.ibul 
envoy at Ins1 I.)ecomc, that tlic Viceroy wisely took ndvantagc 
of the death of that nobleloan to declare (lie conference 
a t  an end. 
lt'rom  lint moment the Governnient of India, acting 
upon instructions from England, resolved " t o  maintain an 
altitr~dc of vigilant reserve until sr~ch time as  the Anlir 
might bclter realize his own position nncl"inte~.esls." 'rliis 
policy wns persevered in for twenty months, During Lhnt 
pcriod the aggressive action of Russia continued to dc- 
velop itself. 'l'licre cannot be a doubl but ~ h n t ,  liad Llic 
ncgolintions I)el\vecn England and l<ussin in rS78 tcrmi- 
natcd in x ruplure betvccn the two powers, IZussin was 
prcpiuecl lo follom in  the foolsteps of Niclir Sliii11-to 
threaten from tlic base of n friendly Afglirinistin llic 
empire of Hindustan. Under  these circumstnnces, it 
was not. possible, that the nritish Govcrnmcnt sliould 
remain quiescent, \vhen-a breach betnfeen Russia and 
England seeming to be a question not of days but of 
hours-the Amir receivecl nil11 remarkable ostcntation an 
embassy despatcl~ecl LO Iiiln by tlic Czar I n 
Pet  though it was impossible that the British COVCIII- 
ment sl~oulcl allow to pass withor~t 11olice a n  act which 
constituted a brcach of thc engagement existing bc~wecn 
itself and the Aniir-the engagement niadc between 1)ost 
Muhammcd and Mr. John Lawrence in 1854, accepted by 
Sher Ali on his zccession, confirmed by him at An~bdlx 
in 1870, and never s~ibsequcntly abrogated-the cngagc- 
ment that he would be '( the friend of the friends and 
the encmy of the cnemies" of thc Dritish Government- 
thc noticc which the Viceroy did take of il was remark- 
able for ils moderation. Lord Lytton simply requirecl 
that tlie Amir, having welcomed an embassy fro111 the 
Czar, should receive in  his capital an embassy from the 
Viceroy of British India. H e  informed [-lie Amir at Llle 
same time that his refmal would bc consLrued a s  an un- 
friendly, evcn a s  a hostile, act. 
T h e  conduct of Sher Ali on receiving the friendly 
lettcr containing this proposal from Lhc Viccroy was more 
than discourtco~~s. Not  only clid he vouchsafe LO it n o  
reply, but lie directed (he officer commanding the arl\~ancecl 
posts in the di?cction of the British frontier to  refusc 
admission to the British envoy and his retinue, and, if 
necessary, to repel him by force ! 
T h e  Viceroy, meanwhile, hacl directed the distinguisliecl 
ofiicer whom lie had nominated to be cnvoy-General Sir 
Neville Chamberlain-to proceed on his mission. But  
when Chamberlain attenlpted to  enler the I<haibar pass 
he  found its heights occupied by the army of the Amir. 
H c  was, in fact, ref~lsccl admittance ! 
l'he position had now become very strained. Lord 
Lytton had t o  consider that the mountainous region 
covering tlie north-\vestern frontier of the empire of \vhich 
h e  was Viceroy, a region upon the maintenance of which 
the predecessorsrof the English, the hfogols, had always. 
insisted, which covers all the passes through which in- 
vaders of India have passecl and  niust ~ ~ s s ,  and the 110s- 
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scssion of which by Russia nwuld Ic:ive India at the 
nlcrcy of Russia, was nois held by an Arnir who, spurn- 
ing his offers, had consented to be the vassal of Russia. 
He ]mad to consider that every mow of the Amir, his 
hostile attitude, his refusal to receive his envoy, had been 
dictated by tlie Russian guests whoni lie was entertaining 
a t  his capital, and that these might at any moment suggest 
action which would for ever paralyze British interests. 
, . Ihem was a strong Russian force at  SnmnrLhand, and 
there were detachments betnlccn thnt city and ICBbul. If  
these were to be called up, tlie situation would become 
cstremely perilous. 
Reluctant, hon.ever, to proceed to estrenmities, Lord 
Lytton resolved to afford tlie Anlir one more opportunity 
to return to n. better mind. H e  wrote tq him, then, to the 
effect that n marked insult had been offered to the envoy 
\vhom 11c ]mad ordcrcd to procced on a co~nplinlentnry , 
visit to his capital; that lic trusted the Anlir would, upon 
reflection, realize that such action was fiot in accordance 
\sit11 friendly relations between two neighbouring nations : 
tliat, if deliberately intended, it was a hostile act ; but 
that in the hopc tliat it was not deliberately intended 
the Viceroy \\us glad to give the Amir the opportunity 
of disavowing it, or, if it liad been clone by his exprcss 
orders, of now expressing his regret for the sanie. Lord 
Lptton adclecl, that unless a satisfactory reply werc rc- 
ceived before the zoth November he should bc forced to 
regard the insull as clelilxrate and intentional, and tliat 
h e  should treat the Amir as an enemy. 
Tlic date, tlie not11 November, fixed for the rcceipt of 
the reply, allowed the Amir six clear days to consider his 
posilion. On the 19th lle penned a wply-a reply as 
. evasive and unsatisfxtoi-y as the coinnmunication he ]mad 
received in 1873 from Lord Northbrook, Tliis reply die! 
. . 
-~ p~ 
not howevcr reach the Viceroy Lill many days after the 
date he had mcntioned. On that date liostilities had com- 
menced. 
Such was tlie origin of the second Afgli;in mar, A hard 
and unelastic principle of policy, the principle thoroughly 
expressed in tlic words " illastcrIy inactivity" applied to it  
by its authors, designed in its origin to deal with a n  
Afglxinistdn boundcd on tlic north and north-wcst by wild 
and independent tribcs, had been rigorously appliccl to nil 
Afghdnistdn natclling with beating Ilcnrt tlie stcady nbsorp- 
tion of those indcpcnclent tribes by the great Northcrn 
P o w r  \\~hich sincc 1859 had been no longer held back 
by  thc barriers of the Caucasus. I n  her fear and her 
agony All1:inist~in had nppcalcd to tllc Power of \vhich 
she licrself constituted the outer bul\\wlc--shc had q ~ ~ e a l e d  
to the British rulers of I-iindustbn. I n  her appeal to those 
rulers shc pointcd to the fact that onc kingclorn on her 
north-eastern border 11x1 bcen virtual!y sn:allowed up ; 
that but one mofith had clnpsed since nnothcr Icingclom, 
beyond her north-western frontier, had been suddenly a n d  
without wartling nnnexed ; that she was n o n  threatenrd ; 
and she a s l i d  alike for synipathy and assistance. Both 
werc refused. An empire n~igllt  be lost, but the principle 
of a, hdlo\vcd phrase \ms not t o  bc infhgccl. ' rhe rulers 
of England, but just a\\~tkeniiig to the conviction that, in 
the  inatter of Kl~ivn, they had  been deliberately triclicd 
ancl deccived by liussin, professed thcir willingness to be  
cleceivcd once again, to believe plcclges made only to be 
broken, to trust in promises \vhich were violated before the 
p p c r  had absorbed the ink with which they were written. 
They answered then thc entreaties of Afghinistin with a, 
complacent asslyaiice that they did not share hcr alarm ; 
that, if shc \ \we  attacked by Russia, and if, then, the 
~legotiators of England failed to  induce that power t o  
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desist, il was " probable " that they ~voulcl assis1 Afghin- 
istdn with troops, provided always it were made clear to 
thew Illat her rulcr \voulcl follow their advice and that 
AfghhistLn " had al~stained fro111 aggccssion " ! Well 
might tlie Amir remark " the goat attacks not the panther; " 
well might lie declizre his detern~ination to receive no more 
favou~.s froin the English ! Can we wonder that, bnRled in 
his hopes, as he knew himself to bc, fooled, as he bclievcd 
hi~nsclf to be, he should take an  early opportunity to dcry 
his former protector, and throw Ilimsclf into the arms of 
England's enemy ? Between two colossal po\vers, onc of 
whom was. profuse of promises, tlie othcr cold and un- 
sympathetic, it was surely natural that he should prefcr t11c 
former ! 
The second Afghdn war, then, was the natural outcoine 
of the repellant policy of 1873. I t  devolved upon Lord 
Lyttol~ to carry it out. H e  had a great opportunity. I n  
the Indian army he possessed, in I S ~ S ,  an unsurpassed 
material, and he was giltecl with t l~c  pow&. of ~nlting accu- 
rate stock of the inen with whom he mas brought into 
contact. I t  mas Lhe perception of Lord Lytton thnt gavc 
to  Sir Frederick Roberts the opportunity which broi~ghl: 
him speedily Lo the very foremost rank. Side by sidc with 
lioberts were such inen as Cliai-lcs MacCregor, Donald 
Stewnrt, James Ilills, not to spealc-for the list is a long 
onc-of very many others. The  Sikh and Glirkah regi- 
m c n ~ s  were well-drilled and disciplined and eager for a 
forwnrd move~nent. The cavalry, the artillery, the com- 
missariat, mere thoroughly organized and ready for the 
campaign. \Vhilst Lorcl Lytton, then, had a splendicl oppor- 
tunity, he possessed ample means for using tlixt oppor- 
tu~iity, for settling for ever the Russo-&ighan question. 
That  hc did not settle it is clear. How was it then that 
h e  failed ? 
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T h e  fault \\,as not the f ~ i d t  of Lord Lgtton. I n  ~ h e  
part \\hich clevol\~ed ~11mi him lie liad done all that was 
possible. H c  had rhosen Lhc right men and sr~pplied 
them with thc bcst mnlcrials. A civilian, even Lliough he 
wcrc Viceroy, could d o  no more. 'l'he rcsulls justified his 
m:icipnlions. 'I'he scco~itl hfglinn war had begun the 20th 
of Novcmbcr, I S ~ S .  111 M;ly of the ycar following Yakilb 
Iih:in, son and succcssor of Amir Slicr hli ,  ~ v h o  I ~ a d  dicd, 
cnlercd thc Uri~.ish camp a supplicant for pcacc ! 
That  event gave the 13ritish Govcrnrnent the long-dcsirecl 
opporLunity, J n  n speccl~ nladc a t  the Lord Mayor's 
banquet in Noven~ber  1878, Lord ~caconsl icld had dc- 
claret1 thal the main objcct of Llic arniccl intcrvcntinn i n  
Afghdnistin was to obtain ': a scientific frontier.:' Like all 
Llic plirnses used I)y that dishguislied stalesman when lie 
wished LO empl~asisc n particular linc of action, lhe phrase 
c : ~ 1 ~ l i 1  Lhe public car nncl \\.as repealed nll over the country. 
Not  cvcry one, however, aslied himself or cared to ask 
others \\.lint it rcal?y meant. T h e  phrase was so sonorous 
and espressive Lhnt the general lx~blic \v;~s conlent to  accept 
it without il~quirp. 
Therc wcrc, lio\\wer, some \vho examined more closely 
its r e d  meaning. Alnongst these \\m the gallant soldier 
and distinguishecl strategist from whose lecture in 1884. I 
havc quolcd i n  a p r a i o i ~ s  chaptcr, Licuienant-General 
Sir Ed\rnrcl T-l'amlcy. 
'I'o Sir E d \ \ w d  Hamley the phrase could havc but o11e 
significance. '1'0 llim n scientific frontier meant a strategicnl 
fronticr-a frontier, \vhich, making India safc against cvery 
chance of invasion, should allow the races hehind it's line 
to livc unclislurbed by continun1 scares. Was such a 
fron~ier  possiblc f ~ r  Ind ia?  T o  give an answer to that 
question I-Iandey applied to the sludy of Lhc subject a 
mind singularly clear and well-stored. When he  had 
C 
thorougllly iltnstcrcd it, Itc, i i ~  response to a requcst mndc 
t o  him Iy thc Council of t l ~ c  Royal Lrnitcd Servicc Insti- 
tution, dclivcrcd his vicws on thc 13th of December, 1878, 
t o  n lnrgc and distinguislted audicnce assen~l~lccl in its 
thcatrc. 
Ncver did Sir 13. Ha1111cy more con1pletcly vindicatc his 
title to thc character of s l rategis~ thnn on this memorable 
occasion. He depicted, wit-lt,a master's hand, tlie condi- 
tions of the Indian frontier; sho\vcd that the linc of the 
Itidus wns no rcal 1)arricr against invasion ; that, if propcr 
prcc:m~ions were talicll on the Pcsh:i\\.nr plain, wc nccd 
not  be apprcl~cnsive regarding an invasion through tlie 
Kli;!ib:lr pass ; that neither the I<hurnm Pass, nor tlie 
Gomnl, need inspirc us with scrious alnrm; hut that 
bctvcen Randnhnr and tlie Indus  were plnins of rcmnrk- 
able fertility which could subsist an encmy's army until its 
gcncrnl should clioosc the opportune momcnt and thc 
cnsicst point whcn and  wherc to cross thc Indus. I-le 
cnmc to the dcfinite conclusion, then, thf t  n.c should occupy 
thc  snlient angle which covered that country and all the 
passcs Icnding into Indin behind it. Tha t  snlient angle 
\\.as rqxcse~itccl by ICandnhar. " I hnve enclca\-onred," 
said Sir Edward, in concluding a lccture which will p r o w  
to aker ages that  there was a t  least one English soldier 
\\rho thoronghly undcrstoocl the posilion, . " LO skclclr- a 
clcfinitc plan upon which to conccntmtc our rcsourccs, and 
by  which to sccure a scientific frontier, and  a permanent 
settlement of this large question. Looking a t  the northcrn 
half of this pnrt of our  tcrritoly, I think we sliould bc 
thaitltful for possessing n frontier so  easily rendc:recl im- 
pt.cgnablc. Looking at thc southern half, we have n o  less 
reason t o  be thankful for l~nving acquirpcl, in  Quclla, s u c l ~  
nlcnns of vigorous and effec~ive~action, and s11c11 nn oppor- 
tunity of  securing new advnntnges of the most importnnt 
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nnd clccisive kind. \.\'it11 a garrison strongly postccl in its 
lines at lianclal~ar, with all the rolltcs and  stages by which 
our forces might be a s s c ~ ~ ~ l ~ l e c i  on that point, all so~irces of 
s ~ ~ p p l y ,  and all armngcme~?ts for tsmsport, lnid domn, ns 
our trained staff ofticcrs arc ccrtainly capable of laying 
t l ~ e m  down, we might vicw calmly m y  possible complica- 
lions beforc us, n~hetlicr arising f ron~   he angmented mili- 
tary ponlcr of Russia in the East, from thc success of her 
intrigues, or from her open hostility. T h e  gro~~ncls  of our 
assurance would be  manifcst and easily unclr:rstoocl, our 
native subjects would soon learn to appreciate them, and 
what would be security for us would be tra~~cluillity for 
I'ndia." 
Spcaking on the samc subjcct, two ycars Ixtcr, at the 
fiojwl &@,r~uj/'ic~d Society, an o f k c r  of Engineers, clistin- 
g ~ ~ i s h e d  for his auainnwnts and \dl0 liad visitcd thc 
country, thus suppo~ted  Sir E. Hamlcy's view :- 
" k'rom a comnicrcial, political, o r ,  military point of 
~ i c w , "  said ~ap ta ;n  I I~ ld ic l i ,  :' Knndalinr is the most ici- 
portant point in  Afgllinistin ; gcographicnlly it may bc 
said to indicate the ~rcalc point of the Afghdn frmtier. 
'I'1icl.e is no Hindu ICusli Ixtwcen ICandnhar and the 
north-west, nor is the distribution O F  the hill country r o u ~ l d  
I<nndalinr of sucli a nnturc, o r  such nil ostcnt, as that 
which enabled the tribcs of thc north to maltc s o  formid- 
able an opposition to us last wintcr. 
" T h e  bronc1 open plains wliicli s u r r o ~ ~ n d  Kandaliar arc 
not well suited to A f g h h  tactics. ~Vhatcver difficulty We 
may liave in  dcaling with n foe \vIiose strcngth lies chiefly 
in his power of scattering, or concentrating, 3s the case 
may be, by lnalting use of mountain tracts 2nd ~~nl tnomn 
hill paths, vmishss \dlen h e  country beconm flnt and 
open. T o  hold ICdbul would mean to hold an extensive 
line of hills round IGibul. T o  hold ICnndaliar means very 
G 2  . 
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little more thnn retainins colnnnnd of the wall.; and 
citadel. 'I'l~c chicf n.cnlth of i t f ~ l i ; i ~ ~ i s ~ h  too is ccrlainly 
co~~cenlrntecl in I<nncl.hs.r :uld J~lcriil.. Conlpnrcd to 
ICantlull:~, ICibul is but nn arsc~inl, and n convc~lic'nt 
slrntcgical point from mhich to govern the turbulent 
~norlhcrn tribes. IL: i s  not n cenlre of trade in nny sense, 
nor has it the commnncl of such grand trade roulcs as 
I<anrlalnnr possesses. 1Jr1t J<an:l:lixlr lies just as ensily 
open t o  approach iron1 onc sidc as  from :t~iothcr." 
, > 1 his, then, was t l ~ c  rc:d scicnlilic frnnlicr-- the estcnsion 
of tlic Urilisli frunticr to I<anclnhar, tile annexation of thc 
u~duI:ntinp Cllnti:lli p1atc:ru 1.1cllincl 'I'nl, nnrl of the l'ishin 
v~~llcy. 'I'hc fortifications of I<nndnll:~r to be strengtl~cnccl 
and that place united by rail with Cirislnl:, Farah, and 
Herfit, which last placc should be plnccd virtually under 
British protection. 
I Il:~ve snit1 " to l < a ~ ~ l n l ~ ~ r ;  " Ijut thc occi~pation of that 
town should incluclc the  occupation of the country as  h r  as  
thc Helmund. " \\:hen we spcal;," said Sir E. I-I:~nllcy, 
on n su1)sequent occnsio~~- 
" Of occupying 1<:111c1:111nr, it is not ~nerely tlnc city 
that is meant. '1'0 lmld 3 city against a Ixsieger bring- 
ing modern artillery to bcnr on it, iu  to cloon~ it 
to ruin, its inhal,il:mts to dcst~.i~ction. Positions I I I L I ~ ~  
be held nt a clist;~ncc--in this casc u p  to the line of Lllc 
1-lel~ni~nd. 'l'hcsc positions, in orclcr to draw from them 
their full advantage against such forces ns the Russians 
cor~ld bring on LIS, shoulcl bc c ~ ~ ~ f i ~ l l y  fortified with c~nrtln- 
works, and nl ined wit11 nl-tillcry nlorc pn\\,erTi11 than could 
follow t l ~ c  march of a n  i n ~ d c r .  Sir Alicl~acl Iiiddulph, in  
n valua1)lc rcport made from personal observation during 
the Inst Afghan wnl; says, "l'hc position,of Girisl~lc is with 
the most modest prccnution i~nassnilaLle-all the pnssages 
of  the Helnlund can be dcfended Ly suitablc works a t  
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short noticc.' Tlii.; being tlic first linc, Ile describes a 
scconcl s~rong line behind i t-and a third, i f  necessary, is 
to' bc fomd, IIC says, on an arc extending Cronl the edge of 
thc desert. ' Irisiclc this arc,' he goes on, ' lies all the pro- 
clwtive country, while willioul it Llic country is sterile and 
an open glacis.' ' I t  s e e m  to mc,' he aclcls, ' that even 
thotrgh invasion Inxy be remote, the possession of this 
point has an importrn~ce which cannot Ijc mtcd too Iiigllly.' 
I t  is upon the lielmuncl, tlicn, lhat \re must dircct our 
march, iC \ve occupy Kanilaliar. And if we clo not occul)y 
it, we can ne\..er I x  certain tlint Russia will not anticipate 
us on thc IIclnlund." 
No\\; \vhcn in May, 18.19, 'l'diilb K l h  entcred the 
British camp at Ganclali~ak to accept any tcr~ns which the 
British (;overnmcnt might offer, ihc obtaining of the 
slrnlcgical fronlicr ciescriberl by Sir Ed\varcl I-lamley was 
casp. \ire hncl hut to ask for it to get it. That wo did 
not ohtnin il was,mora thc f:~ult of the Ministry in Down- 
ing Slreet than of I.,orcl I:,y~~on. 
If Lord l,ytton had proposcd s ~ ~ c l i  a frontier the Cnlinct 
doi~b~less would have supported hi~n. Lord Lytton did 
not propose il., because, being a civilian, he llad to depend 
for his stratcgical plans on the ~iiilitary advisers at his 
elbow, and amongst those adviscrs t h e  was not one \vho 
was posscssecl of practical s~mtegic knomledgc. 
I do not rcfcr lo men likc Robcrts, M a c C q o r ,  Stewart, 
or Hills. They \\we \\dl1 the aruiy in Lhe ficld. But, at 
Simla, Lord Lytton was surrounded by theorists, each of 
\vhon~ had his favourite plan-plans built not,as\\.asE-lamley's, 
upon knowledge and argument, but upon rcasons which the 
supporter would have found it difficult to ~llaintnin 11cfore a 
critical assembly of esperls. To put the niattcr tcrscly 
and clearly, it was Lord I.!;tton's painft11 task to liavc to 
select from a aumber of plans, all of them incongruous 
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and deiecti\.c, tlic plan \vliicli lie dccmcd the least 
liarmf~il. 
I t  is possi1)le-I d o  uot kno\v-but it is possiblc Ile may 
l ~ a ~ l e  b en Ilnmpered by the I-Iome Government. Certainly 
it \\.as in the po \ \w of the H o m c  Government either to 
force a plan 11po11 him or reject and alter any wliicli he  
might propose. Whether tliey clid so  or not I cnnnot say. 
At any rate they must hear the responsibility. 
Now that the Cabinet which rulccl tlic Gritisli empire 
I)et\vccn 1874 and 1880 11x1 clear minds rcgnrcling Lhc 
'' scientific frontier " wllicli its brilliant chief clesirocl to 
sccurc it is impossible to x;scrt. I t  is most p:~inful to mc  
-- to be obliged to admit that, not only llad its members n o  
clear views, but they had no clefini~c iclens wl~atevcr on the 
subject. This \\.as patent up to the Inst moment of their 
remaining in power. They adopted n right principle a n d  
nn intelligent policy only from t l ~ c  moment wl~en they 
acre relegatecl to the cold shade of oppos$ion. 
Rcgnrding " the scic~ililic frontier," the Cabinet of 1873 
l ~ a d  ideas, I have said, neither clear nor clclinite ; and tliey 
Ilad, moreover, no conlpctent military adviser to inspire 
lliem. Not inclcccl, becnusc l l~crc  wcrc not military ndviscrs 
at tlicir c l l ~ o \ ~ ~ .  The l c c t ~ ~ r c  of Sir Ud\snrcl Hnmley had 
been clcli~cred to n very distinguished nnd a very crilicnl 
audience, had bccn spol<cn of 011 tlic very evening of its 
deli\wy in the House of Commons, had bcen noticed in 
the leading nrticlcs of our clnily newspapers, and had 
attracted an extraordinmy amoiint of a t~ent ion.  Wiscloii~ 
had cricd aloud i n  the strccts, But the members of the 
Cnbinet had shut their ears I 
T h e  fact is, lhnt in all matters rclaling to the Afghan 
question the Cabinct of 187.4-80 flounclfled from first to 
last. Succeeding n Cabinet which had adoptcd and per- 
sistcntly acted ~~pcin thc fatal principle cspresscd by the 
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words "masterly inactivity," the Cabinet of 1874 
rescnnblcd, in its I n d i m  policy, a inan who lanew 
Lhat if he were to stand still IIC would die, but nho  
\WS afraid to n ~ o v e  forward lest he should stumble into 
n bog. And that expresses esnctly what this Cabinet did 
do. Althougl~ Sir E d n m d  I-Inmley held up n lnntcrn to  
5 1 1 ~ ~  tllcnn thc solid path along which thcy might Lrcnd 
with security, ~ h c i r  fcarr, whispered that thc light of his 
lantern \\.as the light of n \\lill-o'-ll~c-\\~isp : thcy took Lhen 
a step in a n  opposite direction, ;md suffered thc calasLrophe 
I have mentioned. 
F o r  thc "scientific frontier" obtained by the Treaty of 
Gandnniali was, in w r y  dccd, tlie nork of unscien tif c mcn. 
I t  \\.as a delusion 2nd n snnre. I t  gnvc Indin n frontier 
n tliousnnrl times mosc unrclinblc than thc frontier which 
it hncl abandoned to obtain it. I t  gave 11s tlic Klinibar 
Pass, when wc werc h r  bettcr off in  the vallcy of thc 111dus 
ready to receive a n  cnemy emerging from ~ h n t  pass; it 
ga\Ie us the K h u h  valley, the occupation of which would 
liavc isolated a porrion of our army : it's o m  solitarjr 
mcrit \\'as Llie acquisition of the valley of Pishin. 
I t  clicl not last long. W e  acquircd it aOr-:olutcly, that is, 
 he treaty which gavc it to 11s was ralificd, thc 30th n'hy ; 
the #allant Cavngnari was rnurclc~.ed on thc 4 ~ h  Sep- 
Lember. Threc nlontl~s of existence were anlplc for so 
grotesque nn abortion ! It's early dentli, follo\\~cd though 
it was by n rcncwal of tlie war, was a blessing for \\hicli 
tlic authors cf its esistence ought to be for ever thnnl i l~~l  ! 
Two d:lys after the murder of Cavngnari, ZCobcrts, the 
most brilliant, the most daring, Lhe most accomplished of 
gcncmls, comlnenccd the war. Of  such a man, of such 
men as Hamley, 2s Charles h~IncGregor, and as  Hills, it is 
inspiring to write. P,ut t l ~ a t  task is now rlcnied mc. I 
h a w  to ilcnl only nith lhc rcsulls of tlic cnr~tpaign. I t  is 
I~o\\~e\~er, at least satisfactory to know that such men still 
survive for the service of Grcnt Rritnin. 
The \\?nr thus re-commencccl conlin~lcd lill the cluse 
of ISSO. I'nstcrn Afghdnist:in, or ICnl)ulislAn, 1 . d  becn 
evacunlccl the T I t h  A~~gust ,  and Llic I . L I I C  over L l ~ t  portion 
of ~ l l c  o~~nlry  conrerrecl upon i l l~dul Rnhm.in, the relative 
d ~ o m  Slier Ali 11x1 clefcntcd and drivcn into esilc in 
Jnnualy, 1869, and who h:ld sincc Lllnl time been living in 
Bokhlirn, :L pcnsioncr of Russi:i. I h t  in  \ \ h t  is generally 
called \~esLcrn Afgllinisldn, that is, in Llle country about 
T<nnclnh~r nncl from ICnndal~nr northwards the war con- 
tinued some time longcl: Holding, as I do, \\.it11 General 
Ila~nlcy, Lhat therc was no necessity ml~ate\~cr to intcrferc 
in cnstcrn hfgh;inisthn; that tlic true in~crcsts of Engln~id 
wcrc bound up in the linc from Quclh Lo Knndnlm and 
from I<nnd:lhnr to I-l'erht ; th,~l: Lhnl is thc linc \vhich, LO 
bar Russian invasion, wc have to occupy nncl sec~~re ,  I 
slinll confine nly commcnts to the nktipn of the Xrilish 
Government on that line. 
The ~.cnc\val of the war  had givcn thc Conservative 
C:~binct nnotlicr chance. Aftcr tlic collnpse of the Treaty 
of Ganclnmnk, sonic din1 light of thc trutll of Sir Edward 
I-Tnn~ley's nrgunicnts woulcl scem to have removed a portion 
of the fog which h a d  obscured their reason. T h e  apprc- 
hension stolc upon them that the 1Zandahar linc might, after 
all, be the true line. If we wcre to judge only from their 
d t c r  conduct when in  opposition we might even I~elievc 
that the npprehension grew into conviction. If that were 
so, they were more nlorllly of condemnation than if their 
vision hnd remained clouclecl. For this nt least is certain, 
they never rose Lo Lhc Ileiglll: of the silunlion. 'l'hey sho\\recl 
themselves painfully wanting in accura'k knowledge, in 
decision, in that quality which will cover a multitude of 
minor sins, in pluck. Having ICandahar in their possession, 
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convinced as we must supposc they were convincecl, of its 
enormous importance-for, subsequently, they all voted 
for Lord Lytton's m o ~ i o n  for its retention, in Llie 1-Iouse 
of Lorcls, and for Mr. Stanhope's motion in the I-Iousc of 
Ccmmons (i'lnrcli, ISSI)-LIIC~ lincl not tlic coumge lo 
put their foot down and say " possessing this iml~ortant 
plncc, this place so  ncccssa~y to the safety of India. \YC 
will Ixep it." No-thcy adopted one of thosc lialf- 
measures which are  thc bane of truc statesmanship--such 
a half-nicasure as the elclcr Pitt would havc spurned a ~ i d  
Palnierslon \voulcl liavc deridecl-they placed tllcrc in 
suprenie authority a cousin of the Ink Aniir, a mnli like- 
wise nnniecl Slier Ali, \vho under tlie nnnie of L '  \\Tali " or 
morc properly, " Vali," was c o n d ~ ~ c t  tlie civil adniinistm- 
tion of the districts clepcndent upon Lhe ci~):. l;or nll the 
good that this appointment caused, the Govcrnmcn~ might 
as well have stuck up a lay ligure. 'I'lie people in the 
country covered_by Kandahar wcre longing for the British 
rule : they came in crowds to tlie political officer in charge 
of tlie Chatidli district to implore it. h bold announce- 
nicnt that England lnd nclvanccd her frontier as  far as  
Kandahnr would have had an imniense influence for good. 
'I'he nppointnicnt of the " Vnli " shewed to the popula~ions 
Lhnt tlierc was still a chance of their being relegated to 
tlic hatccl rulc of ICibul. Nor, whilst Llius productive of 
cvil, urns tlie mcnsurc accompanied by any corresponding 
aclvnnLage. From first to Inst thc " V:ilin rcniainecl what I 
havc said he might as wcll have bcen-a lay figure. On 
the first important disturbance, 14th July, 1880, his troops 
eclesertcd 2nd h e  collapsed, though he did not actually 
clisnppenr till thc following Deceml~cr ! 
T h e  collapse3f the " Vali " mas a result second only, in 
the beneficial chances nrhich it offered to Great Britain, 
to  the disappearance of the treaty of Gandnmak. Like 
.- 
that fortunate collapse, it gave Englai~d anothcr cl~ance to 
retricvc her political errors-to secure a really scientific 
frontier. 
But, bcfore Llint chance ofrercd, a change had occurred 
in the guidance of the political destinies of Great Britain. 
'The hllinistry mhich had desired " a scientific frontier" had 
gone out, 2nd the advocates of " masterly inactivity " had 
conle in. The men who had composed the retiring Cabinet 
recovered their senses and thcir courage only with the first 
inhaling of thc opposition breeze. It was, incleccl, high 
~ime that they sl~ould recover both. If it be true, as was 
stated in Jan~~arp,  ISSO, and has been repentccl without 
contracliction over and over again sincc that date, that in 
that mon~li they were trcating with Persia for the transfer 
to that powcr of the important city and district of I-Ierat, 
they must Inve been absolutely on the verge of in1- 
Ixcility. \\Thy, it was to prcvcnt the consummation or 
such an event that Lord Paln~erston plpned the first 
Afghan wnl; and that he inade war on l'crsia in 1856 ! 
And, in spite of that, a Conscrvativc Ministry aclunlly 
dch ted  mlieLher, to rclicve themselves of rcsponsilrility, 
it \\.ere not advisalrlc to d o  that which thc grcatest 
forcign minister-I might almost s?.y, the only forcign 
miniatcr-of this century 1 1 ~ 1  waged L W O  wars to prcvent ! 
Did they ask themselves for a moment what snch a transfer 
would mean; that the handing over of Her& to Per:iin 
~vould signily the handing ovcr o l  I-Iedt to Russia? If, 
it1 their forgetfulness or neglect of history, they li; i t l  
doubted then, can they doubt no\v ? Docs not thc hte cf 
old Saralths rend a lesson ? Has the occupation of Pul-i- 
liishti a~icl of the Zulfagnr Pass, and the threat to occupy 
Panjdell-places far beyond the frontier acepted by Russia 
in 1872 and never till now repudiated-not opened their 
cyes? Or,. is it a hct ,  Lhat il Russia werc to occupy 
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to-morrow the hill \\~hich is said to con~mand Igerit, s 
terrified English l\'iinistry, and an ignorant 311d gulliblc 
British public would readily s\vallow thc csc t~sc  that there 
was n llew H c r i t  as \wll as an old Herdt, and that Russia. 
had only tnken thc latter? 
If t l ~ c  Conservntivc Cabinct 11x1 transferred IIerdt to 
Persia, they would have dcscr\lcd i~npeachmcnt. I3ut thc 
conduct of ils nlcmbcrs sincc they hnvc Ixen in opposition 
has 1 ~ x 1 7  so much morc bold and dccidcd on a11 matters 
nKcc~iny ~ h c  frontier policy o €  Indin  hat I am nilling to 
Iiopc, cvcn to believe, that the idcn, i €  serior~sly d i m s s c d  
at all, nas discussed only to be dismissed. But, beforc I 
advcrt morc fully LO the true conccp~ion of the national 
inlcresls which has guided them in oplmsilion I must nolicc 
thc action of h e i r  successol.s \vllich causcd it. 
T h c  Afghan wnr nlns still unfinishccl when the '' mnstcrly 
innctivity " party rct~lrncd Lo power. T o  thcni it hacl Ijcen, 
and nrns, gall and n.orm\voocl. Rut the clcfcnt a t  Mniwand 
and the sul)scqu&t I c q y e r  of Kandnhnr by Ayi~l, Klmn 
had placctl them in thc, to thcnl, extrcmcly painful 1)osition 
of bcing forced Lo continue the war. From this painful 
l ~ ~ s i t i o n  Lhcy w r c  rescucd by Sir I"rederic1.: Roberts, whose 
i~~~iiiiiuitli iarch and s u b s c q ~ c n t  Zccisive victory will cvcr 
rcmnin one of the most chcrishcd records in the military 
history of Cleat Britain. l'liis vii:~ory concl~~clccl tl!e wnr-. 
Still ICanclaliar nlns in  our hnnds, and we might cnsilp 
h a w  made it n condition with thc new h n i r  w110n1 we 
had placed in authority, that n c  slioulcl hold it. l'he 
rcndcr laust b c x  in mind that thc question c:ul~c u p  lor 
the lrist timc in the year 1851;-I, a t  thc time that Skobeleli' 
was lmparing Lhe cq~edit ion which subdued thc Akhal 
, . 1 urkomnns. 'l'lw idcn thcn occul.rcd Lo mc that i f  Lhosc 
splentlid \varriors \\,ci.c subdued, and wc should, i n  ~ h c  
\.cry same ) cnr, c\.acunti. t l ~ c  fwnticr f'ort~.css n.1lic.h cove-r~cl 
all the western passcs into Hindustan, the ensily inipressed 
pcoples of India n.oulcl not fail to imbibe the idea, not 
only that England was retiring before Russia, but that, 
Trom fear of Russia, shc had left opcn thc onc  gap in 
hcr fronticr linc, throogh which lhc invaclcrs of India  
from tlic n o r h  had always advnncecl. 'To test the correct- 
ncss of tlicsc iclcns I visited India, and spent nearly thrcc 
winter months ~ C I - e ,  from Novembcr to the third weelc of 
January,. ISSO- I .  Thirtylive ycars of previous residence 
in all parts of tlic country had made me acquaintecl wit11 
most of its rcl~rcsentativc men, and I llad little clifficul~y 
in indr~cing Lhcm lo speak frankly wit11 me on the suhject. 
I found, amongst all clnsscs, anlong T\~luh;umn~aclans as  
\wll as among Hindus, a rcmnrkablc ayeenlent of opinion. 
They  all condcmncd the al~nntlonmcnt of Icnndahar as 
likcly to cnusc the people of India to lose confidence in 
h e  staliilily of !?:.itis!: :.!!!c. " NLdir Slldh came by that 
rot1 tc " thcy snid, " nntl houg11 I<andnlnrl slopped him frrl. 
a year, nothing stopped 11in1 nf~cr  hu hncl tnkcn that plncc. 
Russin \ril l  of caul-sc ronclrlcr tllc 'l'url;on~:~ns. :\nd thcn 
I ~ s i  i l l  I I I I -  I N i l  i If ).OII Irave 
Kanclahn~~, you will Imvc opcn n gap I)); \vllicl~ Russia will 
casily cnter. 'I'hc nntivc princcs, mcn l i l x  Scindinli and 
)Iolkar, know t l l a ~  ns \wll as you do. 'I'hcy bcnr your rulc 
Imautc  if you werc not I~cre  tllcy woulcl fight amongst 
tlici~lsclvcs, and h c y  know you c:m dcfcnd tlicrn and 
nlnintnin order. I3ut if they once think that a grentcr than 
you is coming, and 11icy will think :io if you dclibcrately 
Icave the gate open for him to come, lhe hope of gaining 
so~nething out of a general scrimm:ige will pervade [heir 
niintls, and \vhcn  yo:^ scnd your army to nicct lhrssin o n  
h e  Inrlus, Lhcy will slril;c for inclcpcndc~-r^cc in your rear." 
Such was llic gcnernl opinion cspresxcl to nie by the 
Nn;;vcs of Indin, wl~o, in my judgment, were best c a p  
ble of gauging thc vie\vs or their countrymen. Shorlly 
after my return to England I embodied, at  tlic request 
of tlic members of the Constitr~ticnal Union, Iny esperi- 
cnccs in tlic form of 3 I C C ~ U ~ ~ ,  w l ~ i ~ h  I d ~ l i w r c d  in 
Pcbruary nr i \ k ~ r c l ~  of rSSr to a Inlge audiencc in 9. 
Jamcs's 11:dI. I am b o ~ ~ n c l  to nclcl that the Conscrvntive 
pnrtp Il:id long bcforc Ixcomc alivc to the ncccssilp, in the 
intcre~Ls of the Il~ilpire, of ~.et:hiing 1~ancInh:~r as thc ncw 
fronlicr. J.ortl I.,jtton llncl in tlic mc:in\vliilc rcturnccl 
h o ~ n ~ ,  nnd, 1 cannot doubt, h i  esl)rcssccl vcry ficcly his 
r' views on thc subject. 'I'his, at Icast, is certain, that tlic 
iden of ~ l l c  rcte~ition of l innd:~Inr  w ~ s  adoptcd by the 
Conservntive opposition, and nrns ninclc the main themc 
of thcir platform speeches during Lhc nuLumn of ISSO, 
nncl thc first ten \wcks of ISSI. ; 
I t  soon transpircil, Iio\vever, that [lic Ministry of 
'( ~innst~rly innclivily " had no idca of retaining the place. 
It is curious, looking back from the status of acconiplisl~ed 
facts, writing i ~ l = t h c  third week of this 1no11tI1 of hfarch, 
1885, d l c n  l<ussia possesses Snrnkhs nncl h'Icrv, m1cl 
hns advanccd to Pul-i-KIiAun and Zulfagnr, witliiu thc 
I - h i t  territory and witl~in striking distance of h e  city 
of tlint name-it is curious, I say, Lo notice Lhc reasons 
given by tlic authorities whom they quotecl, upon which 
the hlinistry rclied to  justify their relrogrndc n~ovenicnt. 
'J'hc most \rnlucd of tliesc nuhorilics, Generid Sir Hcnry 
Norman, arguing, in n ~ n e m o r a n d ~ u l ~  dated aoth Scptc~ii- 
her, ISSO, against the retention of linndalinr, thus cspresscd 
liimsclf : " T h e  proBnbi/i/J, OM /tnci/i,q to  s/rrrg,qlt. JOT 
Ifiltf/, or to defend Indin from I<nndnhnr, is so remote 
tlint its possibility is liardly worth considering." IVo~ndcr- 
fill forccnst !, 'rJie time s o  rcmoie as to be hardly worth 
considering I n s  narrowed itself to a term of less tlmn five 
years ! Sir Evelyn Baring, another expert of the masterly 
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inncti\.ity school, n.ns eq~lnlly scept-icnl. Then  tllcrc was 
the ncn. 'Viceroy, 1,orcl Kipon, \diosc cspcrierlcc of ratlicr 
1cs:i than one yenr was so  valuable : and, 1;rst not least, 
llicre wns that cmincnt Russomanc-llie S'rinic Minister. 
" 1' Iinvc no fcnr mysclf," h:~d said that high authority, on  
Novcmber 27, 1879: 'I of tlie territorial extensions of 
Itussin, no fcnr of them \vliatcvcr. I think such fears arc 
only old women's fears." Possibly some of tlie constituents 
and many of tlie fricnds, perhaps even some of tlic col- 
leagues of Mr. Gladstone, regmd now tliat rcmark as  
n libcl upon old wo1:ien ! 
l 'lie queslion was clcbntccl i n  tlie I - I o ~ c  of Lords, on 
the motion of Lold T,ytton, on tlic 5111 i\'larcli, 1881. 
Tlicrc the m ~ t i o n  for the rctcrition of S<andnlinr wns 
cnrricd by n majority of Sg (165 against 76). I n  tlie 
I-Iouse of Commons, after n dcbntc of two nights, a similar 
~iiotion was defeatcd (26th March) by n majority of 120 
(336 ngninst 2x6). Of tlie motives \vliich influenced some 
at lcnst of the ~iieinbers of that majority 7 have n word or 
two to say. 
On the evening on \vIiich tl~edivision was to lalce place, tlie 
2G1h hlarcIi,I linppcncd to be  dining at  a Club of which I nm 
not a member. Ecforc I snt down, n;y host informcd me 
that a fiiend of his, n S.iberal Member of l'arlianient, was 
wry ansious to speak to me o n  tlic sul>ject which was tlien 
engrossing tlie attention of tlie House, and tliat he W O L I ~ C I  
come over, if I did not mind, a t  10 o'clock, for that pur- 
pose. I at  oncc cordially assented. At 10 o'clock tlie 
member came over, was introducccl to me, and bcgan 
questioning me about I<andnhnr. After I had answered 
all his questions the Membcr thus addresscd me :- 
" Colone; Mnlleson, I l ~ n d  previously road all you had 
written ; I have now l~enrcl all you linve to say on the 
subject of the nbandonnicnt of I<andnlinr : I linvc no 
liesitation in telling you that I agree with )roo to tlic fullest 
cstent, al~solutely and entirely: I am satisfied Llinl- if wc 
nbn~iilon Kandahar we sliall have to figlit Russia on tlic 
irontier for our Indian empire, and it is quite upon Lhe 
cards that wc mny be  at the same time struggling wit11 the 
nalive princes within its borders. Holding ns I do tliesc 
opinions, you will bc surprised to hear that it is my intcn- 
tion to-night to vote f x  the nbandonmcnt of I<nndalmr ! " 
C:onipletely taken aback by this conclusion, so  opposcd to 
t l ~ e  1rm"mble of the Member's spcech, I could only 
e:uclnim :-'' Good God, Sir, have you got a conscicncc ? " 
'I'he Member, in no way abnshed by an csclnmation which 
lle probably expected, repliccl a t  once wit11 :I jaunty nii :- 
" Conscicncc ! Yes I hnvc a conscience, nncl I'll Lcll you 
horn ii nloves me  to-night. Shortly after I had taken my 
sent for the first time in tlic I-Iousc of Co~umons, n 
friend, who 11x1 been many years n melnl~c~., c a n e  up 
to mc, ; u ~ d  c.ongratulating I T ~ C  011 being thcrc, espressed 
a hope that I mmould keep my scat as many y c u s  as 
h c  had kept his : IIC added that I would lteep it, too, if I 
mould only adopt the plan whicli he had mar!ccd out for 
liiniself: and invariably followed. I aslied my fricncl to tcll 
nic his plan. ' Why ' lie replied ' it is simply this. Kcvcr 
make a speech, never give a votc, in this House, without . 
first asking yourscll, on your COIISC~CIICC,'--11liild you, h e  
used tlic worcl' cot;science-' \vhelhci- that spcech or that 
vote will imperil your rclurn a t  tlic next clcclion.' Now," 
added the i\.Ienlber, " I Iinvc n very slire\\d idea that if I 
were to vole in favour of the retention of I~anc1al~nr I 
should imperil my seat a t  thc nest election : ll~crefore I nm 
going clown to vote against it.. And I can Lcll you," he 
added, " tlicre n u  a t  least fifty, probably seventy or eighty, 
men~bers  of our party who agree with me as to Lhe 
necessity of retaining Kandnhnr, but \v110, actuntccl by Lhe 
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motives which nctunte Ine, will votc for its abandon- 
mcnt." 
Comment on ~liis story is unnecessnry. I t  is onc of the 
saddest signs of tlie times that on questions aliecting the 
wclfnre of Grent Britain conscience is often clcad ! 
I<nodahar was abandoned. Tlie very rails which the 
encrgy of Sir Riclia~d 'l'cmple liad collected ncnr Sili to 
con~inue tlie railway from Nari-just beyond Sil)i-to 
Qt~ettn and thence to Kandnhlir wcrc sold as old iron at n 
loss, according to tlie I h e  Books, of more tlxln hnlf n 
million stcrling ! 
But Tim is rightly cnllecl tlie nvcngcr. Tlie ncws of the 
progress made by Kussia along the nortl~crn frontier of 
Pcrsinn Kliorrisin induced even the rel~resentntives of the 
masterly inactivity party LO repair some of thc evil which 
liad been effectcd. Quietly and uuostcntntiously ncw rails 
were sent to Sibi, and large gangs werc set to labour at the 
r ~ l - a  I t wns ~molved in fact to carry out the 
original plan of continuing the rail\vay tn Qucttn, and, it 
is to hc liopccl, LO Kandnhnr. l'ifforts were 11inde similarly to 
induce the Amir, Alxlul Rahman, to believe that the llritislt 
werc really his fl-iends. Hc  was assurcd, in terms far more 
posiiive and direct than those \~liicIi were eniplo~ccl to- 
wards Slicr Ali in 1373, that should Russia venturc to 
invade his dominions lic \\~oulcl rcceive strong and eflicicnt 
snplmrt : that England recognized it as a duty clcvolving 
L I ~ O I I  her to insist Llpon Russia nclliering to her famous 
declaration in 18Gg, that " AfgIi,iniskin was complctcly 
without the sphere in which that power was callccl upon to 
esercise her influence." If England had at thc same time 
put her foot down-if she had responded to the move of 
Russia upon Snmklis by declaring tliatctlie crossing by 
that Power of the frontier line from that place by Robat- 
Abdullah Khan and above Andkhoi to Koja Saleh would 
Incan war, we might havc had no such disturbnncc as that  
which now exists. But once again was the Cnlinet too 
soft. I n  reply to thc plea of Russia that no proper frontier 
of thc country counpl-ised under the geogrnphical term 
Afglirinistin, existed, she agreed last ycnr Lo dcspa~ch n 
Co~nmission to nlark out with precision, in conjunction 
with n Commission sent from Russia, Lhe line which sllould 
tllenccfor\\wd be rccognizcd as the frontier across which 
Russia was no1 to advance. The line so mnrkcd was 1.0 
bc the dividing line between Trans-Caspian Russia and a n  
ilfgliiunistan subsidiscd by England. 
IN justicc, Lhere sl1oulcl have been n,? question rcgnrcl- 
ing Lhc frontier of Afg11;inis~;in. I have already rclntecl 
that, when in 1869 Princc Cortschakt~if informed I.orc1 
Grnnvillc that his mnslcl; the Czar, regarded Aigl1rinist:in 
as cntirely without Lhe spherc in \ ~ h i c h  Russia would 
be called upon Lo escrcisc her influence, it \\.as furtllcr 
agreed that all thc countries in the effective possession 
of the  Amir Sher Ali, a n d  which had formerly recog- 
nizecl thc sovcreignLy of Dost ~Iuhnmn1nrl, shonld be  
embrnced under that name. Finnlly, after waiting for 
n report on the subjccl froin General Kauf~nnn which 
uever camc, Lord Granville wrote x despatch to Lord 
AugustmLoftus, in Oc~ober ,  1 8 7 2 ,  for communicntion to 
the Russi:un C;o\amment, in wl~ich Ile stntcd Lhat not 
having rcccivccl any 1cLLcr on the sul~ject fro111 Lhnt C o \ w n -  
ment, thc Cabinet h : ~ l  clcciclcd to consider the unclcr~ncn- 
tioned provinces as constituting the frontier provinces of 
tUgI1d.nistdn :-(I) Pladnkhsl~~ln, with its dependent dislrict 
of Vnlihan, from thc Sariliul (IVoocl's 1,alte) on thc enst, to  
the junc~ion of the Kotchn rivcr with the 0x11s (or Pciya) 
forming the northcnl boundary of this Rfghdn provi~ice 
through its cntirc cstect. (a)  Afghiin Turlristlin, comprising 
the districts of ICuncluz, Khulm, and l~allth, the northern 
boundary of whicli would be the line oL thc Oxus from the 
junction of the Kotchn river to the port of I<hojn Snleh in- 
clusivc, on the high road from Bokhim to Ballth ; nothing 
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to be claimec1)y the A ~ n i r  on thc lclt bank or  thc Osus I~clow 
IChoja Snleh. (3) The intcrnnl clis~ricts of i\l;sho, Seripul, 
Mni~ncnc!, Shibbcrjnn and Andkhoi, (he la~ tc r  of \diicli 
would be tlic estrcnie' Afghdn fronticr posscssion to the 
north-nest, thc desert I)cyond beloligiug to indcpcntlent 
tribes of T ~ ~ r k o m n n s .  ( q )  Tlic west err^ h f g l ~ i n  fronlicr, n 
strniglit linc from I<hojn Snlch on the Osus t . ~  Sns~klis on 
thc l'crsinn frontier. This line passed abovc Andldioi and 
Gulu 1:ulu to Robnt-ilbclullali I<li:in on the i\[urgli;ib, 
thcncc by Imam Raksh to Llie Tcjend, close to the to\vn,.on 
the otlicr side of llinl: river, of Snrnhlis. l<ussi:~ :~cccptcd 
that lronticr in clespalches dittccl rcspccti\*ely in Dcccmher 
of that, 2nd in Janrmy of tlic following, year. l 'mn  Llint 
dntc to 1884, tlint lronlicr has ncvcr bccr. q ~ ~ c s l i o ~ i c d  1)y 
that country. I t  Iins nplm.rcd on all tlic Russian I I~ : I~JS .  
Kvcn Schuylcr s l ~ e n l ~ s  of it as well laio\vn L I I I ~  lint needing 
fr~rtller definition. 
Yo qucslions, I rcpcat, werc rnisccl 1 3 1  Xussin regnrding 
this fronticr till 12-34. I t  wns only when, in tlmt year, the  
ncq~~isilion of Merv  nncl Snrnklis brought Iicr upnn it tlint, 
in order to h w e  a pretest for o\~erIeapiugr it, sllc w g p t e d  
Llie proposnl refcrred to in thc last chapter, liussia would 
not have bccn truc to her immemorial policy if, on nppronch- 
ing n new borcler, she hnd not nt once raiscd doubts ns Lo 
its wlidity. T o  solve those doubts, I )oh countries cngagcd 
l o  send commissioners to LIE clebatcd grouncl. 
r 7 1 hough Russia agrccd Lo this nrmngenrei~l ~ h c r c  arc ninny 
rcasons for believing that she did il- :oluly to gain timc, 
and  vith 3. deterlnination not to act upon it. I f  she hail 
m y  designs upon Eritish Inclin, the clelinen~ion o l n  Frontier 
which shc must respect would interfere very imcli with tlic 
use of those insid@~s means \vliich hnd cvcr mnrkcd her 
sledthy progress. 'I'lie sencling troop!; across n fronlier 
recognized l ~ y  hcrself 2nd gunrantccd I)y England to Llic 
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hmir, \voulcI mean war with England as well as war with the 
Amir. She would I)e cffcctually prcvcntcd from justifying 
a forward spring Ily the use of such quibbles as  she had 
cmployed regarding Snrakhs. At thc same lime shc was 
not: quite rcady for war. T-Ier 'l'mnscaspian railway, pushed 
on though it had becn with the zed  of a Power which feels 
that it has a mission to fdtil, had not yet reached the 
required point. Othcr preparations wcrc likcwise not so  
forvnrd as  Lhcy nhight hnve been. Still she could not rcfuse 
to promise to co-opcrntc in i~ plan so fair. Wc may fairly 
concludc from Ilcr s u l m q ~ ~ e n t  conduct that she made that 
lromise with n sccrct rcsolvc to brcak it. 
For, whilst Grcnt Britain, true to Iicr word, despatched, 
in the autumn of ISS'~, a n  English Commission, headed by 
a n  oflicer who ltad lilled high positions in India ; while Lhat 
oficer and his suitc proceedecl by way of Persia to the 
appointccl place of rendezvous, Russia sent no one. For  
oncc, too, she had no cxcuscs but the poorest to offer. Such 
as she did make reririnded the British p~d)lic of the taunting 
apologies suggested by the Yrophet Elijah to the prophets 
of Baal for h e  abscncc of any maniicstation on the part of 
t i  i i i  (' \Vhcre is (kncml  Zclcnoy ?" asked the 
Eritish public. (' \\'c d o  not quite know," answcred Russia ; 
" c i h c r  he  is tnlking, o r  he is pursuing, or hc is on a 
journey, o r  perndventure he sleepeth and must be  
awakened." At all events he did not come to time. 
Whilst the British Commissioner, Sir Petcr Lunlsdcn, 
and  his escort, wcre waiting for his Russian colleague, 
Gcneral Zelenoy, the Russian co~nn~anders  at Sarakhs a n d  
Mcrv deterluinecl LO solve the question of the boundary 
by despatching s ~ n a l l  bodies of troops into the territory 
clainled and occupicd by the Afghdns., If thc reader will 
glance a t  any good map of the country immcdintely to  
the north-west of the Paropamisan range 11e ~ v i , l l  sec mqrked, 
on t l ~ c  rivcr 1Icri-rilcl, at a point wlicre the Iicshcf-rild joins 
thnt river, thc nnmc of l'ul-i.Kh:itun.* 'I'hc 1-Icri-rfid, 
wlie~her under its o \ w  name or ns the 'rejend, constit~ites 
to L i l t  south and to thc north-west as 1 - i ~  ns SnrnIihs 111~ 
boundary of thc pro\~incc of Henit. l 'he principal of the 
110sLson its banks ns i t  flo\\;s uor~liw;u.cl are Kulisnn, 
the Zulfagnr pass, and l'ul-i-J<hi~~~tl. 'l'l~csc posts linve 
long Ixcn recognized as belonging to flcrit. Yct, i n  a 
timc of j~rofouncl pencc, wl~il.it the Uricish Comn~issioner 
appointed to nlark out the boundary was \v:~iting for his 
Russi;ul collengue, liussian troops crossed h e  line then 
recognized ns thc I~oundary and seized n post, Lllirty-two 
miles to the south of it ! Not content even with thxt they 
proccecled likewise to occupy thc phSS of Zulf:~g:~r, somc 
twcuty-eight miles still nearer to Her5t ! 
'l'llerc was no cscusc for these acts : Pu1-i-1Ch:itun is 
nicrelg a good place for a new clcparturc ; it is 11ot w e n  n 
villngc ; il never belonged to, and 112s noll~ing in common 
with, the Turko~nnns, wlietller Sarik or other ; it i s  simply 
an ope11 ground covcred to the casl by high mountaim. 
Of the ground in~mcdinlely to thc wcst of it Sir Chnrles 
MacGrcgor, who ~nade  the journey honi Meshed to Snrakhs 
in  1875, gives the followi~lg account. I should premise 
that lllc r o d  fnllonrs L.he Keshel-i Iiud as f u  3s Slior--jnh, 
just bcyoncl Ak-i-Dmhend, and branches at a riglit angle 
not tiwards, just before reaching l'ul-i-I<hdtun :'I--" 011 
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S 3 t ~ ~ r ~ l f i y  LIIC 2-ltli of July, wc ~iinrcliecl 16  n~ilcs  to Alc 
1 1 r 1 i I  'l'lie roncl lcads clown the ~ a l l c y  nlnlost the 
whole way, only occ:nsioi~nlly Icnving it. Lo go over spurs to  
t!ie Icft, which hcrc and there impinge o n  the rivcr. I t  is 
quite prxticnble cvery~vhei-e for field artillesy. At the 
ci2htli mile nrc passed nncmly built fort cnllccl 'l311glil1ugIio0, 
occupicd by thirty w e k h e d  creatures, wlio lookcd at  LIS 
pnssing with ~ h c  longing of prisoners nrorded n glin~psc of 
the outcr world. 
'' ;\t (lie hurtcenth mile wc dsscen[icd to Llic 11cd of  the 
1,ivc.r :1;1il crossed to tlic sight banl; 1y 3 \ u y  nnsly, bc- 
c a l m  \-cry ~nuddy,  ford. TIICIICC the rox l  \vent over a n  
open phi11 for onc mile, whcn it asccnclcd over a spur by n 
steep, but otherwise casy pass, to  anothcr littlc opening, 
\vhich was ngnin divided fro111 Al: l)usbcnd by nnotlit.1. 
si In i lnr l~nss. 
" 'l'lic river hcre is confincd b e t w e n  hills, so  that the 
valley is not inorc than 300 yards ncros$ and I~epond this 
it gmcluallp gcts n a r r o w r  and nnrrower, till it Ixcomes n 
regulnr ilcfile, and continues thus ti11 it cmergcs fro111 tlic 
hills ut l'ul-i-l<li:il~~n wlicrc l l ~ c  ground I m x ~ n ~ c s  niuch 
111or.c open. All access from Lhc ~ 1 s t  is closcd by towcrs 
pl:tccd on co~n~unncling 1)ositions owlhanging tlic dcfilc, s o  
that the position of Ak l > u ~ + ~ c n d  bccc~nlcs one of vcsy 
cr;nsiclcrnblc! iniportnncc iii co~isidcring Llic clcfcncc of this 
110: Jcr, as by it is the only practicnl soad bct\vecn Milz- 
cluran and the southern siclc of tlic ridges which bound 
h c  All-i-Mcshcd on  the so~~t l i . "  
Four  niilcs beyond hk l)url)end is Sho~jali,  where, as  
stated, the road I>rnnchcs ~iortli\wrds to Snraltlis. Pul-i- 
Klidtun is alx1~11: eight miles to the east by south from 
Shorjnh. 111 his book (Journey through?Cliorris:in in 1875) 
MacGrcgor gives s!c~tcl~cs of N: Uurbcnd nncl of the 
gorge of the Ab-i-Meshed nbove Pul-i-ICl~ritun. 
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On ~ h e  subject o r  Uic suclclcn sweep of Russia ul)on 
that post, Professor IraolbL:ry thus witcs (March 1885)"' :- 
"'l'o this hcl: I reckon," lhnt is, to the fact h a t  I<ussia has 
3 settled design to nnncs Heri t ,  before dl, that Inwlcss 
and unjust aggression of Kussin o n  the north-castern fron- 
liers of Persia, an :~pproprintion of n lnrgc tract o l  C O U I I ~ I ~  
Lo Lhe occupnlion o l  which tile Go\-ernment of the Shih 
has not given its consent, and  he anncsntion of whicl~ lias 
bccn only made wit11 the obvious purpose to approach L l i ~  
district of I l c r i t  ancl to s\voop clown upon this i~nport :~nt  
placc in orclcr to scizc the Kcy of India, and so  bcconic 
thc i~ndispu~ablc ~naster of the country lying between the 
Pnropamisus and I-hc Osus. I fully admit, as I stated in 
n1y pr.cvious pnpcr on tllc I<nsso-hfglxin Boundary Com- 
~nission, that thc country c s ~ c n d i ~ i g  I>ctwccn the ~niddle 
course of the lieri-rdd and Llic hlurgli;ib, respectively, [Ilc 
Iinslik (r,,dr/ts K h ~ ~ ~ h l i ~ d l . ~ )  river hns forn~ed, i n  thc 
course of thc present ccntury, n debatable ground I x t r \ ~ c i ~  
~\fgh:iuistin and Persia, b u ~  since Lhe lnst-namccl co:~~;try 
was LIII:IIJIC to clear this Iiigh\vny of t!ic 'I'urkoman Alnliinns 
( I m y s )  on h e i r  inroads into thc eastern part of Khosds:in 
2nd Scistan, the (JL' f k t o  possession niust bc, and call be, 
only accorded lo the Af,ll,ins, as LO tlic P o w r  a l ~ l e  to put  
:I check on Lhc devastating incourse of the recklcss frcc- 
Lootcrs of the north. If Kussin. had the sinccrc inlention 
not to lneddlc wit11 Heri t ,  as hcr statesnicn nsscrl, Llie 
encroachment upon Sarnlths, whetlicr tllc new or Lhc old 
one, which is nl~nost the sanle, \\.oulrI haw been quite 
sr~perfluous, and she could have cnsily avoided to rouse thc 
just suspicion of I<~lglnncl. Cut \vc sce tlint quite the con- 
trary has llnppanctl. Encouraged by the vague tl~rcats 
c o ~ n i ~ i g  fi-om the anofiicial quruters of I'.ondon ;uiJ Cal- 
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cutla, l i~iss ia  liurricdly rcll down still rirthcr to  the soi~tli, 
and  laid hand upon Tul-i-Kllntdn (the Lady's Eridgc), at 
the  wry moment when the Ihglisli l!ou~~dary Commission, 
hcaddl  by Sir l'ctcr L,umstlcn, nrrivcd at the spol. l 'hc  
object in view was to p row to the English that the place 
whcrc (hc  Keslief-rlid joins tlic Hcri-rild is Russian terri- 
tory, and cannot bc nlacle h e  object of furLhcr discussion. 
I'lut we bcg leave to ask what a rc  tlic reasons which have 
necessitated this step ? l'lierc are 110 'I'urkonin~ls s~lbjt!c.l 
t o  liussin i n  this o ~ ~ t l y i n g  district, there is no intcrcst to  
defend, and thc whole movement is nothing else but a . 
badly-co~icealccl ntlcmpl agaiust I-leriit." 
. 'I'he Zulhgar l'usa is c w n  stronger for aygressi\.e pur 
~ O S C X  1 slxdl spcak at greater length of this further on. 
\\'riting on ~ l i c  sul~ject  from Bdln i ~ r l l ,  rorty-six 
miles below Panjdch, tlie correspondent of thc 7iims 
(March I 2, I 885) writes ns follo\vs :--"You will scc from 
llie map that both tlic roads to  I-leril run through 13ndgIiis," 
the districts to thc north and north-west oFthe city of I-Icrit, 
wllicli co~iipriscs the vnllcys of tlie Hcri-riltl, Kushk, and 
Murgli:il~. Tha t  is \\thy it is so v:ilual.)lc to  11s and to 
Russia. If Russin Ilnd no clcsigns on Ilcnil s!ic would 
not care ~vhc t l~cr  hcr frontier \ \wc  at: Sarnklis or I'ul-i- 
Khl i run ,  or a t  Yohtnn or Pnnjtlell. But of cwrse  slic 
cares. liussin has stntcsmcn, and each natur;llly aspircs to 
b e  tlie Joshua who mill t c r ~ n i ~ i a t e  hese weary nnntlerings 
and lend her armies into tllc l'roliiised Land. Once ~hcrc ,  
their troubles are  at  an end. Evcrythi~ig is therc t.) I)c 
round, lor llie \*alley of Hcrdt flows with milk and honcy." 
'J'lie writer closes a very interesting letter with tile follm~ing 
pregnant sentence:-" The /wo tholtsnttcl miks 70c h77v 
wtnt-rllrtt bc/werri t h  Cns-intt (711d the 17n'tls hnw rrs?./ni/tll, 
c ( ~ ~ z i i w l  11s / k t  f i d k  is /he got-den of Asia, and /hot ottly 
i / t  hlrii~-h'et.dt m d  Bndghis w e  but oases-are ./c.m/e;r. r711d 
wssin's Lns l  ~ l l c l . i l ~ ,  tuid E ~ ~ g / ( r ~ t d ' . r  A'(p/~l. 1 05 
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On thc salnc point n wcll-informcd writer in thc same 
pa lm tthus rccently cspressed himsclf :- 
" A t  the time oT ~ h e  Rrlssian war \villi Khiv:l, Sllcr Ali 
rcprcscntcd to thc Viceroy his :~pprehcnsion of Lhe con- 
scqllences Lhnt \\voulcl cnsuc i f  tllc 'I'n~.I;o~iinns o r  Ncrv 
werc drivcn by 12ussinn inv:uion into his prc.vince of 
E:ltlghis. 'I'hc fact Lhnt no European travcllcr pa:;sccl 
t h r o ~ ~ g l ~  this rcgion aftcr Vnmbdry in  he early dirys of 
Sher Ali's nulhority Lo Lcll us what thc esnct condition of 
Panjclch was, is not an nrgrlnwnt invalidating the iV'gl~in 
claims over tllc l)lace, cspccially a s  those claims arc sup- 
porlccl by Lllc ~ w e i p t s  o r  trilmtc fronl the surrou:lding 
tribes contai~lecl in the rcgistcrs of the I1cr:it Adminis~rn- 
lion. If thc presence of [lie Amis's troops :11ic1 officinls 
were l o  ljc nl;tde the only tcst of his right to  rnle therc are 
many olher plnccs Imides those which Russin I n s  scized 
t h t  i \ b d ~ r r a h n < ~ n  \ ~ o u l d  11nw to sr~r~wxlcr .  I t  is, of 
course, intelligible that Russia should seck lo make Llle 
Amir's burden i n  governing his st:~le as heavy as possil~lc, 
but it is difficult to  understand ho\v this argu~ncnt can be 
inclolwd by any i~np:~r~ in l  witncss. T h e  Amir llolds 
ZJanjdeh, partly because it has always Ixen dcpcndcnt on 
IIcr:it, and partly bccnusc he found it marked on the Innp 
~vcll nvithin the fronlicr drawn by the English Intclligcncc 
1)cpartnient. But liis chief rmson ol' all is that the 110s- 
session of 1';mjdeh is ncccsswy to the prescrwlion o l  his 
llolcl on the road running north\vards from Hcrdt through 
th(: province of Afglxin 'l'urkislnn to Maimen6 and Unlkh. 
ltussia \ \ ~ u l d  give hiul that road and no more. I t  is 
absolutely essentkl to its security that the A~necr  should 
retain thccontrol of the region on its western Rank, which 
includes Panjdeh and the I<ushk valley. On  he question 
. of l-'nnjcIcli, as o n  that of %ulf;lgnr and the l<olx~t l'nss, 
there is n o  room for discussion or difference of opinion. 
T h o s e  places form an integral p r t  - o f  Llle ~ \n l i r ' s  , 
dominions, and apart from their own inherent value h e y  
nrc most important as cons~iluting thc nntural out-works of 
I-Icrit, T h e  Russian troops hnvc not yet nssnilctl cithcr 
l'anjdeh or I ~ h o m b o u ,  but they are encamped close to Lhc 
former place 2nd at Zulfngnr. W e  hnve rrequently pointccl 
ou t  L I E  risk thus crcnkxl of n hostile collision, and wc can 
only repeat, that nn attack on ei t l~er  of tlicse places coi~ld 
only be regnrdcd a s  an act  of unpro~okcd  aggression upon 
t h e  Aniir which wc slioulcl bc bound to pron11)LIy resent 
by forcc o f  a r m .  
"'Shosc persolls who estcnu:rtc thc latest phase of 
I<ussinn aggression ignore d l  the circumstnnces which in- 
duced the English Government Lo join with llussin. in a n  
attenlpt to  delimit the Afghdn frontier. 'I'hey purposely 
o \ ~ r l o o k  the fact that the delimitntion of tlic Amir's 
Ixmnd:~ry on Lhc nort!~ west was tnlxn i ~ p  cuecause Russia, 
only t\\,clvc months ago, seized Merv in supreme inclirfcr- 
m c e  to her rcpented cleclamlions lo  us Lhnt S I I C  had not 
thcleast  intention of npprop;.inling Lhc 'l'clike strongholtl. 
We hnvc no \\rish to cml~iller Lhe prcscnt controversy by 
dwclling ilpon past brcachcs of  faith, bnt t l ~ c  suclclcn and 
secret occupntion of Mcrv wa!; a n  act that sho\\rccI how 
illusory Russian plcdgcs arc. Yet now tlint Russia, f x  
from sln~iding still, hns \vithin the last ycnr pi~slicd her out- 
~ O S ~ S I  50 miles south of Merv, and to places within 
Afgliinisdn, we are  again nskcd t o  confidc to her honour 
wllen she repudiates all intention of heating I-lerdt ns shc 
has treated thc othcr plnces on the Mul-glxib nncl I-lcri- 
rucl. I\'hen Rwsinn troops cnl-ercd i\fcrv it was at  once 
pointed O L I ~  in thesc colunlns ~ h n t  he time hnd come for n 
dclinile and dccisivc policy with rcgnrd to the Kussi;un 
advance Lonwcls Indin. TVz only ncquicscctl in the scimrc 
of Merv on thc csprcss u~~ders la~ ld ing  that the frontier of 
Afghinistbn should be clearly markecl out, and ~ h n t  h e  
lcast infraction of this line nould be rcgnrded by l h ~ l a n d  
ns n cnms h d i .  That  course wns adopted I))? our C o v e m  
ment, and to all appearance that of the Czar also coincided 
in its justicc and agreed to par~icipntc i n  giving it ~alidity. 
'I'o the policy of maintaining the integrity of AfgI1dnist:in 
this country was commitled, not only by n sensc of ils own 
interests, but also by the definite nssumnccs givcn to the 
Aniir from lime to time, and particularly in I S S ~ .  It is 
one from \\~hich the Govclnment have as yet sho\\~n no 
sign of departing, and, indeccl, thc least symptom of waver- 
ing \voulcl bc a t~cnded  \\'it11 fatnl rcsults to lheir own esist- 
ence. They 1i:ivc from evcry point of view a position 
\vhich is practically unnssnilnble, so fxr as ~ h c  mnltcr is one 
of negotiation. T h c  eschangc of opinions which took 
place in 1872-3 bct \~cen the two Govcrnnlcnts on the sub- 
jcct of the ~ f & &  frontier has I m n  descril)cd ns no longer 
binding on Xussia; but the Russian Ambassador at: the 
Court of St. Jnmcs's mas instlucted in thc spring of 1882 
to slalc that the St. Petcrsburg Porcign Office still're- 
cognized ~ h c  \ditlily of the arrnngemcnt then concluclcd. 
This statcmcnt acquired more csplicit value from being 
follo\\~ecl up by thc dcclnmtion of Kassin's readiness to 
clclinlit thc A f g l ~ i ~ i  frontier from the Osus t o  Snmlihs. 
I-low, it ma): be askccl, can Russia carry out her own pro- 
position by throwing a loose linc round the Salar and Sari!< 
clistricts, and incorpornting all thc region 111) to thc I'nro- 
pnnlisus? 'Thc Russian acts now are in flat contradiction 
of everything stated by 31. de Gicrs up to the period of 
the h4erv occupxdon, and thcre is evcry reason to say that 
thosc expressions wcrc repcatecl still more e~ophatically 
aftcr that event 11x1 takcn placc. 
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L C  \\Thilc 111c English Go\.crnmcnt are ticd down to n 
policy of maintaining the integrity of Afghinistin 11y their 
formal representations to Russia and by their solemn 
plcclgcs to the. A~neer, the Russian Govcrnmcnt cqunlly 
bound themselves 1.0 co-operate in the task of dclirniting 
' thc Afghan frontier from Khojah Snleh to Samlihs.' I n  
measuring thc cxtent of the unfriendly nction to \vhich 
Kussia Ins resorted within the last t\\,o or three months it 
is ncccswry to rcmember that the Fronlicr Con~mission 
was clcviscd as a means of showing Russia's good faill~, nncl 
of ~woving [hat tllc Czar's conquest of M e n  did not con- 
stilute n mcnncc to England, ns many persons ~.epresented 
that it would. Nor can we lose sight of the fact that long 
bcfore General Lun~sdcn left London the scopc of his 
lahours llnd been clcfinccl by  he higlmt Russian as well as 
Iinglish authorities. I l c  was ,to complete what had been 
left unlinisl~ccl in 1873, ancl to givc the hmecr's territory, 
which was adnlittcd to bc ' outside the sphere of Russin's 
inllucncc,' a recognized boundary from therOxus Lo Saraklls. 
I t  is as impossible to reconcile Russia's recent action with 
the original understanding regarding thc labours of this 
Coinmissiun, ns it is to discover in thc occupntion of 
Z~~lfagw and Pul-i-Khisti thc cvidencc that I l~c  Russian 
Govc~.n~ncnt has no sinister designs upon Herit  ancl other 
places nenrer India. Instend of cordially co.operating 
\vith us, as originally arranged, the Russian Government 
have delaycd their Commission until thcir troops 11ad 
occupied thc most important ;)ositions within thc debatable 
ground, and then they have brought for\varcl thc cth~lo- 
gmphical principle, whicl~ should have been ventilated at n 
much earlier stage of the question if i t  \\!as to be employed 
at all. Altllough thcy \vent so far as tenominate n chiei 
Conlmissioner in the person of General Zelenoy last Sep- 
tembel; they have allowed him to remain ever since on his 
private estzte near Tiflis ; and \vhen the scason approached 
for beginning nrork on thc spot, instead of hastening the 
lllovelnents of their representatives they sent an agent, &I. 
Lcssar, to London to make demands which arc simply pre- 
posterous and to which no Governmcnt could vcnture to 
yicld. In  short, they have strivcn tl~roughout to lioocl\\~ink 
our Ministers and to mislead English opinion ; but they have 
already imposcd more than enough on our credulity. Not 
only have they con~mitted a flagrant breach of diplomatic 
etiquetle, but they have really invaded i1fghinist:in. Un- 
less t h y  rctire from the positions, which they should nevcr 
have cntcrecl, there is little chance of averting n hostile 
collision, for the English Government can never concur i n  
the \.iolent seizure of districts'to which Russia lins not the 
shadow of n claim, and some of which :Ire vitally ncces- 
sary to the preservntion of the Amir's authority in his 
kingdom." 
1)eTerring to another chapter the consideration of thc 
several routes fwm the important ccntrc of Her6t to Lhe 
places on its frontier-for the districts in disputc must be 
rcpardcd as outlying districts of the HerLt province-I pro- 
pose to treat now of those districts only, to seize which, 
Russia, in a time of profound tranquillity, and at the 
moment she had herself selected for amicable clelineation, 
has violated the rights of nations and threatencd the peacc 
of the world. 
The  outlying districts comprise the territory compre- 
hended between the line already nlarked from Sarakhs to 
Khoja Saleh, and an imaginary line below it, stretching 
from a point below thc Zulfagar pass, sixty miles below 
Sarakhs, on the one side, between Panjdeh and Meruchak 
on the Murgl~tib~ to n point just above Andlrhoi, and 
thence by the existing line to Khoja Saleh. This line 
would bring liussia within easy striking distance of I-kri t  ! 
If the render wi l l  consult Coloncl Stc\vartls mnp lie will 
see that tlie firs1 linc, from Snmklis to Rhoja Saleh, cuts off 
the cclgc of h e  Iha-I<ilm descrt some distancc abovc Gu1- 
Rulu nncl n sninll portion of tlie sanie desert in the vicinity 
of Saralihs. With thesc esccplions the district consists of 
valley, plain, and mountain, capnble of being developed 
into an  extraordinary state of fertility. To  thc west, from 
Snmkhs down to ICuhsnn, up Ll~e Heri-r~td or Tejend, tlie 
country has never been occupiecl by the T ~ r l i ~ l ~ ~ a l ~ ,  but 
that migratory tribes of h a t  racc have seltlecl for a timc 
in other parts 11ns bccn a colisccluencc of tlic gcncrally 
disturbed slate of thc counlry. 'I'u~kornnns wcrc c~icnnqxd 
for instniicc, at I'nnjdch, when Caplain Abbott visited 
that place in 1S4.o. Cut the Turkomnns \vho hnvc occupied 
parts of those districts hsvc becn cver ready to sulmit to 
thc prince ruling at I-Ierdt whenever 1ic might s!iow any 
disposition to enforce his power. They sublnitted to Slier 
Ali, and, as Lhc render will see from n lettcr quoted in the 
ncst chapter, no one has madc n grcatm iniprcssion on 
tlie several tribes within his territories tlinn the prescnt 
Afghdn ruler. If, then, t l ~ c  Russians sliould Rase Lheir 
clnims lo tllc positions they dem:md on the I-Ieri-rild 
('l'cjencl) and the Murgliib, and the country above tlic 
imaginnry linc I have referred to, on the ground that, 
having occupied Snmklis nncl conquered Merv they arc 
tlic inheritors of tlie territories occupied by the Snrilc 
'l'urlromnns, those claims fall at once to the ground, for, 
whilst lhe positions on the Hcri-rlid (Tejend) never were 
occupied by the Turkomnns ; whilst at the sevcrnl points 
bclow Snmlchs villngcs were not built because of tlie dread of 
the Turkomnns felt by the people ; tlie tribes of that race 
\~Iio'pitclied their tents in thc~vnlley of the,h$urghib, at Robat- 
Abdullah IChdn, and bclow it, have, since 1863, and even 
R?/s.ricrl.v Ltrsi M ~ . ~ J c  rrrzd Erghrr~tZ's Xcll,lJt, I I I 
prceiously, paid tribute to tllc rcprescntativc of tlie h n i r  
who was ruling a t  Ilerlit ! 
Cut Russia wants that broad strip of land, first, because, 
sitllntc for thc most part I)elow thc clescrt, it lmtnkes the 
general fertility of tlie H e r i t  province, and niay tlicrcfore 
I)c occupied as n bnsc for opc~.ntions against the mlleys of 
IG~shIdi and TCaln-i-nau. \\That those \mlleys are, n.hnt 
the country linows undcr tlie gcncric tcrni Hdrat " is, 1\41 
be explained i n  the nes t  chnptcr. Itussin \~mi t s  thnt skip, 
secondly, because tlic possession of it will bring licr within 
ensy striking distance of tlic city of I-1cr:i.t; slic wanls it, 
thirdly, bccmse, by taking it, she will absolukly neutralize 
Persin, by tlirusting n wcdgc bctween ,the l'ersimi town, 
Meslicd, and her frontier. 
Now, if me allow Russia to occupy these districts, or any 
portion of Lliem, \\T virtunlly ninlre her a prescnt oC I-Icrdt ; 
and I raise again lily warning voice to dcclare, that if 
Russin oncc be nllomed to occupy I-Ierdt, the conquest of 
India by hcr wiU be ;L merc q~lcstion of time. Even at  
Snrakhs, she was within a 0 2  miles oC the city of that name, 
whilst the English outposts arc 5 14 lililes clistnnl from it, and 
145 miles even fi-on1 Kandnhar. Since, tlien,sIie liasillegallp, 
nyninst the law of nations, puslied licr troops across the 
linc, \\;hicIi, sincc 1872-3, lias bcen recognized as Llie frontier 
linc of westcrii ffgliinistdn, and has o c c ~ ~ p i e d  the pass of 
Zulfagar oil the Heri-rild, and the posts of NiI<alshcini, 
i lk  Robat, and 1'111-i-Khisti, it is the duty of the Govern- 
ment of Englnnd to insist that slic ~vithdrn\\~ ~v i t l~out  delay. 
T h e  insistance might bc  made now with erect, for the 
Tmnscaspinn line of rnilwny is not yet ready, and Russia is 
not, therefore, prcpared for a niortal slruggle. 
Of tlie Russian claini to Panjdell, n foreigner well com- 
petent to judge, frofcssor Vamubbry, of the University of 
Buda-Pestli, writes as follow. Continuing 1-lie remarks 
which I have nlrencly extracted, about Pul-i-I<liitun, he 
adds : 
li Of a si~nilnr nature is tlie aggression planned, but 
hitherto frustrated, against Panjdeh (five villages), on  thc 
right bank of the Murglxib, thcrc where tlie clrcnry sands of 
Llic Ram-1i;um steppe ends and thc cultivable country of 
thc outskirts of  tlie Paropamisus begins. I n  former times 
Panjdch ~vas a nlost flourishing place in the district of Heri t ,  
and under the reign of Sultan I-Iusein blirza Bailtarn, when 
Llie capihl  on thc I-leri-rild was tlic cultural centre of tlie 
Ik i te rn  hlol~n~nrncclnn world, the environs of Panjdch and 
hCal.ucIink (IAtlc Mer\:) were tlie favowitc summcr abode 
of the rich and  lkur ious  \vorlcl of I-lcrit. I n  tlic subsc- 
quent periods w c  only occnsionally lnect with the name of 
Panjdeh in the historical works referring to this part of 
Khorasrin, but we can safely assume that the ultinlate 
clcstruction and desolation of the place dates only from the 
time when the Sarik ' l 'urkoma~~s,  vanquished by thc Tekke 
'I'urkomans, had to retire towards thc 11-untains, particu- 
larly to  tlie regiou of Upper i\.lu~.ghib, which was reckoned 
from in~nieniorial h n c s  as belonging to Hcrdt, and, since 
this place was talicn by ~ l i c  Argkins, as an integml part of 
Afglidnistdn. 
" T h e  Russian claim on tllis place is, therefore, from every 
point of  view, unfounded and unjust. By their assertion 
that the Sariks havevoluntarily ncknowledgcd the supreniacy 
of the Czar, they might claim h e  country on both banks 
of the Murglxib from Yolatan (rechits YLII-o-tin=passage) 
to Sari Yar and Ak Tcpc', b u t  not. tlie country near and 
a r o ~ ~ n d  Panjdeh, the Afghin property of which hacl been 
ascertained by the Russian tr:rvcller, Dr. Regel, in July 
1884, nrho found there an Afg1i:in garrison of a very un- 
friendly behavio~~r,  in consequence of which hc was obliged 
to change his route and  to return, viit Merv, to the Oxus. 
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Panjdch, which the Russi;un iravcller erroneously cailsP%irdr; 
is, tlmcl'orr, i n  thc unquestionable possession of Afgh;inis- 
tin, and thc rcccnt nltcmpt of General Alikhanoff to over- 
run this plncc and lay hold on it in the name of the 
Emperor of I<ussia cannot bc otherwise styled than an 
irruption into a foreign country, nay, into the clominionsof a 
prince subsiclizcd by 1S1~glaiic1, consequcnily into 1.h~ icrri- 
tory of a fricncl and ally of Great Britain."'. 
Subsequently, thc 15th March, the same high aulhority 
wrote a letter to thc Tiiitcs ( 2  1st March), \~hich virtunllg 
disposes of the assertion mnde by Russian par~isans that 
l'anjdch hnd ncver previously bwn occupied by the 
Afghans, and was only recently taken 1)osscssion of on the 
instigation of Sir Petcr I,umsdcn. 'I'l~c letter runs as fol- 
lows :- 
" I n  your article entitled ' 'l'hc question at issuc betwen 
England and Russia,' ~~iiblisl~ccl in the (Zi/ms of the 13th 
instant, I read that the assertion ol several leading German 
papers concerning the quite reccnt Afghin occupaiion of 
Panjdeh can be easily rclated by the fact that Abcli~rrah- 
man had already ordered his troops to take possession of 
Panjdeh t~vclvc ~nontlis ago. I n  order to provc this fact 
your contributor proceeds to quote the events of I S S ~ ,  
when the ruler of ICibul got an English map sho\ving the 
frontiers of his couiitry to\vards the north-west, :incl it wns 
in conscqilcnce of this cartograpl~ic ommunicaiion that l ~ c  
found it practicable to put a garrison in tllc above-111~11- 
tionecl place on the WIurglnil~. 
" As Continental critics m y  be rather sceptical as to 
English maps and English oflicial communications, I 1)cg 
leave to call your allention to a Gcrman scientilic p p c r  
writtcn by a I<us$mn ol'ficcr, in which it is clcarlp s~atcd 
t lnl  Pnnjdcli \vns ulrc:~cly in ~ h c  ~msscssiun or lllc h fg l~dns  
in June, ISQ,  and that it \\-as not a t  all the instigation of 
thc English, under Sir Pctcr I,uinsdcn, n~hicli promptcd the 
AfgIiAns to occupy I'ilnjdch and to pro\.oIic  he quarrel 
betwecn England a n d  Russia in Central Asia, as Rrlssian, 
Gcrman, and also French pnpcrs choose to imnginc nnd to 
rcprescnt. 
"'l'hc p p c r  named i s n o ~ h i n ~ ~ e l s c  than the highly respcct- 
able geogrnphical pcriodicnl knovn as ' Dr. A. Peter- 
~nann's Alitthcilungenl1 \ a l u n ~ e  31, 1885, N o  I., in \vhich 
there is a noticc by Dr. Regel, the csplorcr of l>ar\vaz, 
Roshau, kc., concerning his journey from 'I'chihnrdjui 
ncrosr; h'lerv to I'nncli (hn jc leh)  and back, cxcc~~tccl in 
June, 1SS4, and wherc \BC rcad, p. 24-' i l ls wir am 
viertcn Tngc (i.~., thc 9th of June, 1884) nu[ I'iindi 
(L'nntljch) losgehen wolltcn, brachkn die Leutc nus 
Uulihn (YuliiLcn) die  Nnchricht crstcrc Ortschaft (viz., 
Pnnjdch) sci cben crst von 4,000 bis 5,000 ACghAnen 
bcsctzt wordcn.'* 'L'hese are other sin$& stntcmcnts con- 
cerning t l ~ c  prcscncr of the AfgMns in Ynnjdch in the 
month of June, I S S ~ ,  nncl 11s this Gcr~nrui-l<r~ssi:un oflicer 
will not: bc suspcctcd of l)rcvnlcnl English sympathics, and 
as hc hncl written his paper long before thc outbrcnk of 
thc prcscnt quarrel, I vcnture to  say tile qucstion of English 
instigation may be easily clismissed, as thc tcst i~r~ony of Lhe 
, traveller named will sufice t o  rcfute any contrary statc- 
ment." 
It is ~ 1 ~ 3 1 ;  tlicn,  hat ngainst right, in the face of right, in 
dcfinucc of hcr rcl~cated protcsta~ions, Russia has crosscd 
the borclcr 1i11c \vliich slic ngrced to i n  1Si53 ,  n.hich is 
* " \\'lien un Ihc fonilh tiny (Jumc g, rSS4)#i'c were dm11 to pro- 
ceed Lo l'ondi (L'nnjdch), t11c people fro111 Yulilan (Yoliitcn) broucllt 
ns the news that thnl ~ ~ l n c c  ( v i z .  I'nnjtlch) had bcon 1 ~ t  just occupiccl 
by from I'om. to I;vo I l ~ o t ~ n ~ i d  i f i ~ l l n n s . "  
recognized as t l ~ c  bordcr line in all the Russian niaps of 
any aullmrity. She has co~un~ittecl this infraction of public 
law at thc wry time she had IlcrselC sc1cc:ed for a ncw 
and pcacerul demarcation of the fronticr line, wheli she 
l inc \~  L I I : I ~  a laryc English army and n contingent of Indim 
troops wcrc in thc Soudnn, that tlic minds or the English 
~ninisters \ \we occupied by grave E~~ropean  complications, 
and that Ilnglaud \\.as iess prepared for a grcat war than 
shc had been for thirty years. She co~n~riitted this infrac- 
tion of public In\\-, inorco\w, at- a period when the cou~lsels 
of England wcre g ~ ~ i d c d  by a ministry \vhom she had often 
deceivccl, and hacl founcl no dificulty in deceiving ngnin : 
a ininistry \vhich shc had seen yielding to bold deeds in 
the l'mnsvanl, to pressurc from France, to scjnlctl~ing wry  
like mcnnce from Germruny : n ininistry \~liich had shown 
a strong inclination to undergo any humiliation rather than 
engage the country in \vai., even in rightfill war. Pceling, 
then, as shc l ~ n d  a right to feel, that the game of bluster 
and swggcr wts n safe gamc to play undcr the circum- 
stances, she had played it boldly and unscrupulously. 
Pursuing the policy so aptly described by Lord l'almcrston 
in his letter to Lord Clnrendon, quoted in a. previous page, 
she spoke in  honied phrases at St. Petersbiurg, \vl~ilst, 
rcndg to disavow them if they should fail or to reward them 
if ::ley should swceecl, shc instructed her agcnts on LIE 
frontier to strike the Llow which might secure for her n ncw 
and vcry real basc against India. 
Ho\\J have the Miniskrs of England repliccl to this 
auclacious attenipt ? \Vc all know !low Mr. Pitt would 
have answered it, ho\v Mr. Canning woulcl have answered 
it, ho\v Lord Palpxston would have answcred it. We 
know how America, how Germany, how even Francc, 
would have met such an insult. IVithin four-and-twenty 
hours ordcrs would have been transmitted from St. Peters- 
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bi~rg to thc konticr for ~Iic wi~hdra\val of the Russinn troops 
across thc I~orclcr. I f  tlic oulragc had been ~ n c t  with 
firmness and resolution, prompt alonement would have 
becn made. 13ut, 111) to the prescnt momcnt, our Ministers 
Iinvc c1ispl:iyccl nei~lier firmness nor resolution. l'nr from 
grasping tlic rcnl significance of Russia's forwnrcl movc, 
they hnvc begun by mnlcing a concession which is a virtunl 
yielding of liussia's clemancls. Bussin had no c:~sc where- 
with to support licr impudcnt advance. Our Ministers haw 
provided hcr wit11 one. Lct us imagine, if me can, a French 
nrlny crossing the Gcrmnn frontier, \\hich was finnlly scttlcd 
nbout  lie same time ns the Afgliiin fronlicr, and seizing 
l\iIelz ! Is i t  possil)le to imagine [lie German Chancellor 
allowing thc inmcling army to reniain in that fortress unlil 
it should bc dccicled by negotiation to whom thc line of 
llic Rhinc properly belongcd : then lo listen Lo Prince 
Rismnrk, \\hen incerrogakd in Parliament, as lie made a 
slntemcnt like thc following ? 
.- 
'' Upon that con>munica:ion "-a demancl by Prince 
I3ismark for tlic witliclra\\~al of the Frencl~ troops-" a 
cor~.espondence ensucd, and tlie l~rcncli declined lo nritli- 
clrnw their troops. They gave ccrtain esplnnntion5 about 
them ; and h e y  founded thcir ansnrcr upon the belief they 
enterhind that the territory is theirs, tllnt they claim it as 
n matlerof right. Well, sir, that being the state of the 
case-we of course had adclressecl a requisition to them in 
the bclief that it was German territory-as tlie French 
nintle n serious claim lo be the rightful possessors of thc 
territory, w could do nolliing i n  the matter consistently, 
I Lhink, either with prudencc or with any honourable regard 
to the interests of peace, except to prosecute measures for 
bringing about a proper investigation .2hd decision of the 
clainl that had been preferred. That being so, uncloubkdly, 
1 will not say actually, there has been a withdrawal of the 
/2?issirz's Lrrst d!ove nlid E ~ g h d ' s  &p&. I 1 7 
requisition, but substantially it conies to the same thing. 
Tlie npplication that was ~nncle has lapsed I'ro~n tlic circum- 
stnnccs of thc casc." 
And yct, n~ul(r/is ~ n m h i h s ,  this was tlic precisc csplana- 
tion, Llicsc I V C ~ C  tllc $ s ~ s s ~ I J ~ ( ~  7 ~ ~ 1 . h 7 ,  \~Iiicli tllc l'rinic 
iV1inistcr of Ihglnnd ~ n n d c  when inlcrrognted by Mr. 
Edwarcl Stnnliope as  to Lhe action Ilc hncl taken with 
respect to the invasion of a frontier, which is, to all intents 
and ~iwposcs, the fronlicr of Hritisli Indin ! 
. I t  is to n certain cstent n sntishctory sign of tlic 
tinies thnt  his reply of Mr. Glndstonc lins n\ \dicr~cd the 
scorn and contempt of the men of all pxlics. 'l'hu 7';m~ 
of tlic following morning csl~ressecl the gcncrnl ol~inion 
when it  l n ~ i i e ~ ~ t e d  ~ h n t  Lhc l'rime hlinister should hnvc 
shown "so  little of the spirit of n ninn \vho nicnns Lo 
vindicate the rights of Lhis counlry." . . . u nvoicl w:~r 
by siniplc :~ba~idonment of clainis which hnve not bcen 
investigntecl by competent authority, nnd to permit Kussin 
to  retain posi l icx \\.hich slic has scized in defiance of her 
own admission of thcir doubtful o\vnc1~sIiip, is Lo proclni~ii 
ourselves impotcnt in presencc of audacious aggression, 
and to deprive ourselves of the confidcnce which alone can 
Icad to firm and fruitful alliance with Afghbnistin." 
I t  is in vain, I fear, notwithstanding Lliis expression, and 
similar csprcssions, of opinion from all parts of the country, 
to hopc that tlic Ministry nil1 bc inspirccl with tlic moral 
courage \vhich can nip nn evil in the bud. T o o  oftcn havc 
they turncd lhcir clieelrs to the smitcr. I \voulcl, ho\vever, 
ask them to rcmcn~ber  tlist in  his instance it is not n clues- 
tion of ni,inor import:unce--it is an Empire which is nt stnkc ! 
The rulers of England ;u.e the trustees Tor the people o f  
1Snglancl. I bes~ccli,  I iml~lore tlie~li, not to ~ieglect ~ l i i s  
opporlunily of shutting the door lo the invader. I,el ~ l i e ~ n  
" be just 2nd fear not." I f  mistakes have becn made by 
both pnrtics in the past, let both unite in thc sncrcd duty 
of firmly securing the nol~lcst clependcncy of England. 
For it is that dependency, it is India, which is cndangercd 
1,y this advnncc. If 111y fceblc voice cannot penetrate within 
tile porlnls of  Downing Strcct, il h e y  r e f ~ ~ s c  to Ileal. me, 
let them listen to thc voicc of one to n l ion~  for many yews 
thcy cntrustecl ~ l i c  Government of Indin, and to uhose 
advice thcy arc  bound to pay nttcntlon. " My own ricw," 
w o t e  the l h l i e  of Argyll, in n lettcr dated the 18th 
March of tlic currcnt year, to  tlic .Sf. jnnr~s 's  Gnzs//c :- 
L'h[y own view ]ins al\\.a~'s been [lint the conc~ucst I.)y 
Russia of Lhc Tckl;c l'urkomnns and of all tlic khanates of 
Ccntrnl Asin has Jcen inevilable. I h a \ t  hcld, furthcl-, 
that n o  civilization and n o  conmerce could bc cs~ablislied 
in  hose rcgions until that conqucsl had been nccomplishcd; 
and that on this ground, as well as on several other grounds, 
it was at oncc useless and i~ndigniliccl on our part to I x  
perl:c(ually renlonstrating against ' advances ' ~vhich we 
could not prcvc~it and  which, in the intcrasts of hunianity, 
we ought not  to rcgrct. , 
" E u t  nonc of thesc considernlions apply to any advanccs 
by Russia icross the I~orclcrs of A~Ixinist:i~i.  Wc must 
insist on [lie indcpcnclcncc and ilitcgrity of that country 
Iwing rcspcc~ecl; and in s o  1.1s ns tlic l\f~Ji,in kingclonl 
m ~ s t  of ncccssity I)c unclcr any predominant influence, we 
must  in& that this preclominancc sliall be  ours. I trust 
all pmties a rc  ngreecl in this doclrine and in this policy, 
and in desiring t h t  our Govcrnmcnl shnll carry it into 
cffect with firn~ncss." 
Finally, I would invite their nttcntion lo thc remarlis, 
published in the Ti//lcs of the s m c  dale, 19th March, 
written by the great soldier whose warnings rcgarcling the 
occurrcncc of  certain evcnts in  Cen:ral Asia unlcsv we 
sliould take ccrlain precnutions, linvc, unfortnnately, alnnys 
Russ ia ' s  Lnsd Agovc a n d  E I ( s ~ I ~ ' s  1;)QO. I I g 
been ncglcctecl and alwnys justified. " A  wry rcnl danger 
has come," wrote Sir Edmnrcl Ramlep, "\vithout o w  seek- 
ing, LO meet us on  thc Afghin frontier, I t  is impossible to 
conccnl from ourselves the design with which Russia is 
pushing on. Our manner of meeting her is among the 
marvels of the most ~inaccounLablc period of our history. 
We t r a ~ t  her ns one of two cstnldislicd coterminous Powers 
whosc respective limits require clcfinition. T h e  facts a re  
dropped out of sight that a fen' years ngo she was a thousand 
miles from the Afghrin frontier, that shc groui~ds 1icr brand 
IICW title to contest its territory with us on her conquest of 
ccrtain predatory tribes on whosc outskirts other predatory 
tribes \vnnder, and thnt on tllc strength of this estrnordi- 
nary claim she suddcnly puts forth the irupudent formula, 
' \VIintcver territory you cnnnot saiisfxtorily p row your 
right to is  nine,' wliich thenceforth 1,econlcs the l~nsis of 
negotiation. What can such n prctcnsion put in action 
inean but to defy us to wnr, with the alternative of ruinous 
submission ? And, in f x t ,  for weelrs past, the daily 
qucstion has been, ' Is there to bc war with RLISS~:~ ? ' a n  
event only staved off tlnis far by the hu~niliating nlternn- 
tive. LiIie the tcrrilied prcy of brigands we hnrc cast 
ourselves 71crrfre It fc~-rr: I h t  even submission the most 
abject cnnnot avail. T h e  attitude we hnvc chosen is not 
csnctly thc best for Itccping tllc throat from thc Icnife. And 
what effect \rill it hnvc on our woulcl-bc allies, the Afglirins, 
the poverty of nhosc dialect docs not pcrhnps cnnble 
them to cliscriminntc niccly betnccn a11 agreement and nn 
nrrongement ! What erect, too, in Ind ia?  I f  I do not 
spcalc of the effect in this country it is bcc:uise \re arc, for 
the tilnc, wrnpt i!l an opiun~ drcnm, in which facts count 
for nolliing, dclusi,ons for much. 
1:y ~o1111:lon c o ~ ~ s e n t ,  the rcxion for thc Russinn 
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advance is Lo bc found in our embarrassments in Egypt. 
That being ~ h c  zrsc, wl~al: could Russia desire .better if 
she herself tiad the ordering of orrr policy, than that we 
should cnst fresh armies and ncw licnps of trcasurc into the 
Soudnri ? Cnn she be supposed to look on \ v i ~ l i  other feel- 
ings tlmn dclight \vhile Uritish ships are Inncling railway 
11lant by the hundrcd mile at  Su:lkirn? Had  the same 
energy becn clisplnyecl on the Indus wc should now hnsc 
11;1cl a nilway to Qucttn, perhaps to l<.inclaliir, wit11 Len 
Iho~rs:~ncl Rrilish Lroops at thc end of it. 
"\\;hat n sound judgment woi~lcl scem to counsel, thcn, 
is an immediate rrconsitlcration of our position. Nobody 
will maintain L ~ : . L  n.e cnn carry on two wars, cithcr of  which 
\ v o ~ l d  suficienlly tax onr resources. I\'e must clioosc 
Ijetween the will.o'-~lle-\~isp and thc mortal emergency. 
Happily, troops nnd mntcrinl nt Sounkim are already so far 
on thc dil.cct way to Kurrachee. A n d  for the force onthe 
Nilc, i l  it can continuc its retreat to I.o\\ler Egypt (and the 
douht speaks nl~tch for the perverse inge~ldity \rhich created 
it), 1st it abandon its delightful ant1 salubrious sulnmer 
r111artcl-s alld d c s c c ~ ~ I  the ri\-cr ; thus, so many nien will bc 
siwxl townrtls the saving of  thc Empire. Ancl let us 
simr~ltnneously takc nll nccclft~l stcps ftir placing nn 
effcclivc army i n  the field and putting  his ltingdom in a 
condi t io~~ of clcfcnce. I (  a t  111c same Linle, that lost art, 
diplomacy, sl~oulcl chancc to revive among us, it will find 
ample occupation in endcasouring Lo persi~nde the Afghins 
to invitc us to n military occupation of their country, in 
procuring friends among lhc European I1o\vers, nntl in 
persuading Lhe unspcakablc T u r k  to form with us that 
ng-ccment (or nrrangcnlcnt) necessary to cnnble us to  
opcmte cfkctivcly in the Black Sca." I 
These w e  pregnant words. Of this, at least, Englishmen 
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niay bc sure, that it is only by concentrating all thc energies 
of Great Britain on  the maintenance of the esisting fronticr 
of Afghinistdn that HcrAt can be saved. If wc allow 
I-Icrril to fall, India is doomcd. That thc reader may 
understand this clearly I procced to ans\vcr thc q u e ~ y  
which I can imagine forming in his mind, " Whnt arc 
those plnces which thus scem to consl i t~~le thc outlying 
redoubt of Indin? " 
CHAPTER VIII. 
THE OUTLYING; RKnOUUT O F  INDIA. 
TIIE city of I-Icrdt stands in tlie fertile valley of the 
I-Ieri-rtid z ,G50 feet above tlic level of thc sca. The 
Ilcri-rlid rises in the mountains of I-Iazireh, not h r  from 
thc villagc of Robnt Tarwan. 'Under the name of Jangal-ib 
i t  flow in n, south-westerly direction to a point bclow 
Daolatzhr, a village on the direct road between Ilerdt and 
Eaminn. At this point it is joined by another bmncli, tlie 
Sir Tingilbb, which rises likewise in the Haziireh range, 
though at a point somewhat more to the south-east than 
t 1 ~  Jangnl-rib. From tlic point of junction the united 
strcams take thc namc of I-Ieri-rdd and [allow an alniost 
direct westerly course south of [lie Paropnmisnn rnngc. 
Sonic fifty rides beyond I-Ierdt, which lies near its nortlicrn 
bank, tlie r'iesi-roc1 tnltes a turn to thc north-west and then 
to t l~c  north receiving many streams in its course and 
passes Romnnk, Kulisan, ICasan, 1311-i-l<hitun and Sn~lil is .  
Between the two last named places it loses the name of 
Heri-rud and takes that of Tejend. 'IJncler this name it 
flows north-west~~arcl ti l it' is lost in the sand and swa~ilps 
of the great Turkomnn desert. 
At the point nlrcady indicatccl wlierc tlic combined 
w\-ntcrs of tlie Sir TingilAb nncl tllc Jnngnl-Al) form tlie 
IZesi-rild, the rivcr trnvcrses a broxl valley which it adorns 
and fertilises. All along this clinnncls from the river 
spread o w r  its Ixoad surfncc, converking Cdcscrts into corn- 
fieltls, and mnste lands into gardens of fruit, Tllc supply 
from its swiftly rnnning wnlers ncvcr hils. I t  was equal to 
the demand cvcn in the days wl~en Herlit was LIE most 
fnmous city of Ccntrnl Asia, passcssing thc most influential 
court and constitutir~g the most splendid conmiercial mart 
in the 13astcrn \vorld. Though the clianncls have been in 
ninny instnnccs destroyed the supply is Inore ~ h a n  equal to 
the demand even now. 
Ju this vnllcy the city of H c h t  is tlie principal city. 
According to thc graphic account of Conolly, who visitcd 
It in 1830, it is situated " at four miles clistant f7om hills 
on tlic nor~h,  and t \ \ ~ l \ ~  luilcs fiom those which run south 
of it, The sljnce bctn~een the hills is one beautiful extent 
of littlc iortificd vill;nges, gardcns, vineynrcls and cornficl~l~, 
and  his rich sccw is briglilencd by many smal1 streams of 
shining water, \\d>icln cut the plnin in all dircclions. A 
d a ~ n  is thrown across thc Heri-rilcl, and its wntcrs, being 
turnccl into many cal~als, arc so co~ductcd over Ihc vnlc 
of 1-ler,it that cwry part oC it is watered. Variclics of thc 
iuost delicious fruit arc gro\vn in tlic valley, and they are 
sold cheapcr cvcn than at i\'Iesliccl ; the neccssnries of life 
arc ~lc ,n~iful  and cheap, and tlic brcnd and water of I-Ierdt 
arc prowrbial for lhcir cxcellencc. I really ncvcr, in 
England even, tnsted 1110rc delicioiis watcr than that of 
tlie I-Ieri-rild : it is ' as clear as tears,' and the nntivcs say, 
only cqunllcd by tlnc ntntcrs of I<asIimir, which inaltc tliose 
who clrink Llie~n I~eautifnl." 
The origin of ~ l i c  city can be traced far inlo ~untiqui~y. 
'1'0 thc ancicn~.s the provincc of which it \\.as and is 
~ h c  npitnl wns known ns Aria and Ariann. Tlic city is 
mcntioncd I y  h e  cnrlicst \vritcrs. Arrian writes of it as 
Artnkoann or :\rlakann, thc royal city of the inhabihnts of 
Ark. JI: ofLcn scrvcd as thc l.esiclencc of tlic grcaLcst 
conq~~crors of ~ h c f  kst .  T r d i ~ i o n  Ixings to it Ncl)ttcl~nd- 
nezznr and Sc~nirnmis. Thc l'crsinn 1iistori;uns assert, with 
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rcnlarltablc unanimity that Alesander the Great pave it thc 
nnme under n.liich Arrinn writes of it. There can be n o  
doubt but that tlic cily was the gate lhrough which Lhc son 
of Philip of .Maccclon passed t o  tlie conquest of Indin. 
I t  was lomnrcls thc close of the tcnth century thnt the 
vallcy of lhe Heri-rlid obtained the importnncc which it 1 
exercised during many centuries which follo\vcd. An 
oasis betwecn Llie Turkoman clcserts and the rocks and 
mountains of Afgliinist:in, Lhc cenlrc wliesc convcrgecl 
the roads fiom 13okhdra, fionl Pcrsin, a d  from 1ndi.1, it 
l~ecanle, nt that period n commercial ccnlrc which even thc 
contesls Ixtwccn tlic Irdnian and thc 'l'urmiinn did not 
clislorb. I n  tlic year 1219 t h c  city of 13er:it posscssecl 
I 2,000 retail shops ; 6,000 pul)lic bn[hs, cnravnnsarics, and 
water-nlills; 350 scl~ools and monastic institulions ; 144,000 
occupicd houses; and the city was visitccl yearly by caravans 
from all par'Ls of Asia. 
l'hc invasions of Chcngiz I<li;~n, 1219-22, and of 'I'nimtit 
in r j S r ,  inflicted upon I-Tcrit enormous-clmiage. I t  was 
through her gates that  lie Intter  narch he cl to   he conqncst 
or India. Gut tllc rebound \\;as n~agicid. Undcr tlic rule 
of Shih Rokh, fourth son of Taimul; &r$t soon vindicated 
hcr claim to tlic [ i l k  of Queen of thc citics of the East. 
'I'hc country beyond the Osus boasted of many famous 
cities. 'There was Bolchlira, and  thei-c was a city then more 
inll~rentinl still, the famous Snmarkhand. Uut Shih-Roltli 
recognizcd in the province of I3er;it a military position 
whence he  could hold fast the co~mtrics beyond the O s w ,  
\vhilst lteepilig in n fir111 grip the cuuntrics Lo the cnsl., to  
the  west, and t o  the south. Under his rule Herdl  became 
the capital of Lhc whole of Central Asia. 
The rencwccl prosperily of the chy and llrovince, 
beginning \\;it11 tlie rule of the son of l'nimur, 139G-7, 
lasted with but little interruption, to the period of its con- 
q ~ s t  hy Persia in 1510. With that conqucst thc glory of 
tlie city depnrtcd. l 'he rno~~nrchs of Persia ncglectccl 
Herit 1.0 pntronizc n city of thcir own, the holy city of 
wsll ec~ .  
From the dntc of its capturc by Persia, Llic province of 
H e ~ i t  becamc the bnttlc licld bctween the Uzl~elis and the 
Illnians. ' l h  city suffered 'miny sicgcs. Finally it fcll 
to the latter, and thence to thc ycar 17 15  it shnrcd thc 
forlunes of Lhc Persian monnrclly, ~ieglected nnd nll bul 
forsalccn, from tllal molilen t, ~lntil the death of Niclir S11:ih. 
It fell then into thc hands of thc AfghAns, and i n  thcir 
llands i t  has sincc rcmaincd. 
The limits of thc provincc of Hcrit  hnvc varied with h e  
times. Eut regarding that province asconstiti~ting\\~cstern 
Afgll5nist;in it Inny hc said to bc 1)ordcrecl on the north 
by thc linc from Snrakhs to lihoja Saleh, on the west I J ~  the 
Hcri-rlid, to the so~~th-\vest I)y thc Iks i an  descrt as far ns 
SGistn~;, lo the south by tlic 1Ieri-riicl ; to the cast I,y 
thc inoi1ntainoi16 ranges separating it from Andkhoi, 
MaimcnC and Shibbcrgan. 
It's value to India resls on two facts:-the one palent to 
the eye, that ns long as the province of I-IcrAt is held by 
an ally or dependan1 of the ruler of India, Indin is unnssail- 
able : thc other that I-Ier;it constitutes n ncw and perfect 
base for a hostile army. 
On the first point I would remark that I-Ierdt is called 
thc gate of Indin because through it, and through it alonc, 
can the valleys be entered which lead to the most valuable 
of all the divisions of Asia. Those vnlleys, running nearly 
north and south, are protected to the east by ranges practi- 
cully innccessible, to thc west by sterile deserls. No invading 
army would attcinpt to traverse tlie great salt desert, and tlie 
desert imnlediately to tlie south of it, the Dnsht-i-Naobad, 
whilst n British army slloulcl hold Herit. I n  thc eloquent 
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lccturc, already nllucled to, on thc subjcct of tlic ftonlicr of 
Inch ,  delivered by Sir E. Ha~nlcy  in I S ~ S ,  that nlnstcr 
of the strategic art laid clown the bloacl principle that if 
England were to hold tlic wcskrn linc of communication 
with India, that by I-Icrat a n d  l<nndnhar, shc ncecl not 
troublc herself vcry 11111~11 about thc castern or ICibul line. 
On thc samc occasion, the emincnt soldier-politician \\rho 
has made the question of the frontier policy of Inclin tlic 
study of his life, declared, in reply to n question put to 
him, that rather than allow the occupation of 1Hcr:it I>y 
Russia, hc \vould vcnturr: the wholc might of Dritisli Inclin. 
Sir Hcnry Rawlinson saw clcarly that the posscssion of 
I-Ierdt by Russia meant the possession not only of a 
strategic bnsc whence Russia could invade India, but the 
possession of n country wlierc shc could remain quiescent 
unlil the opportune moment for making the Gtal spring 
shoulcl arrivc. 
T h e  mention of this consideration !ends me to [lie 
secollcl point of my argulnent-to tlic assertion Lhnt thc 
povincc of I-Icrit \voulcl form n scctirc and perfect base 
for .an army of invasion. I have spoken of the \voncle~ful 
fertility of tlic valley of the EIeri-r~icl. Ancicnt rcmains . 
prove that the valley of the Murgliih has been and can be  
rendered again not less productive, l'hc vallcys ot 
IUidshk and Kala-i-Nau, thc  country about Panjdch, 
belong to tlie same category. .Abbott, Conolly, Vamb&ry, , 
found everywhere trnccs of large occupation. T h e  pro- 
vince produces in abundance tlie willow and the poplcr, 
trees which maltc the bcst charcoal. I t  possesses mines of 
lead, of iron, and of sulphur. T h e  surface of many parts 
of thc country is laden with saltpetre. I t s  fields produce 
in abundance corn and  wine and oil. ~ h c e  a n  army in the 
province 'i\~hich, callcd by its inhabitants Badghis, niay be 
conqxehended under the generic term Herzit, and nothing 
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neccl be brought to i t  from Europe. 'I'he valley which 
was the granary nncl the province vl~ich was the garden of 
Central Asin, can equip it, provide it with its ~mlh-i~?, ay, 
even with men and horses. On the city which gives its 
name to the valley, moreover, convergc all the great roads, 
but one, leading on Indin. Occupiecl by liussia, it \vould 
beconle " an eye LO see nncl nn arm to strikc." 
Tl~cse are not 111y mords done, they ace not my thoughts 
alone. They are the words ancl the thoughts of every 
Englishman of ordinary intelligence who has studied lhe 
subject. They \;we Lhe words and thoughts of the cver- 
to-be-lamented Barlle Frerc : they are the words and 
thoughts of Hnmley, of J<n\\~linson, of Napier of Magdaln, 
of Roberts, or b4acGrcgor. \\'hat says the latter, n most 
accomplisl~ccl and instructed oflicer, on the subjcct? I 
cannot quote from the ablc mernornndum which I 
received in conhclence, but, forhmntely, Lherc is an 
appendix tu his book on 1Chor:isin which contains his 
views, writtcn so* far back as rS75, on thc subject I a n  
now discussing. 
" I t  is not, honever, suficient," wrote Colorlel Mac- 
Grcgor, '( to show the importance of Ivterv. I will go 
f~~r t l~c r ,  and try and sho\v ~ ~ h y  Ilerlit is important, because 
of course if Hcr:~t were not important, and tllcre was 
nothing beyond Mcrv but dcscrt down to the scn, I need 
not have troubled myself to pen these remarks. Merv has 
almost no morc value, npnrt fro111 Henit, than the head of 
a sap 113s apart from a fortrcss selected for attack. I there- 
fore \ \ ~ I I  particular attention to be give11 to the nest step 
by which I hope to prove lily case. 
"E1er:it has been tcrmed thc Key or India, not lightly as 
n Inere figure of stcech, but b y  every officer who has had 
an opportunity of seeing its valley. I t  is so, becausc it is 
the neal-est and best point at which an invader could con- 
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centrale mid prepnre for tlie invasion of that country ; 
aclvankiges which it gains from ils beautiful vallcy, ~ l i c  
fcrlilily of which is unri~xlled in Asia ; from its slrn~cgical 
posilion, which gives il tllc command oT all ~ l i c  important 
roads to India ; from the grcat strcng~li of its foriress, it 
being, in  fact, the slrongcst place from the Caspian to tlic 
Indus ; from its admirable climate, and from tlic prestige 
it- enjoys throughout Asia. 
" T h c  fertility of its valley, nncl its capability of maintain- 
ing large forccs, is provcd by Lhc fact that it has bcen 
besiegcd oftencr Lhan any cily in  Asia, ancl has always 
af~ordcd supplies Tor tlie armics of both besiegers and 
besieged. And it rnrlsl bc remembered tlie first have 
sonletimcs rcached as  many as 80,000 men, and have 
scldom fallen below 30,000, while both have always been 
composed of nnclisciplineil men who deslroyed nearly as 
much as  they consunled. Moreover, I have seen it with 
my own cycs, and I have no hesitation in saying that it is 
capable of inaintnining a very largc army.- 
l L I t  will not be necessary to  clescribe the defences of 
Herdt, but  only to remark that Sir H. Rawlinson's descrip- 
tion is in  no way csaggernted when hc says, ' I t  is sur- 
~ o u n d e d  by works of Llie most colossal character, which, 
with h e  adaplalions and improvemen~s oT modern science, 
might be renclcrcd almost iniprcgnable.' 
" A glance at  the map, will convince any soldier o f .  its 
importance strt~tegically. i No less ~ h a n  five dislinct routes 
lend lo Herlit from the west, viz : I. from ASII~LIK by 
Shahrood, Toorsliez, IChaf; 2. from Guz by 130stam, 
Subewar, Toorbut, Haiduree, ancl Shuhr-i-Now ; 3. from 
Astrabad by Findurisk, Jnlijurm, Jowen, Nisliapoor, 
Furreeninn, Shuhr-i-Now ; 4, by thc Xhorgaun, Rabat 
Islik, Boojnoorcl, I<oocliaun, LO Mushudcl, and J u n  ; 5. 
from the mouL11 of the A t l r ~ ~ k ,  by that river tlirougli ~ l i c  
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same points. From the north two routes lcnd direct o n  t o  
it from hlerv, and n third arrives from Icirki by Maimend. 
Hcrdt conlmnnds all these routes, as \ \ d l  as the routes to 
the south horn l'crsin, viz. from 'I'iln by ICIiaf, from 
Ghain, Sulm\.nr, from Bisjund to F ~ ~ r r n l i ,  Herdt and 
Lash. h[orcover lllc routes lending out of Herit ,  or over 
which an army stntionccl Ilcre may bc said Lo have the 
comnand  are, I. the route En Rib111 by lktuiian ; 2 .  Llle 
route to thc same plece by rjehsootl ; 3.  Lhe same from 
I\[crv by ISala Murgl~ab ; 4. the route by Balkh to l<dbul ; ' 
5 :~nd 6. two routgs to ICandaliar ; 7, thc roule to Ghuz- 
ni through the H q z ~ a h  coiu~lry ; 8. tlic roulcs fronl 
Persin \vl.~ich lead through Sulizwnr, F ~ ~ r r a l i ,  1,ash or 
Siistan, and \vliich all converge on Kani1;lhm.. :" 
'' Besides all Lhese p o s i t i i ~  and patent advantages which 
this place possesses, Russia in I-Icrat would have nn un- 
assnilnble position, from nl~icll  lo 1hre:lten us in India, so 
a s  LO force us to kccp largc forces al\wys ready to meet 
the menace, \vhik shc \vould be able to cast abroad 
L1~roughout India, that ' seething, festering mass o f  d i s  
nffection,' the sccds of a rebellion that \vould still further 
cripple us, she \\rould altogether alienate from us Lhe \ ~ h o l c  
of tlic Afglidns, nnci tlic Persian Kliorisinis, and w o ~ ~ l d  
practically control for her own purposes nearly all tlleir 
military resources." 
111 thcsc remarks thc whole case is contained. T h e  
conclusions, ~ ~ n h r t u ~ i a t e l y ,  arc irrefutable. 
4' 
'I'he principles which apply t o  the whole province appIy 
equally to that northern portion of ndlich is containecl 
betwcen the line of 1872 and the new Iine which the 
Russians are hying to enforce. ?'he concession of that 
line n~ould bring the Rus~iai i  outposts to  nithi11 a very 
short distance of I-Ierat-not much greater than the distance 
between D w e r  n ~ i d  1,ondon. Slle \vo~~lcl l i z  securely on 
I< 
L W O  rivcrs, each possessing n full strexu and an unsurpassed 
power of fertilizing-each, as I shall show in  Ll~e nest 
clinpter, opening out a route casy to be tmvcrscd. I n  
desiring to acquire these districts liussin can havc hut 
onc object, nncl that object the one which has been 
the end and aim of her Transcaspinn struggles. T o  
allow her to retain the Zulfagnr Pass, Pul-i-1Ch;itirn ancl 
I'ul-i-Kishti, with the country to the north of lllcse places, 
wonld be as crinlinal and as fatal to h e  nation allowing 
it, as i f  the commander of a f 0 r t l . e ~ ~  were to pcrmit a 
hostile army to encmnp on ~ h c  glacis. . The conquest of 
Merv ancl the occupation of Samkhs brought Russia near 
cnough to Herit-but liltlc longcr than the distance which 
separates the British outposts from ICandahnl; If wc would 
preserve H e r d  from hcr clutches, if we would nlaintain 
India, we are hound to insist that the horder line from 
Sarakhs to 1Choj;i Snleh shall be scrupulously respected. 
CHAPTER VIII. 
I PROPOSE no\v to describe the routes, and with the ro:ltes 
the nature of the country, from Herit along the Hcri-rdd 
to Snrdths ; from the same place bji the I~ l~ush lc  river to its 
junction with the Murghzib ; and from Henit, also, by Lhe 
ICaln-i-nail valley to the Musghib. I n  carrying out this pl;ul 
I shall make frec cstrncts from L l x  journals of older 
tlnvcllers, men such as James Ahl~ott, Vambdry, Mnrsh 
ancl MacGrcgor, and contrast their esperiences will1 Lhose 
of  he compnnions of Sir Peter Lumsclen ~ 1 1 0  haw written 
on the subjcct tc  thc London papers. 
I take f rst Lhe routc from IlcrLt to Sarakhs along the 
Hcri-rlid valley, bnsccl upon the esperienccs of Captain 
Marsh, who traversed the country in 1872, and of Sir C. 
MacGregor who visitcd i L  the following year : 
Riding westwnrcl thc first stage lands. the traveller at 
Shakhwan n large group of ~hree villqes and a fort, l'hc 
distancc by the direct road is twenty-four miles, but to 
avoid the wet cultivation near the river i L  is often necessary 
to nldic n dt?to;r of eight miles, crossing h e  Julglln or 
])lain of Hcrnt " a sandy loam \vhich bears goocl crops by 
irrigation." 
The second journcy is thirty-two miles to Sabash " a  
little, mean, dirty, fort, bnrely habital~le." The first: part 
of the road talics the traveller along n networlc of canals 
as far as a riiinecl carnvansnrai ; thence, along high grounds 
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at some distance from h e  rivcr to the fort of Rozanak, 
about four miles from thc tonm of Ghorian to the south o f  
it, and from Rozannk across a vast gravel plain with dis- 
tant hills on both sides to Sabash. 
From Sabasll to Kuhsan the distance is but twelve miles 
across the s:iune gmvcl plain. Kulisan is no\v in ruins, 
but in Sir Charles l\.lacgregorJs opinion it could easily be 
i~nproved "so as to  ~ n a k e  it worthy of the frontier fort of a 
warlike nation." T h e  same autliorily speaks with enthusiasm 
of the fertility of its soil. " Cond~~cted,"  he writes, "into a 
most delighthd garden, I bivouackecl under the shade o f  
some fine plane trees, by a tank o f  clelicious clear water. 
After a good bath in the Ial tc~,  it was a great luxury to lie 
back in one's bed, and devour, for nothing, bunch after 
bunch of glorious grapes, that a t  home would have ruined 
me." H e  makes special mention of the splenclid gardens 
and vineyards in thc vicinity of the town, as  wcll as  of its 
\viridn~ills, wIiicI1 like\vise are to bc founcl in great abund- 
ance about liozannk. Regarding its posieion AiacGregor 
writes : (' The  position of Kuhsnn is one of considerable 
importance as being the first village in :he valley of the 
I-Ieri-rdcl which would be reached by forces coming from 
the west, and the point on nhich the roads from l'arbut, 
hIeshed, and Sarakhs join. It is therefore a place nthere 
thcrc shoi~ld be a fort of considerable strength, because an 
invndcr could not venture to pass it n~ithout taking it, and if 
it we're able to offer a respectable resistance, it would necessi- 
tate his being detained long enough anlong the barren tracts 
to the nest." 
The fourth clay's journey is to Chasn~a-Saoz, a distance 
of twenty-fonr miles. T h e  road, which is good, traverses 
a plain on the left bank of the Heri-rdd. Supplies of all 
sorts are here abundant. This journey terminates in  a 
pass, \vhicli, judging from the equal distance, sixty miles 
from S ~ r ; ~ l h ,  can be no other [Inn the Zulfagar Pass, 
recerirly seized by the Russians. 
T h e  fifih chy takes the traveller to Pul-i-IChdtun, twenty- 
eight miles. ' r h e  r o d  crosses the- Kotal Istn-ICllanchil 
pass, and then traverses hills, crossing to the right bank not 
far f i ~ m  I'ul-i-l<l~:itun. TI-lough not good, it is practicnble 
for g ~ ~ n s .  Not far i ron [hese hills, the most northern branch 
of the Heri-rud takes the nanle of the T'ejend. Thcre is 
no villngc at Pul- i -Rhdt~~n,  but forage is abundant. 'l'hc 
bridge \vhich gives its name to the locality is an old bridg? 
of stone. 
From Pu1.i-Kliitun to Saralths, the distance is ~llirty-two 
ndes ,  the road lwei all the way, over n plain on th-. left 
bnnk of the river. At sixteen miles the Si)rt of Knln 
1lnolatil)hd is passed ; eight milcs beyond, t ' ~ : l t  ol  N;~ozn- 
bad. 
Contrasting with this account is the grnphic descl.iptian 
of the salne road, t:lkcn [he reverse way, from Sirakhs 
down the valley," ns rccounkd by Mr. Simpson, the specinl 
artist to the J/l/tshnlcd Lnirdt/:l AZzils, pul~lishccl by that 
paper, in its issue of the ~ 1 s t  March of the current year: 
"The  march from Pul-i-Khdtun to ICojeh Saham-ed-din, 
and thence to Goolnr, on our way to ICuIisan, was n w r y  
interesting one. The  interest of it lies in its strategic 
featuses in relation to a force moving from Sarakhs on the 
line of the Heri-rilcl to\vnrds I-Terit, From Sarnkhs to Pul-i- 
I<hituo the ground is open ;. on  the left or Persinn side it 
may be called a plain the \vhole way ; but on the right bank 
a gentle rise begins at ICazil Koi, about eight miles south 
of Sarakhs. 'l'his rise assumes the char~c te r  of n plateau 
or of undulating clo\vns, all the way south to l- 'ul-i~l<h,it~~n. 
Nowhere in thaP space is there any strong posilion of 
defence. At I'ul-i-I<h.ltun the whole character of the 
ground changes, t l ~ e  bed of the river beconxc rocky, and 
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pcrllaps nbout a qunrler of a mile distant a gorge presents 
ilself. Here the slrnta stand nearly peqxnclicular, and the 
road leaves thc rivcr to pass over the spurs of the higher 
hills on the south. This gorge, with one or two s~nall 
heights, :und the spurs jusl mentioned, could bc easily mnde 
very formidable, if not impregnable ; even as they arc, a 
very s~nal l  iorce could stop a very Iargc one. Souh is thc 
position at Pul-i-I<hitun itself ; and it forms the key of t l ~ e  
whole strategic probleln. I t  is tlic Ell)urz Range wl~icli 
bends eastn.:~rd, or south.enstward, to bc Inorc corrccl, : ~ t  
one of i ~ s  ridges, ~hc. ridge clips down to the I-Iel.i-rhd, 
disappears, and crops up again on the east side of Lhe 
bridge, from which it slondy rises to\vards the Zulfagar Pnss. 
I t  is n common fenturc of the hills in this rcgion to bc 
steep and rocky, nlnlost precipitous, on the south and 
south-west ; while on the north the slope is easy. The 
ridge extending south-cast from Pul-i-Khdtun is of this 
character. For a few miles it i~ no great height, and there 
are one or two places \vherc it might be $ssed by troops. 
'I'l~e best place would be whnt is known ns t l~c Germab 
I'ass, nbout nine miles from Pul-i-I<h:itun ; this line takes 
thc ' chord ' of Lhc cur\re ~vhich [he river ~uakcs west\vard 
to Pul-i-l<lxilun. When thc rjvcr is low, this pass is taken 
by travellers from its being the shortest linc to Saralchs. 
A forcc coming south could turn the position nt Pul-i- 
I<hitun by this pass, but if the def'ending force was large 
enough to extend along the whole grom~d to the Germdb 
Pass, it would hnvc n strong position. The Germbb Pass, 
it wi l l  be understood, must form part of the whole position ' 
to be includccl as belonging to l'ul-i-ICbitun. South-emt 
of the GermAl) Pass, thc r i d ~ e  beco~nes so elevated and 
stecp in park that no force would try 'to? surn~ot~nt them. 
The nest pass is that known as the Z~~lfagar ;  its southern 
entrance must be about thirty miles from Pul-i-Khitun, and 
the distance from leaving thc river to the point wlierc it is 
again touchecl by anyone coming through must be still 
greater; and I understand that no mtcr  is found in tlie 
pass itself. This will indicate one difficulty in marching 
troops by this linc, on account of tlie want of water; and 
if there wcrc a force dcfc~iding the sou~h  end of the pass, 
thc difliculty might Ix i~icrc:~setl. 'I'hc Zulhgar Pass is a 
very striking onc, fron~ t l ~ c  ~xxd le l  ridges of lcvcl strata in 
tlie hills on each sidc, n.hicli rise to n grcat Iicigl~t. 
" liojeh Snhani-cd-din is n saint's tomb, but our camp 
was a t  a spring of watcr about a mile hom it. Our next 
march, to Coolar, was a very short onc; being only eight 
miles. The deserted character of this part, since leaving 
Pul-i-Kl~Ltun, is even greater than anything we have yet 
passed. 'I'hc ground has been cultiv;~tcd at some fosrner 
date ; and \\T Iiaw seen spots on which towns have stood : 
now there is not an inhabited house all the way to Kulisan. 
At Goolar we were in a piecc of open country, with plains 
and heights, hutof  a small elevation, in comparison with 
the hills around. 
L '  Our ~~ ia rc l l  from Goolar was at f rst for about seven or 
eight miles soutli, still on the west side of the Heri-rilcl, 
which we had not seen since the march horn l'ul-i-Khritun 
-on tliat march we crossed it and re-crossed it again. Right 
across our line on leaving Goolar was the Kuh-i-Jam range; 
and o u ~  linc soutli, over the lo\\w ground, I~rought- 11s to 
this range, which we began to ascend in n valley. On our 
left were four mnrltcd hills known as thc Clialzar Do\vli-- 
' Chakar ' meaning four. Between two of these the Hesi- 
rlid passes oot fro111 the Iiuli-i-Jam into tlie open conntry 
bct\\.een that and the high ranges at Zulfagnr. The gorges 
of tlie river whe~r: it passes the Kuh-i-Jam are inlpassable 
for travellers ; hence tlic necessity for going ovcr .the hills. 
Our route lay op the valley in a south-wcstcrly clircction. 
I 36 7 '1 '1~8  ~~USSO~.A&L~I( Qucsiiou. 
- -  - - - 
Troops could march by this load, Lut nothing on wheels 
could pass. \Ire stoppcd for thc night a t  an open bit of 
g o u n d ,  \\,here there was a stream of good water, with trees. 
On the top of a hill are 'some bits of the walls of a fort, 
Stoi, but the  Persians call it Istoi, and this givcs the 
llame to the Pass. \Ye were said to be about 4,000 feet above 
the sen this place, and it was very cold. There were 
clouds and  a few drops of rain or sleet." 
T h e  party had four days' marches yet to perform to reach 
K u l ~ s a ~ ~ .  
'I'hc distance from I-Ierht to Sarakhs by h i s  road is only 
t\\,o hundred and two miles. I f  the British Government 
alld the Rritish people are insane enough to allow Russia 
to shorten that distance by sixty miles-and that is the 
distancc between Snrakhs and the Zulfagar pass-to occupy 
a place which is valuable only for its position, for it does 
not even posscss a Ilut--\\~ ought not to be surprised if we 
arc soon called upon to yield I-Ierdt liltewis'c ! 
I turn now to Pnnjdeh-or group o; five villages-a 
long \my within the Afghin frontier proper. A glancc at 
the following itinerary between H e l i t  and klerv along the 
valley of the bIurgh:ib, on \vI(:lich Panjdeh lics on the 
direcl line, will sho\v more clearly than any special descrip- 
tion the enormous importance of Lhe position. I quole 
1n3inly from Captain Abbott's journal. 
From Heri t ,  due north, to Parwina, is eleven milcs. 'l'lle 
road lies b e t \ ~ c e n  close l(:lills, of no considerable height, and 
ascends the entire way. Around h i s  village are hills and 
plateaus producing \vo~~~uwood,  \vhicl~ is browsed Ly ;he wild 
antelope. l 'hcre are many wells and a little coltivation. 
l:rom l'nrwinn the road leads across the mountain ridge 
of  l i a i~ i l ,  north-easlward by north to IC!(:l~~sIlk, a two days' - 
jous~~ey .  Captain James Abbott, who n ~ a d e  it in the )rear 
1840, turned the dilticult passes of t l ~ c  highest ridge and 
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slept in a hollow where wns a little water. From this he 
proceeded llic nest day "by a very distressing cross- 
counlry path, over steep liills covered with grass, to [he 
rivulet Iihilsl~k, whence we ascended to the capital of that 
name. T h e  \ d l e y  here is pictl~resqire and interesting." 
T h e  place, styled somcwhat magniloquently as  the 
cnpital," is a small fort round which are mud houses and 
nlud kibitltas or cabins. . l'he valley of I<lilishk is tlie 
dwelling-place of the Jn~~~sl i idis ,  a tribe of Turkish 
origin, disting~~ished for heir. loyalty and their gallantry. 
'The present condition of the place and tlie people is thus 
described by the Tims correspondent in UAld Mulgllib, 
from whom I 11nve already quotccl :- 
I' On Deccniber 211d we entcrcd by narrow cleliles the 
wllcy in which tlie Jamshidi or Jenisliicl seltlement trt' 
Iilidslik is situatccl. I t  is about f o u r t c c ~ ~  milcs long and of 
a n  n\wagz width of three-fourths of a n ~ i l e ;  h e  hills are 
of low, rounclccl clay, bnre of trees, tlwir sides clotted wit11 
~ i l l agcs  of do~dcd  rnld cabins. The irrigation from llic 
river is profirsc, nnd h e r e  is ~nuc l l  cultivation on tllc tcq) 
and sides of the hills, where rain crops are grown. The  
grain rniscd is only suflicient for thc wants of thc people, 
and cscc1)t in opium there is no esport trade. Every 
Jamshidi h i l y  has its own home-bred horses, smnll wiry 
animals l i t  for any nniount of \vorlt. Tlic Janishidis them- 
selves arc n quiet, trnctablc people, estreinely friendly and 
well disposed Lo us. They were the lirst nomad tribe we 
saw at home, for though tliey have their niud cabins they 
only live in thew during the winte~; and at other seasons 
tliey prefer their kibitkns, which they nre always prepared to 
take up and walk. Perhaps I ought to explain what a 
kibi~lia-thc ho;~ie of Lhe no~nncl, and a T-ery comfortable 
home, loo-is like. IGbillia is tlie Russian and Ev tlie 
Turkoman name. It  is n dome-slinped frnnlc\vork of 
lattice-work covered with layers of felt, the nnniber of layers 
being in proportion to the severity of thc wcather. The 
walls for about Git. of their heigh~ are vertical and L11e.u 
the dome rises, its highest point being from  aft, to ~gf t .  
A felt cap fits on a hole in the ccntre of tlie roof which 
lets in the light-for the kibitlcn has no windows-when it 
is fine, and lets oul the smoke when you light a fire on the 
ground i~nderncath. The floor is generally spread with 
carpets of choicc pxttern, rich colours, and velvet softness, 
worked by thc fair (?) lingers of tlie clnoghters of thc 
kibitka; on  the wnlls, too, hang camcl bags, al~out 6ft. by 
4ft,, of the same rich carpet worlc. The great advantagc 
of n Itil~itka is thaL i n  n few hours you can strike, pack 1111 
ancl load it on n camel and be of[ Lct Paterfamilias 
imagine the convenience of being able to put his c01nfor~- 
able house in the train 2nd take it off to the seaside, and 
then he will understand that nomad life Iias its advan- 
tages. Hon.ever, if on' rcading this description he wishes 
to send for a kibitkn from l'urkistan, he ~ n ~ i s t  not order a 
kibitka of such and such a size, but a Icibitltnwhich is n load 
for one, t\vo, or morc can~els, ns the case may be." 
After dwelling upon the past recent history of this 
interesting tribc, and stating that, in thc struggle I)et.ween 
Aylib IChdn and Abdul liahman the Jnnishidis, having 
transferred their allegiance to thc Latter, had quilted Khilshk 
to take r c f ~ g e  in a less ncccssible valley, and Ilad only 
returned \vhcn the cause of A y ~ i b  Khdn was irretrievrrldy 
ruined, the writer thus continues :- 
" However, the prcsent. bmir has moved 1,000 ia,milies 
back to Bdld MurghBb, an inlportnnt strategic position 
which he wisely desired to colonize. Indeed, it was t i~nc  
that  something of  the sort were done, Ar, owing to over- 
population and over-irrigation thc I<li~islik valley had 
become very unhealthy, and h e  people were dying off fast 
from a sort of enteric fcvcr which has been rife there the 
last few years. Anhu l l a  KhAn is the Governor of 13811 
Murgl~db and Panjdeh. Therc are still about 4,000 
families in Khdshk-every four families are supposed to 
fnrnish one horseman in  ordinary times-and I was mucI1 
struck by the painful contrast between their physiquc and 
that of Jamshidis living elsewhere. The Jnmsl~idis claim 
. to be descended from a Iiaianinn Chief, who obtained 
from Shdh Abbns the comn~and of a military colony com- 
posed of horsemen belonging to different tribes of Hcriit, 
and 1.0 this colony he gave the name Jamshidi, from Jam- 
shid, the apocryphal progenitor of the Paishdadian and 
therefore Knianian family. Shdh Abbns gnvc a district in 
Bndghis to the Colony, and round the Persian stem thus 
planted there gradually clustered all the waifs and strays of 
Heriit, till the Jamshidis mustered some 60,ooo families. 
During N:idir Shdll's reign, however, they were reduced to 
I 2,000, and they now number only nl~out (5,000 familics- 
namely, 4,000 ir? I<hlishk, 1,000 in RAIL Murglxib, and 
1,000 in Iiurukh at the foot of thc Kaitli ~nountains, four 
miles from Herit .  The  Jamshiclis resembIe the Turko- 
mans in dress and manners, but they are appnrently a 
quiet, peaceable people. An English officer might safely 
live ninong them without any guard, and if they have only 
respite from raids and gar they will doubtless spread over ~11d 
multiply in the inore healthy but deserted lands of Badghis. 
They  are hardy, clever horsemen, and every household 
])reeds its own horses.. When wc were i n  IChdshk the 
weekly fair was held ; it was nttendccl by lmny Turko- 
mans fron~ Panjdeh and by some l~iruzkuhis, but by very 
fcw Hazarehs, with whom the Jamshidis are not on very 
friendly terms. 'T%e Turkomnns brought salt, rice, soap, 
carpets, horses, shcep, and found for sale in the bazaar 
ploughshares (of cast iron) and hatchets from Mitinien6 ; 
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Russian and French loaf sugar, Austrian matches, also 
Bryant mid May's, Meshed and Bokhira silk and cotton 
goods. T h e  greater part of the lattcr was Russian, not 
English-let Mnncliestcr draw its own conclusion." 
From this valley tlie traveller bent on reaching Mzrv can 
either folloe tlie rivulet of Khilshk by I<husI~ak Sian, Cliahill 
Docktar, Knla 'I'apa, Chamnn-i-Baid, Kila-i-hlaur, I'al-i, 
Kishti to Panjdch ; or  he can proceed by thc more direct 
road to l<;ila-i-Nau, thence to  Pul-i-'I'abnn on the Murghdb, 
nncl follonr that river also t o  Panjdcli. Cap~ain Abhott 
followed tlic first route, \vliicli he thus describes :-" \Vc' 
pnssed clo\vn the \.allel- of the I<hilslik ri\wlet averaging 
about half n' mile iu width, and  bounded on either side by 
sloping, grassy downs, sprinkled wit11 Rocks of sheep nnc? 
goats. Under  tlic lo\v, sunny clilfs and hills the Jamshidis 
had pitched their I h c k  tents in considerable numbcrs; and 
in  the fields of the vnlley hundreds of m3res and colts 
\ w e  grazing, T h e  sccnc was exlreniely pleasing. 'l'lic 
wlley is highly suscepti1)lc of culture, &id has once bcen 
well tilled." Captain Abbot: enc:~mped that evening at  n 
point on thc river between 1'~isIint Sin!] and liriln 'l'npa. 
The next day Iir niarcliccl along a siniilar counlry to the 
latter place; beyond that, the day follow in^, to within two 
niiles of Clinman-i-Baicl. Beyond Ki ln  Tapa he met Inrgc 
flucks of slieep. 'l'he slleplierds," lie writes '' come w e n  
from -Merv to this plcasnnt valley bringing water and all 
other necessaries o n  asses." 'I'lie day after, as h e  mnrclied 
to IWa-i .hlal~r ,  scenes almost si~nilnr met his gaze. 
" Large Roclrs of whitc sheep still sprinkled the hills on  
either side, bu t  those hills merc growing niore arid and 
sandy as we advanced." Again, " We met not less tlian 
six o r  seven caravans of grain from h,Ielq/.l1 
A few miles beyond Kala-i-Maur is Pdl-i-Gisliti+: a spot 
" BInrkctl in Colonel Stcnrart's mnp simply Ly the word " Britlge." 
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\vl~ich Russia has actually seized. I t  is oilly eight. miles 
from Panjdeh. Hcrc Abbott halted, and of it he wrote as 
follo\vs : " Here the vallcy is about three-quarters of a ride 
in breadth. On the east bank are sloping sand hills, about 
Goo feet higher than the valley. On the west is the desert, 
a high sandy plain ovcr-run with lo\\, bushes and canlel 
thorn and estending to the mountain barrier of Persia." 
At Panjdeh to nhich he then proceeded, Abbott received the 
liospitnlity of the Turko~nans \vho were then its occupants. 
He speaks of the desert as having been once populous and 
cultivated. 
Not less interesting to us at  the present ~nonient is the 
alternative route by IClila-Nau and Moghor, to. l'ul-i-Taban 
on the Murghdb, and thence by way of Bila MurghLI~ and 
hInruclialc to Pnnjdeh. Fortunately we are able, owing to 
the escellent correspondents of the London papers to see 
the country as it is at  the present moment. 
ICBla-Nau is n valley which constit~~tes, o to speak, the 
capital of the 1-krkt HIU~I'UIIS. It bears n strong re- 
scn~blance to the I<dshk valley already described, cxcept 
that it is smallcr, more healthy, and more fertile. " The 
people," writes the IYt~tcs correspondent, " are a branch of 
the SIiinh Ilaztirehs of Haztireh Jat, between R e r i t  and 
IC~IJLII, but, 11;~ving become Sunis they havc 11ow no con- 
liexion with Lhen~." 'I'hey are n very fine set of men, with 
pleasant frank faces, and with little trace of their Mongol 
origin. The influence of the present Amir ovcr them is 
all-pwa~nount :-" I'very year," to quote from the salnc 
interesting source, '' an increasing number of the Hazarehs 
still remaining in Persia join their brethren in the 
Kala-i-Nau valley, where there is plenty of room for them 
and many others ,The I-IazB.rehs were at one time very 
troublesome to their neighbours, but they are now well in 
hand, and to quote the words of a native writer, ' Before 
Abdurrahman K h i n  becanle Amir the I-Iazireh Chief could 
murder his political opponents, but now he cannot.' I 
must say that I moulcl not like to be in Mahomed Khan's 
way, had h e  n chance of removing me. H e  is a shrewd, 
self-contained, clctermincd little man, with a quick eye, 
which is always intensely fixed on his own interests. The 
Hazirehs are very prosperous, not to say rich ; their land 
is exceedingly fertile,-they have not much more to 
do than to sprinkle seed on the hill tops and wait for the 
friendly rain; and then, a5 they say, rcap a hunclreclfold. 
Their chief wealth, however, is in cattlc. ; ol shcep they 
hnvc enormous flocks. The Hazhrchs of IWa-Nau :1fford 
another proof that the Amir's authority is absolutc and 
~~nqi~estioned," 
I don't think I can do better than allow the writer to 
continue the journey to BilA Murghlib 2nd to give his 
account of thal place in his own graphic stylc : 
" From ICBla-i-Nau we might have takcn the same road as 
Grodekoff and VambCry, who travellccl frmn Bdla i~1urghhb 
l ~ y  Tnlkguzar and tllc Darband pass, but it was not 
adapted to camel cnrriage, and accordingly we turncd the 
mountains by following a stream which ran in a north- 
westerly direction through a succession of uncultivated 
valleys of great fertility, but at present only used by the 
nomad Ghilzais and Turkomans as grazing ground for 
their flocks. I t  was a long timc since we had been i n  
contact with Afgh&ns, and the discourteous manner-I 
daresay they could not help it-of these Ghilzais contrasted 
very unfavourably with the genial friendly attitudc of thc 
Char Aimaks and Hazirehs. About 30 miles from Ab-i- 
ICamri, the stream we were following was turned in a . 
norLherly direction to the Khdshk riverby a high hill which 
stood in our direct path, while we wvl~eeled to the south-west 
into the 'rorshek valley. Five rides brought us to our camp- 
ing-ground by the sidc of a s t r e a ~ n  of vcry indifferent water. 
Close a t  hand too, \\?as a hot sulphcr spring, \vhich in ancient 
days was apparently conducted into a hugc bath, canopied 
by a brick dome said to hnve been erected by Shbh Rokh. 
On Lhe I zth of Deccmbcr we reached Bi la  Murgliib, and 
as  we neared the place fro111 the sonth-cast, the guns of 
the fort fircd n snlutc of scventccn guns in honour Sir Peter 
hmsc len ,  who simullancously cntcrccl the valley from the 
opposite side. T h c  rivcr \\.as about 60 yards broad at  the 
ford by which we crossed it, and  not less than 3 Teet deep. 
Thc  current was very rapid, a n d  though the ford had been 
sltilfully slakccl, thc laden camels had considerable difficulty 
in crossing it, and  some \vould assuredly hnve been 
lost had it not bccn Tor thc rcady help given by the 
Jamshidi horscnlcn, who wlien a ca~ne l  slipped or drir~ecl 
d o \ w  the current, s\varmed round him like flies, \vhippecI 
off his load and drugged him into salety. 
Li \ \Te arc greatly plcased by  our winter quarters, and  
everybody is \velA and  in good spirils. Our camp is sur- 
rounded on  t h l w  sides by the river in a vallcy about seven 
milcs long and one or two miles Imacl, which runs from 
south-wcst Lo norlh-east, and-is enclosed bclween two ranges 
of rounded clay hills. A1 Lhc s o ~ ~ t l i e r n  cstrcmity there is 
a dceply i~idCnted gorge in thc grand mountains of  he 
'I'irbund-i-l'urkisl:i~i (which runs west to cast) through which 
 lie I~lurghbb tcars its way. A t  the norllieyn cnd of LIie 
valley the hills gradually conlrnct inlo n narrow defile Tor a 
fcw miles, when they again opcn oul into the valley 
of Knrnolkhana. Twice again d o  the hills ~ I I L I S  contract 
and expand into Lhe v d c y s  of  h4cr~1cliak and Panjdeh 
rcspectivcly. Pnnjdch, I sl~oultl  add, is a b o t ~ t  forty-six 
inilcs from hcre. ,I havc alrcatly cxplainecl that tile iilnir 
1ir.s colonized 13ila Murghrib Trom among the  Jamshidis, 
Firuzkuhis and  Haziras. This  was a \vise slep, for Bdla 
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Murghib is n. very important position strategically, situated 
as it is on the high road from the capital of  AfghBn 
P 7 l urltistin, and: perhaps, when thc R u s s i ~ ~ n  flotilla of 
steamers is ready to navigate the Osus, from ICerki Lo 
I e r  13ut il: is not the sort of place thnt ,z timid h g l i s l ~  
spinster lady \\~ould select as a residence, surroundcd as it 
is, or to spcnk more accurntcly, as it was, by marnuding 
Turkomnns, unruly ilimaks, and the t u r b ~ i l a ~ ~ t  Uzbegs of 
kIaimen6. But now thc l'urkolnans m e  tamed, the Char 
Aimalts peaceful, and hhimend has been subdncd. Hdln 
hlurglxib is consequently n safe habitation. 'I'he colonics 
estnblished h c r e  seem contented and prosperous. On the 
left or opposite bank to us there nre thc Firuzkuhi and 
Hazireh colonies, nnd on this bank the Jamshicli colony. 
The happy family is il\vcd into harmony by Lhe fort with 
an Afghin garrison, nncl every clay when n.e attempt lo  go 
out for a ride the flooded fields and numcruus \v&r.cuts 
remind us that the work of reclamation is being rapidly 
pushed on. I cannot say there is pretty pcencry, thuugli, 
no doubt, it isgrand scenery, but there is the same w n t  
of trees \\~Iiich has charac~erized nearly every. district \ve 
havc mnrched through." 
The  routc referred to by the correspondent as having 
bccn follomcd by Grodekoff and Vnmbe'ry, and which is 
the shortest and   no st direct route, is thus described by 
the latter :-ILIt is reckoned n rout days jow.ncy for horscs 
from Ikih h.hrghdb to Herdt. Camels q u i r e  double L1:e 
time, for the country is mount-aillous. . . . 'l'nw liigl~ 
mounl~inous peaks visiblc to thc south dr  U d a  hlurghrib, 
\ \we pointed out to us, and we were told that it n.oulc1 take 11s 
two days tu reach thcm. They both bear the name 
Durbend (pass), and are far loftier, narrpver, ancl easier of 
defence than the pass on the right bnnk of the Murghib, 
leading to h11aiimene'. In proportion as one acl\rnnces 
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natilrc nssunics 'n wiltlcr nnd more romantic nlyxlrrnlce. 
Thc clcvnted ansscs of rock \vIiicll fort11 tlic first Dcrhend, 
are cro\vnccl with tlic r ~ ~ i n s  of an  ancient forl, the subject 
of the most varying f:hles. Further on, ac tlw sccond 
Derbencl, on t l ~ c  bank of tlie Murgl~ib, there are tllc re- 
mains of nn old cnstlc. I t  was tlic sunlnier residence of 
the rcno\vnctl Sultan I - lush  hlirm, I)y \vliosc order a stone 
bridge-l~ul-i-Tabn~i-\\~ns constructed, of which traces 
are still tlistinguislinble. 111 the tinlc of this, the niost 
civilizccl sovereign of Central Asia, thc whole of  the neigh- 
l)ourl~ood was in a flourishing state, and Inany pleasurc- 
houses are said to 11;ir.e esisted along thc course of the 
Murghab. 
Beyond the second l m s  we quittcd tlie Alurglidb. 
The route t ~ ~ r n e d  to tlic right, in  n westerly direction, 
townrds n plntcnu closely adjoining n part of the desert 
peopled .by the Sdor. Were begins the lofty mountain, 
Telkliguear, \\,hich it takes three hours to pass over. 
" Towarcls micihiglit we halted at n place called Moglior, 
\vlience, ncst n~orning, we reached tlic ruios of thc former 
town and fortress, 1Ma-Nin1, iio\v sunounclecl by n few 
tents of Lhe Hnzirel~." 
Of l3;ili Murglidb Vanlbery thus wrote; " this part of the 
valley of the Mv~urghAb bears the nnliie of B91a Murghril) ; " 
( tom the fortress of that name) "it extcncls from the 
frontiers of the lofty mountainous chain of the Hazirehs 
as far as hiaruchak, where dwell the Salor Turkonians : it is 
saicl of old to havc been a possession of the Jnnisliidis, and 
that they were for n time dispossessed mid afterwards re- 
turned. T o  the south-west of the fortress the valley be- 
comes so narrow that it merits mther the name of a defile. 
Through the midse the M.urgliAb rolls foaming away with 
the noise of thunder,-it is not until it has passed Panjdeh, 
where the river becomes deeper and more sedate that the 
L 
valley sl)rcntls itself out nncl ncqr~ircs n I)rcndth of one or 
two miles." 
lkild hlurghib is 46 n d e s  south-cast of I'nnjddi, , 
h.lnrr~cl~nk, nlso on the Murghil), being about hnlfkay 
bctnvccn the two. 
Tlw following nolcs, by Captain Artlinr I;. Ihrow, 
Aide-de-camp on the staff of Sir l'ctcr Jmnsden, as  to the 
military value of Pul-i-Klxitun, ~ \ ~ c r c  published .in the Mtts- 
t i vkd Loiin'oit fViws of the I .$I i\Iarcll last :- 
" Proni Saraklls as far a s  l'ul-i-Khitr~n, mosement on 
eithcr bnnk prcsents no difficulties. To Daulatihid, 
t \ \dvc miles south of Saraklls, both banks are l e \ d  ; from 
tliat to l'ul-i-l<h:itun, the right 1)ank dominates, and all 
movements on tlic right bank are under cover, and fi~lly 
concealed from observation from ~ l i c  left bank ; whilc, on 
the other hand, no niilitary movement whatevcr coulcl 
possibly be carried on upon tlic Icft bank, within, a t  least, 
sis' miles of tlie river, without h ~ l l  cognizance of the right 
bank. The river itself, by reason of its ^depth n.nd width, 
is nowhere a nlilit~ly obstacle. At I'u1.i-lChitun, the road 
passes through a narrow gorge; it is a mere track with 
stcep graclicnts, and thencc, as far ns Gool:tr, \roulcl present 
great difticulties to the advance of cvcn n srnnll flying 
colun~n with the lightest guns. Wit l~out  \reeks of labour, 
it could not be relied upon as  n main line of communica- 
tion practicable for heavy artillery with its ammunition 
column, with the ambulcnce and the heavy-\seeled trans- 
porl: and impediments of R large army. T h e  river is, on 
thc east side, shut out froni Badghis by a steppe, ndlich 
drops precipitously into it, thc cliffs averaging from rsolt. 
to 2ooft. in height. 1'i! this curtain there are  two gaps, by 
which access to t l ~ c  river is obtained,~al led respectively 
tlie Ger~nbb and Zulfagar Passes. From Goolal; our route 
lay to the west of the rher, which passes, it is stlid, tl~rough 
an i~npractical)lc gorge ; scvcral o ~ h c r  routcs arc, ho\w\e~-, 
availnblc-one by way of %os:~l,nd, \rllcre watcr is fou~lcl ; 
and tl~crc is snid Lo Itc \.cry liltlc nnlurnl ol)staclc tu all 
advance I~eyond Coolnr 1)y tllosc routes. Enough has lwcn 
said Iicrc Lo sho\v that tllc possession of l'ul-i-lih:itun, by 
any Powcr which nntic:ipalcs nd\;nncing on I-Icrit in the 
fulure, is a clcsidcxtunl of considemble valuc ; for access 
to the Pass would nalurally rcsult i n  the immediate con- 
struction of a good road, along n strcnm of escellent 
watcr. A t  tlic snnie timc, it must not bc  overloolml tlmt 
the imj)cnetral)lc nalurc of thc cliffs o n  Lhc cast hnnli 
oS the river, render lhc I ~ S C  of  his ronte, as a main line at  
advance, open to Lllc vcry serious mililary objection that 
no IaLernl co~nmunica~inn  could exist: wit11 parallcl lints of 
advancc on tlint siclc ; and  that, in any conil)incd rno1.e- 
men[., the force  sing this road might bc met nncl clcfcatecl, 
at its csit, by n superior force of the cncniy, wliilc thc 
other columns wcrc I)cing clclained by inferior forces, ocm-  
pyiny strong dcieasiw positions. T h e  occupation of 1'11l-i- 
KI14tun by a \veal; Powcr, opposed to the aclvance of an 
army on 1-lcrcit, a n d  by one to wliicl), owing to distance 
from its base, pancity of troops, or \ v ~ n t  or money, the con. 
version of Yul-i-l<h;itiun into a dcfcnsive posilion is a n  
impossihili~)~, wor~ld at any rate result in the road remain- 
ing in its prcscnt condition ; and would thereby deny its 
usc 1.0 an enemy, at: least for some considerable timc after 
the declaration of liostilitics." 
T h e  city of ICuhsan is thus described in Lhe same: paper, 
of Lhe same dale :- 
" Kuhsan, sis~y-eight milcs from the city of Hcr:lt, o n  the 
fron~ier of the Persian Tcrritory of IChor:lsdn, stands on 
the Heri-rud wlierr Lhat river bends from a wcskrly t o  
n northerly direction. T h e  Heri-rud, a beautiful rivcr 
fertilising and enriching the vallcys of norlh-western 
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AfgliBnistPn, rises in thc highlands of I-Iazlreh, and flows 
from east to west between the broad inor~ntain mnge ' 
which the Greeks named the Paropamisus, now called the 
Safed Koh or " White Mountain," and the Siah Koh, to  the 
city of Herdt, and  thence to Ghorian, where it turns 
north-wcst to Kuhsan. This district, copiously irrigated 
by artificial canals, was once populous ancl wealthy ; it is 
one of tlie most ancient seats of civilization. I n  the 
i\Iicltlle Ages, during a t  least four centuries, HcrAt was one 
of tlie finest cities, and its prorincc one of thc most pro- 
ductive, in Central Asin. From Kullsnrl LO Sawl~hs ,  by 
the road following lhc ~ O I I I X  o r  tllc I-Tcri-rucl, the  clis- 
tnnce is eighty-four ~nilcs. 'J'l~is is the road on \vhic.l1 the 
Russinns hnve recently ndvnncccl more than half way, 
seizing Pul-i-Khdtun, nearly forty miles from Sxrakiis, and 
recently the Zulfagnr Pass, thirty miles higher u p  the 
river, where an opening through the \wll of clifls on the 
eastern bank gives access to the interior of Bndghis, and 
through Ak Robat to the ICh~ishk vnllcy :?cl the Murghbb." 
l'anjdch, and thc road thcncc to i\Iaruchak--the plncc 
nbovc Bdla 1\Iurghil)--arc thus clcscribcd by Mr. Silnpson, 
special artist to thc same papcr. 1I the r e a c h  will recol- 
Iwt ,  the Russians claim to draw the new frontier line just 
above Maruchak (Little hIerv) : 
" W e  stnppcd a d a y  at Ak T'apa, and then mover1 on to 
l'anjdeh. About six miles to  the south nearly the whole 
dislance is covered with Sarok villages, formed of  Itibitkas. 
T h c  Snl.01~ 'l'urkomans have conle south from tlic i\lerv 
district, and have become ATghLn subjects. T h e  MurgMb, 
as  \\.ell ns the Khdshk vallcy, was without inhabitnnts, ancl 
its fields \yere lying waste. Some years ago the Saroks 
nrrivecl, and thcy have restored the ?lace to  life ngnin. 
Some of their chiefs came along the IChrishl; valley, and  
met Sir Pctcr Immclen on tlie third march from Ak Tdpa;  
cro\rds of thc Sarilts t~lrned out to see our arrival, and  he 
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outskirts of the camp were generally fringed wit11 tl~om, eager 
to look at tlie Feringliis, and watch whnt they \ \we  doing. 
There was a good clcal of trade going on in Llic pu;.cliase 
of carpets, and other articles, by our people. A consider- 
able quantity of Indian rupces and l'ersian crhis was left 
among theln, so KC may supposc that they will rc tah n 
ple:isanl recollcciion of us. At Panjdch we remaincd Lwo 
days; o ~ i c  of Lhesc dxys was princip.dly occupictl by n 
visit from [lie Governor of Herst, \\h hncl fo1lo:xccl us 111) ; 
and Sir Peter Lumsden paid a visil Lo Yali~i l~is l~ IClhi, 
 lie chief of the Jamsliiclis. 
'"l'licre are the ruins, liltlc more ~ h a n  ~lwunds, of a n  old 
fort, and tlie evident rcm:~ins of n town around i t ;  these 
also are nothing Inore than mounds, on tlic west side of 
tlie river. A n u n  called it " Kona Penclie," by which 11e 
meant old Panjdeh. If tlicre is a new Panjdeli, we did not 
see i ~ ,  unless it be tliu kibitkn \dlxges of tlie S;~rilts, and [hey 
cxtend for over trrc~ily niilcs along both bn~ilis of the 
Nurgliib. Wc ~ r c  scnrccly psepal.ed for such n Iugc 
sized rivcr as  we round here. It is as wide ns Regent 
SLreet, of considcrublo depth, with a large volun~c of 
bluish-grey water flowing steadily put. \J1lien to\rns of 
iniportance, equal to tliosc we linvc t r x e d  tlie remains of, 
conic inlo csistence again on its banks, " penny bo.115" 
will bc shooting d o n g  from pier to l~ier. Fords arc wry 
S w ,  and the one \IT crosscd at h.I:~rucl~ak had at least four 
fcct of water in ils dcepest part. I heard sollie one esti- 
mate tlie breath of the wlley at l'unjdeh as about four or 
fwe miles ; n.lietlier this is exact or not, Lliere is a large 
width of ground, which llad been cultivaiccl \rhen the 
valley wns pros[~crous and full of inhabitnnts. 'l'he ~nounds 
were the remain6 of' largc to\\ws, and they are a sure 
evidence of tlie popdntion that once esisilcd and found 
subsistence on the banks fertilized by the \voters of tlie 
Murgliib. 
" 'l'lie m:~rcll to I:u~id i-N:dr-i was alolig Lhc wcstcrn side 
of . t h e  wllcy ; ~ L I O L I L  linlf way, Llic sandy Iiills on this side 
project considerably into tlic plain, narrowing it w r y  iin~ch. 
Our r o d  nsccndccl the liciglits, but al,out n mile or so to 
tlie sout l~ wc descended again, and found tlie valley nearly 
as wide as nl: 1':~njdcli. Our c:lnip wns pi~clied on a piece 
"f level ground close to the hills. The  lhr~icl-i-Nndri \\;IS 
not far lioin us, but it turned out lo Ibc the tlld I)u~icI, 
\\.l~icli lintl I)cc~i made on a I x c l  of  he ~-ivcr, which the 
w t c r  of tllc Alurghib h:icl Sursalccn, a i d  a 1 1 2 ~  I)i~nd, o r  
dam, Iiighcr ul), wns n ie~~t ioned  as Iinving I u n  ~nnclc. 
?'he J3und.i-Nnclri canal, ;I. I;-lrgc I\-atercourse for irrigation, 
I l o w d  past close Lo us; it \\.as fillcd \\ith n beautiful clcnr 
siream. .'l'liis is l l ~ c  annl wliose watcr h:id hccn Icd, a t  
somc former period, across thc l'ul-i-Kliisti. 
" Our nest march \\.as also on ~ l i c  westcrn side of tlic 
I 
valley, d o n g  tlie I m c  or the hills ; and agai l~ wc left the 
lcvcl soil, to pass through a l~o l lo \ \~  nlnong Lhcm, which ex- 
tcndccl for somc milcs. On conling 001: again on the 
vallcy, we passed a Turltoman villngc, which I unclcrstood . 
\\as the last of tlic~n to\vilrds Llic SOLILI I .  WC struclr across 
the vnllcy Lo lhc rivc.1; where llicre arc lhe piers only of n 
brick bridge standing, At  h i s  place there is n ford, which 
\vc crossed. Sir I?etcr 1,umsden placed n nuniber of l'urlco- 
uinns across the rivcr, along Lhc whole line of the ford, 
thus carrying out tlie military rnle, wl~ich was very neces- 
sary, ns the lord was far Srom being a slraigh t line, ancl the 
current \\.as 8h011g. Ey this liicans all got ovcr in pcrfcct 
safety ; evcn mild IIindils, on  w r y  s~nnll baggage-animals, 
\vho smolw and slecp instend of looking out where they 
are going, crossed scatheless. Our camp was formed close 
to [lie ford, and for tlic lirst t i m  on thekight bank of  lie 
31~1rgli;ib. 
" Mnruchak is on thc same side ; it is some distance from 
the rivcr, nild lillle ovcr a milc Srolii t11c fbrcl. \\'c wcre 
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rather surprisccl a t  the estent of its walls, which moulcl 
imply that tlic place liad becn inlinbitecl at a Inter pcriod 
than the othcr ruined towns wc hacl sccn. Our party found 
pheasants vcry plentirkl at 'Mnr~~cIiak, and there was somc 
good shooting there. From Mnruchnk to I<nraul I<haneli, 
mhich WE the ground of our nest march, has not get been 
repcopled, and tlie \vhole space is at prescnt in tlie condi- 
tion of a vast g a m  preserve. T h e  birds flew 1111 in great 
numbers, and when thc sportsnien cahie in ,  covering tlie 
ground with long rows of dcacl pheasants, tlie only com- 
plaint heard referred to the deficiency of cartridges. 
" After passing i\,IarucIiak, the hills change in their fornl ; 
below that place they arc undulating and rounded, l ~ u t  the 
curves have a vcry long rnclir~s. Above &laruchak they 
form smdl rounded knobs, with steep sides, all thc way up 
to B d a  Murghdb, to the soul11 of which the geology 
entirely cllanges. Thc march from hIaruchalr to ICaraonl 
I<hnnch was on the right bank of the river. Towards the 
end of the m a r h ,  we struck to the left, through a gorge 
formed by the steep sidcs of thesc mnmclon hills, and came 
out a91in about a mile farther on. Kamoul 1Chaneh is the 
site of nn old town ; judging by the mooncls, it liad not 
been of grent size. I lcrc  n valley comes in  from the left, 
and, had tllc first idea of wintcr qnartcrs beyond the A h -  
gh ib  been carriccl out, we were to linvc ~noved in that 
directio~i; But a change had been maclc, and Riln hiur- 
g h i b  had bcen dctem~incd upon, so from ICarnul I<hnnch 
\ve marched, still on thc right Ixtnli of h e  river, nncl came 
on herc, arriving on Ucc. I?." 
'I'he abovc cstracts, made from Inany independent sourccs, 
will 1101: fail, I believe, to convey to tlie reader a tolerable 
idcn of tlie nnt i re  of the country of H e d t ,  and of the 
inlmcnse importnncc to England of the conlinucd posses- 
sidn by AQhLnistin of the border line concccled to it in 
1S72--~11c straight linc bctnreen Saraklis and ICl~ojn Salch. 
As I write,  his morning of tlic ~ 5 t h  of hiarch, the air is 
f r~ l l  of rumour.; regarding a Russian advance e n  I-IerBt. I f  
t]ley sllould prove true, jt will clevolvc upon Peter Limsden 
to play in 1 8 8 j  the part \vhich Eldrec! Pottirrger played in 
1 8 ~ 8 ;  to aid in the defence of tlie Pcar-1 of I<hordsrin, 
until n I-3ritish army can reach that city fro~ii Lhe Pibhin 
valley. I n  this vicw of the possibililies it is incumbent to 
glance, not only a t  the respective forces of thc two na t iox ,  
I ~ u t  nt  he distilnces which cach must traverse bcforc ilie 
battle ground can be reached. 
On the subject of thc nrmanmnts of Russia thc l lai ly  
NEWS nppearsto he singulnrly well-informed. I n  the issue 
of  that IJnper of the 19th hIarch appeared a statement. of 
thc  numlxrs, composition, and distribution of tlie Russian 
forces in Central Asia, so important 3s to draw to it the 
attention of cwry  !)olitician and every soldier. Inquiries I 
made in other quarters likely to  bc well-infortnbd, linve 
satistied tne that the statement is in all csscntinl points 
correct. I1 is as follo\vs :.- 
T h e  army of the Caucasus has not reccntly csecuted any 
movcmcnt indicntivc of diememb-rment, and is still in that. 
part of the country with the follo\ving exceptions : 
C 
I .  Eattalions of light infantry formed in ISSO, and since 
that time qunrtcred In the 'Tmns-Caspian prolinces : 
No. I, at ICrassnovodslr, 
No. 2, at Geok Tepd. 
Nos. 3, 5, 6 ,  at Asknbnd. 
No. 4, at Tschikisjlar. 
2 .  Cossacks. 
Two regimenls and two squadrons of KOLI- 
bane Cossacks. 
3. First Battalion of Railway Rescrre. 
JXFAN'~.K\'. FIRST BI~IG:\DE. 
Transferred to Taschkend, their habitual 
10th :, quarters, in the circumscrip~ion of Sir 
12th ,, Uarin. 
srcl 'I'rnnsfcrred from Snniorkhnntl to Sara\whan. 6th ,, 1 ,  
6th :, . . .'Tmnsferrecl from I<al.tibourgnn to Snrnvschnn 
7 tll ,. 
4th ,, ) Transferred ( ~ ~ ~ a n g a n  
, i to Anclischan Ferghana 18th ,, Kokancl 
1 7 0 ~  IUII BRIGADE. 
2nd ,, 
fronl Mnrgliellane to Ferghana. 
20th ,, 
'I'lie 5th, r3tl1, and 17th Battalions do not form p.ut of 
the above-named brigades. 'I'lie 5th Ins been transferred 
from I'etro Alcsandrovski to the Amou Daria ; the 13th ' 
from 3hrghcllanc to Ferghann. The 17th rcmains at 
hlerv. 
Four battalions of light infantry arc in garrison at  
'I'aschkend. 
FJEJJI ARTILLERY. 
1 s t  Rsttcry at Samarkhand 8 heavy pieces. 
zncl ,, at Taschkcnd 8 nine-pounders. 
3rd ,, at Andiskhan 8 light pieccs. 
4th ,, at San~arklland 8 light pieces. 
5th ,, at TL~schkencl 8 four-pounders. 
6th ,, *Iex- 8 moun~ain guns, j-pounders, 
anclrovs~;i I 
7th ,, a~ Samarkhand 8 mountain guns, 2 i. 
Besides these, th'ere is a battery mounted with six nloun- 
lain guns (three pounders) in garrison at Rlarghellane. 
F o ~ r n ~ s s  ARTILLERY. 
3 Companies at Perovski, Tnschkend, and San~arkhand. 
- 
ENGINEERS. 
Half a Battalion of Sappers 
I Detachment of Artisans ] at, Taschkend. 
IRRISCULAR TROOPS. 
REC;IAIENTS OF ORENDURGM COSSACKS. 
No. 4. Squdrons I, 2, and 4, at Alexandrovski; 3, at  
Koungrad. 
No. 5. Squadrons I, 2, and 3, at Taschkcnd ; 4, in For1 
No. 6. 
One 
No. 2 .  
No. I. 
Squadrons I, z, 3, and 4, at bh.ghcllane. 
battery of Mounted Cossacks is at Tnschkend. 
C 
R~crnrEN~s  Or OUI<~\I. COSSACI~S. 
Squadrons I, 2, 3, and 4, at Samnrkhancl. 
1nt'mitry.--1:rigndc of the Linc of Wcskcrn Sibcria. 
srcl Batt., iransfenrd from Ujarkcnt 
J J  I J  Kaurakol 
6111 ,, 1 )  Kopal ,To Sdrnc'r6lschinsk. 
7 111 ,, I, Verni 
SLII ,, ,, Verni . I 
1st ,, 9 I Omsk lo f\kmollinsk. 
2nd  ,, 17 (hrrison to S6niipnlatinsk. 
411 J ,  11 l'o~,L Saisanski to Sc'mipa1;~~insk. 
At Tobolsk, Tonlsk, Omsk, and S6niipalatinsk there are 
also four bntlnlions of reserve with [lie cadres for f ive 
companies cucli. 
13esicles thcsc tlierc went  Omsk ano~licr scpar;ite detach- 
mcnt and a mililary prison co~~ipluip. I n  several otlier 
towns and fork of \Vcslern Siberia tlicrc are nltogcther 44 
scparatc detachments. 
1 ~ 1 s ~  ,I, A I ~ . I . I L . L ~ I ~ ~ .  
I S L  I3attcr.p a t  ~ h n i  ... S light picccs. 
z~lcl :, J)jnrkcncl 8 light pieces. 
3rd ,, l<nurnkol 8 mountain guns (3-pounclcrs). 
4th ,, Saisnnslci 8 pieccs of small calibrc and z 
mounti~in guns (3-pounc1e1.s). 
Onc company nl Vcrni. 
Onc co~npnny of Sappcrs a1 Omsk, 
I < R G I ~ I ~ T S  01: S I I N K I A N  COSSACIG. 
No. I .  Squadron 2 at  Ochoni~clii, 8 nt I<itldjn, 5 nl Iiold- 
schat, I, 4, and G in For[ Nn. 4. 
No. 2 .  Squ:drons 2 ,  3 ,  and 6 a t  Lepsinsk, I a1 Bachti, 4 
near the river Chorgos, 5 a t  Djarkent. 
No.  3. Squadrons I and  3 a t  Saisnnski, 2 and 5 a t  ICoton- 
Karasai, 4. at  Kokpekti, 6 a t  Tschagan-Obinski. 
As to Lhe composition and mcnns of transport of their 
army, wc are not \vithout accuratc informntion. ' h - o  clays 
aiter thc st:~tcment I h a w  extracted from the Daily f\rc7t1s, 
\\.as publisl~cd, there appeared in thc 2iiict.s n w r y  intc- 
resting paper " O n  the Army of  the Cnucasus." Intcrest- 
ing as this paper is-and the reader is now again afforded 
the opportunity of re-perusing it-there are some points in 
it  which seem t o  invite special remark. 
"Thc operations of the l<ussian forces in Turltornania, 
of whicl~ the latest feature has hecn the seizurc of placcs 
within the accepted boundary or  Afghinistb:~, h a w  attracted 
greater attention to the arnly of Lhe Caucasus, \vhich sup- 
plies the garrison of the Czar's recenlly-acquircd posses- 
sions east of the Caspian. A gl.cat d 4  113s I X C I I  said 
about the formidalrlc p o w r  of this pol.lion of thc Russian 
forces, and  some military authorities have gonc so far as to 
assume that half its strength \ ~ o u l d  be avnilable for n 
campaign against Henit, and that, without considering the 
armies of  Turkistan a n d  Orenburg a t  all, Russia could 
despatch from thc Caspian, within a reasonable 1)criocl of 
time, an army of nearly roo,ooo men. l ' h c  bcsl way to 
ascertain how far thcse opinions may he dcenlcd rensoc- 
able is lo consider the actual co~nposition and organization 
of the army which has ils base and hcac lc~~~ar te rs  at Tiflis. 
" T h e  arlny of the Caucasus has been roughly computrcl 
a t  200,000 men, but in order to  arrive a t  that total, all its 
0 details must b e  included, reservc, irregulars, and Cossacks. 
T h e  regulnr army of the Caucasus numbcrs jo,ooo men, 
but its resenre of another 50,000 \\.ould raise it to  I 20 ,000  
strong. Besides this force of the line there are 30,000 
Georgian and I~neritian irregulars of horse and foot. !rhe 
Cossacks estnl~lished in the settlernents nor111 of tllc Call- 
cnsian range, represent another section of the armecl forces 
of the Til-lis (+overnorship, and Lhcy arc espcctccl to supply 
n q u o h  of  50,ooo men. 'I'hesc sepnralc tolals nmltc up 
the grand result of zoo,ooo mcn, and this force may be 
properly compnvccl and contrnstecl with thc Anglo-Indian 
:lrrny or a l ~ o u ~  Lhe same nomi~inl strength. I t  resc~nbles 
that force in another respect which is too often obscured. 
11 vcry large proportion of tlie army of tlie Cauc:lsus is 
non-R~~ssian. T h e  Cossnclcs, Circassians, Georgians, and 
others fonn the ~najority of the troops whom Prince Don- 
cloukoff-ISorsakoff could array in time of war. T h e  
70,000 men \ ~ h o  are permanently engaged in garrison duty 
south of the C3ucasus are clistributccl bekween Ratoum, 
'I'illis, I h r s ,  and  other fortified places on the Turkish and 
Pcrsian frontiers. They have also to furnish thc troops 
employed in the Askabad district, and these numbcr about 
15.000 men, of wl10111 9,000 are  in  positions east of Bami. 
I t  is q+te certain that any estrn work thrown upon this 
porlion of the Russian army \vould ilnmedi.ately necessitate 
the calling out of the reserves, who are really nolhing more 
or less than military colonis[s who receive a grant of land 
and arc allo\vcd LO Innrry a f ~ e r  serving f ~ v e  years with thc 
colours. l 'hc  calling out of' the reserves, and the increase 
of the Cossack regiments by the corps clra\\w from the 
steppe, would be  tlic preliminnries to  placing the army 
of the Caucasus-on n war footing ; but even then there 
\vould be plenty of work on its hands. I t  is \vithin the 
range of possibility that the Russians could increase 
(;cncral Tionm.ofrs army to 50,000 mcn il '  ~ h c y  wcrc 
Icfl :~ntlisturlmI in A r ~ n c n i : ~  m c l  on tlic I:l;~cl< Sva. 
I < I I ~  tlint task cooltl only Ix csccr~tcd at tlic cost of n pent 
cfforl., :md nftcr Lhc preparation of many ~nonlhs. I n  18Sr, 
wlicn 1.L11ssi:~ thrc\v I~crsclf into Llic wo~.lc of repairing tlic 
rlcfc:~t of Gcolc 'rep6 and CI-ushing the Turkomans, she 
succeeded in placing 25,000 troops on the castern shores 
of the Caspian, but the preparalions Look nearly t \ \due  
, 
months. H e r  permanentgarrison in  the Asltabacl province 
is no\v, as  alrcady stated, ~j.,ooo men, and she lm a rail- 
way f r o n ~  near ICrasnovodsk to 1:arni. 'I'hcre is notliing 
incredible in tlic sr~pposition that under these i n i p ~ m c d  
conditions shc could in Llic cor~rsc of the summcr ~ h c c  
50,ooo iuen on  the northern borders of  Persia. 
'I T h e  composi~ion of cvcn thc regular regiments ol' the 
army of the Caucnsus is I~etcrogencous. Russians form a 
irlajority, but there are nllmerous rlr~r~cninns, Polcs, Jcws, 
7'artnrs, and Russo-Germnns. Circassians are also largely 
to  be met with, ~)articulnrly in the cavalry.. But even the 
regular troops a r e  sul~jected to a \.cry light clisciplinc, and 
if there is anything in our and  German ideas as to military 
efticiency t h e  can bc little bcttcr than militia. A rcccnt 
military traveller, \vho knows the Caucasus and h r m e n i ; ~  
well, and  who does not conceal his iclcntity under the 
pseudonym of "Wanclerel;" !>as given in his interesting 
" Notes on the Catrcnsus " the following description of thc 
military routine of the regular army :- 
" T h e y  have very few par:tdes and absolutely no pipc- 
clay; 2 company or two is  pnraclecl daily during tlic 
summer months for riflc practice undcr the ncljutnnt and 
musketry instructor, and  the corps is assembled once n 
month for muster. T h e  rest of the time the men d o  much 
a s  they choose, and usually either worlc a t  tmdcs, selling 
the  product of thcir industry at a sorl: of market which is 
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held every Sunday in the bazaar of the town, or hire Lhein- 
selves out at so ~nuch per diem to privatc individuals as 
I~orters, labourers, &c." 
"This sort of life is very clin'erent from the sustnincd 
military exercise to \vhich our troops in Inclin arc nccus- 
tomed, ancl, altl~ougl~ the conclusion may be unsound, it 
will be generally considered that these soldiers \\~oulcl stand 
but a poor chance against our highly-trained Europcan and 
Indian regiments, The Cossaclts are excellent for all the 
purposes of irregular warfare, but they nevcr have been 
trusted by any Russian General against a disciplined army 
in the open field, ancl of the 50,000 men who111 Russia 
nlght place east of the Caspian onc-half would bc Cossncks, 
as they are the most easy to mobilizc and send on foreign 
service. The Cossack cavalry have attached to them a 
. certain number of six-gun batteries of horsc artillery, and 
these move about with them in the field. The regular 
artillery of the Caucasus numbers forty-three bntteries of 
cight guns each, . o r  314 guns i n  all, ancl wllcrens thc horse 
artillery consists of sis-pounders the field artillery is com- 
posed of ICrupp's nine-pounder stcel breech-loading guns. 
The artillery is unquestionably the most efficient part of '  
Lhe arlny. The officers are well trained, and the men are 
specinlly picked for the service. The guns are admirably 
horsed and equipped. There are also a fen; batteries for 
mountain operations. IYith regard to the Georgian and 
other irregulars, it is declared that they are not inferior 
to the Rl~ssian regulars; but it is highly improbable that 
they would be employed outside the Caucasus. It is, of 
course, impossible to gauge with any degree of mxracy 
the comparative efficiency of two armies \shich are organ- 
ized on two different systems and which have never met 
in war ; but while admitting. t!le merit of the Russian 
soldier, who is stated, n!itho~it any excessive exaggeration, 
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to be " capable of going anywhere on blacl; bread nlltl * 
wntcr," it does seem as if the superiority in military 
efliciency and military resources rested n$h the :\nglo- 
Indian army ~ x t h e r  than will1 that of the Caucasus. I 
' I  We llave some practical experience of what the arllly 
of the Caucasus can d o  in actual warfare. I n  1877, on 
the outbrcal; of the 'rurkish mar, it could only place 
50,ooo men on thc frontier, although prepalntions for wal. 
were begun in 1876. This force proved inacleq~~nle to
cope with the Turks under Mulchtar Pasha, and the 
Russians were, as n mntter or hct, repulsed all along the 
line in their lirst attempl to invncle Armcnia, At one 
period of the campaign, had llle 'Turks l m h e d  their 
advantage with greater vigour, or perhaps il \vould be 
more correct to say llad they been better provided with the 
sinews of \var, they could hardly have failed to achieve a 
clccided success; but they allowed the opportunity to slip 
by, and when the winter of 1877 began the Russians had 
srlccecded in arraying roo,ooo men b e t w e n  Erivan and 
' 0 .  It must be remembered that this was only accom- 
lAished under co~upulsion and by a great effort. Yet the 
concentration of troops was on th? nearest frolllier of Llle 
Russian donlinions, and the b l o ~  to be struck was against 
an erlelny within 150 miles of Tiflis. Any campaign 
ag:linst IIerht-for if war ensues Russia's objective \\.ill, of 
of  course, be the town on  the I-Ieri-rrid-would bc of -an  
entirely different cl~aracter. H e r i t  is 1,200 miles from 
Tiflis, and nearly 400 fi-om Askabad; and although an 
army might be sustained once Herdt is rcachcd, niost of 
the supplies for this force en m r t e  would have to be carried 
with it, after making the most liberal allowance for what 
might be drawn from Meshed and Northern Persia. The 
Russians, it is true, have 4,ooo men on the MurghAb and 
nearly 5,000 between Askabad and Zulfagar, and those two 
7 ' h ~  A r~r~irs cn h / A .  .5'i(/(x, 161 
-- - 
. 
corps, ii~crcnscd 1 y  n I:lrgc Turkomnn gnlhcring from 
klcrv, woulcl undoubtccllg sufice a t  this momcnt to owr-  
come nl l  o p p o s i k n  outside the mnlls of Hcri t .  h t  in 
thc e \ m t  of Russia committing liersclf to tlic i r ~ c \ ~ o c a l ~ l c  
stcp of an act of hostility ngninst tlie Amir, i t  is clear 
that, allliorlgh nii initial success might I,c s c o ~ ~ c l ,  it would 
be a nlnttor of cstreme diffkulty, if not nn utter i m p s s i -  
bility, to raise the n:lvnncccl nrmy to anything like tllc 
large numlm.s tlint \vould be ncccssnry in  h c c  of the 
joint opposition of thc :\Fglinn and Indinn armies. I\.e 
escludc from our calculntion~ ti\:: c f k t  thst would be pro- 
duced by an Anglo-'rurkish n1li:lncc 2nd tlic alq~cnrnncc 
or 20,000 En,:lish troops in Atmcnin. 'l'herc i i  nothing 
cliimcricnl in either propositiol~, nntl the army of tlic 
Caucasus is so Fnr isol:ikd that its commnnicntions with 
tlic rest of Russia arc cscceclingly diilicnlt and su1,jcct t o  
interruption. 'I'lic arm); or thc Ciucnsas \ \ l i l l  somc (1:~)' IIL:  
more forn-~idablc thnn it is no\\,, nnrl \hen thc rnil\vay 
system on the W s t c r n  side of tllc Caspinn ns \ \ d l  3% on 
tlie enstern is complete, it mny be possiblc for Knssi:~ 
to throw tlic \vliolc of hcr military rcsourccs into tlic cffc~rt 
to place roo,ooo nlcn on thc Afgli;ui bordcrs. At  prcscnt 
SIX could d o  nothing of tlic kind wen \ v ; ~ l i  t\vclve months' 
prcpnration. T i ~ c  conviction that tl~csc G~cts :lrc patent 
at 'l'iflis nlust strengthen the I)clicr in n pacific sL:ttlclucnt 
or tlic prcscnt difficulty, nl l l ~ c  snmc time tll:rt tiley s1iou7 
[lint Russin has not the n\.nil:il)lc po\vrr to ~n ; i i~~tn in  t l ~ c  
aggressive position she 1 ~ 1 s  tnkcn up on the rivers 1lurgli:il) 
nncl I-Icri-rdd, ancl Llint a c  have only to be firm in out 
cleclnmtions and lo stand slanclily hy h e  ilmcer, to irisrrre 
the spcecly cvncuation of thosc ~~lnccs  south of S.i:xkl~s 
and I'ulntnn \vIikl~ Genwnl Iiomnroff and Coloncl 
Alikhanoff hnvc within the Inst four months npprcprintcd 
by force." 
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rrhc sentcnces in this paper \\~liich appefir to me to invite b 
sl)fCial attention, are those which speak of the difiiculties 
mllicl~ liussia would encounter in the even1 of her precipi- 
tating hostilities wilh the  Amir. These diflicul~ies m ~y 
thus be classified : 
1. T h e  raising of the advanced army to anything like 
the large numbers that would I)e necessary in 
face of the joint opposition of the Afg1i:in and 
Indian armies. 
2, Tllc  danger that tllc TZussinn army might be iso- 
Intctl. 
3. l'hc difliculty of f~~rn ish ing  it with supplies. 
I propose to consider these three points i n  detail. 
1,eaving Cor consideration further on tlie question of the 
entire force disposable in India, I would ask the reader to 
accept with me for a moment the statements which liavc 
reached us from that country by telegram, that tlierc is a t  
thi; moment n force of 30,000 men inethe Pishin valley 
ready to advance by way of l<anclahar as soon as they 
shall receive thc order from Head ~~~~~~~~~s. Accelpting 
tllis stntcmcnt, we must ask these tvo  questions : what is 
the distnncc to bc travcrscd ; and how long will it take to 
traverse it. 
The distance from the present advnncccl posts of the 
Anglo-Indian army to Kandahar is about 145 ~ni les ;  from 
I< id-h : i r  to H e r i t  is 369 miles. I t  is not easy ninrching, 
even when there is no enemy to be looked for. I n  the 
second ASghdn \var Stewart found the march even to 
Kandahar n very ~rying one. Unfortunately tlie intcrven- 
ing time has not bccn eniployecl in the manner to  which 
it might have been s o  usefully devokcL-the making of a 
railway. Our armics 1\41 have to ~narch as  they did in 
1839 a n d  1879-So. 'I'lic clifficulties, especially in the way 
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of collecting carriage for s ~ ~ c l i  a force, will I)e a s  great lionr 
as t h y  wcrc hen. 'I'hosc wlio recollect how in I SS I 
I'liayrc's forcc was delnincd in inaction, at a critical 
iiiomcnl, for tlie wnnt of carriage, will npprccinlc the grcnt 
eslent of those difliculties. 
Tlie rond to Iiandaliar is nrell lanow to our generals and 
our soldiers. I think that, having rcgnrd Lo the initial 
difficulties of starling, tlie best of thesc would d m i t  tliat if 
lie were to reccive the order to advance to-n~orrow, lie 
\vould tliinlr a fortnight not a day too long to enable him to 
reach I<nndd~ar with 30,000 nicn. Sir John ICcaiic, in ~S jc ) ,  
marching as rapidly as hc couid march, took ninctccii days 
to accomplish the distancc from Qucth. Thencc to Herit 
the road is less known, but it is certainly inlinitelg more 
cliflicult. I propose, in a few words, to describe it. 
'l'hcrc are three important posts on the principal road 
between Kandaliar and Her5t-Girislik, Farmli, and 
Sihzwir. The distance by this road is 369 miles. 
From Kandah:tr to Girishlc thc clistnncc bnrcly esceeds 
75 miles. 
'The first march is to Kolidrnn-7 miles. 'I'l~c first 
3 niiles of road pass through tlie enclosed gardcns and 
suburbs of the city. Tlie road crosses the several canals 
dmwn from the Argancldb for irrigating tlie ICandaliar 
valley. At Iiolcdwn water is abundant, tlie encamping- 
ground is well adapted for a large force, and forage can be ' 
supplicd in sufficient quantities. 
T o  Sanjd~i-5 miles. The bed of the Argandib is 
crossed. Thc river, in the month of June, averages about 
two-and-quarter feet in depth, and the passage of it is 
easy. There is a ford about thrccquarters of a mile lower 
down by which it Bonld be advisible to cross heavy guns. 
Beyond tlie river one or two artificial watercourses hnve 
to be crossecl. Tlie r o d  is stony in some places, but 
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generally good. 'Therc is escellcnt encamping-ground at 
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Snnjari ; water is plentilul, and f o q e  is suficient. 
r 1 1 &r~z-i-kladdad K l l i n - r ~  nlilcs. An escellent road 
across a brond, hard, level plain. :\ canal runs pnrallel to 
thc road tlie wliolc of ~ h c  nlarcll. The ground for encamp- 
iiicnt is good ; water is plentiful l m r  the c:tmp; forage for 
camels is abundant ; grnss is scarce near the camp, but 
plcntifill n few iniles to tlie south of it. There arc several 
villages in tlic neighbourhood ; as well as floclcs of sheep 
and  goats. 
Rhdshk-i-Nnk11dd-15z miles. A hard, level, gravel 
road without obstacle or difficulty. At ICl~ilsl~l<-i-Nalrli~id 
water is plentiful, from two artificial water-courses ; tlie 
encampi~~g-ground is good; fodder for caniels is plentiful ; 
b u t  grnss, in thc iminediate vicinity of the camp, is scarce. 
T o  IChalr-i-Cliapaii-9% miles. The road generally good 
a n d  level, though here and h e r e  [lie sand lies deep. The 
encamping-ground, thougli somcwhat irregular, could easily 
be  occupied by a large force. 'I'herc is a'sufficient, thong11 
not over-abundant, supply of water. Forage of all sorts is 
less plentiful. There nre, however, villages and cultivatiorl 
two or three miles soutl~ of the encamping-ground, as me11 
as large floclts of sheep. 
T o  Girishk-not quite 24 miles. The road to the 
left bank  of the Helinund, about tmenty-t\\ro miles 
a n d  a half, is generally good and hard, tlie first part 
slightly undulating, with one or two sandy patches. There 
is a well about midway, but tlie water procurable from it 
is insufticient for more than a few travellers. 011 tlie left 
bank of the river is an excellent dncamping-ground, with 
abundance of water and an ample supply of forage of all 
sorts. T h e  Helmund is a difficult r i v e ~ t o  cross. I n  June 
its depth is about three feet nine inches ; its width in the 
widest branch is seventy yards. The culrent runs at the rate 
of three miles an hour. There is a ferry nphich it is some- 
times necessary to use. At Girishk the encamping-ground is 
suficient, though here and there broken. \,\later and slip- 
plies of all sorts are abundant. I would add that, so far, 
thc country is well known to our generals ; it comprehcncls 
the districts which, as I have stated in a preceding page, 
\vol~lcl devolve llp311 its in the event of n permanent occu- 
pation of Kandnhar by the British. 
IVhnt Girishk once was may be gathered from the tmdi- 
tions of the timc of Zarnan Shih .  Even then people 
used to say that ' I  the Helmund flowed through a garden." 
Now, tl~oug11 arable land abouncls, there is but littlc cul- 
tivatiqn. I n  fact, with the cscoption of the Innd imme- 
diately on the bank of thc ri\w-, there is nonc. \:.'it11 pence 
and security for l i l  the cul~ivntion, llowevcr, would speedily 
revive ! 
Thc  fort, though much clilnpidntcd, com~nands n good 
view of tho surroundin;: country. It is not, a t  Imsent, 
capable of defcnw against artillery, Imt il: might be made 
so with a conlparati\~cIy small expenditure. 
From Girishl; to Farmh the distance, b y  the route 
adoptcd by Ferricr and Marsh, is r a o  miles. 'l'here 
is a route by S!lordb a n d  Hasan Gilan, shorter by 
zo milcs, but of this I have been unablc to find any ac- 
curate rccord. 
C;irishk to Zil-ak-zo miles. 'l'he fir..t six luilcs stony 
: ~ n d  undulating, the beds of several torrents crossing 
thc line. 'I'hc road then beconles levcl and easy till 
the fort of Sxaclnt, 18 ~niles fro111 Girishk, is reached. 
Sandnt, once a rather strong, but, when Captain Marsh saw 
it in 1S7;-1, a deserted and ruined hill fort, has n plenti- 
1111 supply of watcl; l 'he road then becomes again undu- 
lating :md continues so until close to Zirak. Zirnlc is a 
sn i ;~ l l  village situxtecl at tJ1c foot of thc mountains 011 the 
right of the road to Herit and oppositc >Iahrnudabad, - 
described by Captain Marsh as a small village in a 1101- 
]om wntcrcd by an artificial ma~ercourse. At Zirak water 
is good and abundant, and forage for canlels and horses is 
plentiful. 
T o  ~ilshalch-12% I I ~ C S .  The road hard and level. 
IVatcr at the village of Sdr, about half-way. 'l'hc encamp- 
ing-ground a t  Ddshnkllih is good, and foragc for cnmels and 
horses is abundant. 
T o  Biabannk-threc milcs and n half. Koncl Icvcl, 
across n tolcrd)ly linrd plain. Thcrc is an artificial canal 
at Biabanali providing plenty of water. Grass and fodder 
are abundant. 
T o  \\'asl1ir-z4 inilcs. About four miles from Eia- 
bnnali tlic road enters a range of hills with n gradua! 
ascent to goo feet, presenting no great difficulties. Prom 
this point to Washir thc road wincls among clcclivi- 
ties, nnd follows the bed of watercourses, passing ovcr 
much difficult ground. For the last (;. milcs the road 
runs Cio~vn n valley, with a gentle slope. I t  is hnrcl 2nd 
good til l  within 2 inilcs of Wnshir, when it beco~nes 
undulating and stoney. Many villages and gardens, 
watered by artificial canals arc passed in this descent. 
Ferrier made thc journey by halting ditring the heat of the 
day a t  Biabnnak and Lhen pushing on ncross  lie range, 
20 miles, to Painak, but with no advantage over the 
route here laid down. At Washir supplies of all sorts, 
including water, arc abundant. 
'To the IClishrlid river-14 ixiles. The road stoney 
and uneven, the last 4 miles being along n dry matcr- 
course. The descent into Ihe bed of the Icdshrlid 
steep and bad. It is, howver, practicable for artillery. 
The river supplies escellcnt water. Forage for camels 
abounds, but grass is less plentiful. 
7 T o  Hijf Ibsiihi~ni-1'1 ~nilc's. T l ~ c  fording of the 
I<:ishrild is at certain scnsons impossible, in consequence 
of l l ~ e  impetuosily of thc Lorrent. I n  thc 1101 seasoti, 
ho\\wer, the depth of t l ~ c  water docs not csceccl 18 
inches. After crossing thc river the road pursues a 
tortuous course among hills for about 3 ~niles; it then 
crosses n drcary stcppc till it reaches Hiji 1br:ihinli. 
1"crricr stales that bct\vccn I-lijl J.briihimi and l<:islirilcl 
t l~erc is not a drop water. \\'aLcr and foriige are both pru- 
curable at  the former place. 
I-Idji 1br:iliimi to Siah-db-Fcrrier calls this place 
Shiaguz-clistance 10 ~niles. Siall-db is t11c p i a t  wlicnce 
a direct road, avoiding alike I;:rrmh and Salmvar, runs 
7 i d  Girnneh to I-lerit. I t  is 311 encamping-ground wlicrc 
water and forngc are alike available. 
Siah-bb to I<liarni:ilik--zz miles. The first and last 
p u t  of this stage leads Lhc travrllcr through plui~is, ficlcls, 
nncl marshes. 'I'hc intermcclintc part is intc~scctcd by 
stony mountai~is, stccply scnrpcd at  the siclcs. " lchnr- 
nidlik," writes Captain B*larsll, 'Iis situated in a sn~nll grassy 
liollow. A few date-palms and cattle, in tlic inr~ncdinte 
neighbourhood of a few mean huts and wall-surrounded 
tower, arc dl it posscsscs." \\'ater and forngc are pro- 
cumllc hcre. 
I<harm;ilik ti) I'arrnh-ao ~niles. The road lends 
across n c1esol;tte plain ; then, ovcr a low l m s ,  enters n 
stony valley. Numerous ruins near thc road id ica te  that 
the district was once \ \ d l  pol)rilnted. The plain is totally 
devoid of clrinlting water. 
L I T l ~ e  nppeitr:~nce of Farm11 n short way 011;' writes 
Captain hIarsl1, " is imposing. I ts  higli embattled and 
I~astionccl wnlls, ,its broacl, well-kept clitch, and fine large 
gate and drawbridge give it the air of \rcaltli and ease. 
:Ih11 \\hat a dclusion is this ! On entering tl)e city T. was 
surprised Lo see its fallen state. T h e  size of the interior 
is, perhaps, the  third of I-Ierdt ; but it does possess twenty 
huts, a n d  those a11 in ruins. \\'here is the city of Farrah ? 
Na\vherc." 
F:irmh on7cs its clestruction to the Persians and the 
Afghins. I n  rS37 the Persians besieged and laid it waste 
bccause it belonged to Afghdnistdn. I n  1 5 5 d l l e  Baralizye 
A$,$ins completed its destruction because it was depen- 
dent up011 the Saduzye AfghBn rulers of I-Ierat. 
Parrall was before the first of these e\wlts Conolly bore 
testimony i n  1832, Alter speaking of it as a town possess. 
ing two thousand houses, he  adds : 'LTlle land is fertile 
and much grain is cultivaLcc1, as the shepherds for many 
miles are supplied with it from hence. . . . T h e  Furrah- 
r ~ i d  " (river of Furrah) " is in spring a wide and deep river, 
and there is always sufficient water for much cultivation." 
l ' en  years previously 1\41., Frascr had described it as a 
city as large a s  Nishapur, situatcd in a valley anlong hills 
wilh nbout twenty villages and  many garqens." Again, I 
repeat, with peace and security for life and property its 
revival \vould be assured. 
I havc stated that from Siah-rlb runs the direct road to 
I - h i t  aid Girdneh, avoiding Farrnh and Sabzwar. I t  is 
worthy of consideration whether this route might not be 
ultimately madc the main line of conlmunication. I t  is 
shorter ; and a force stationed at Giraneh would conlnland 
nlilic Fnrrah and Snbz\var. Ferrier, after alluding to the 
strength of the fort as  it was five-and-thirty years ago, thus 
writes regarding the position. " T h e  position is important. 
I t  co~nnlancls the passage of the river and the defiles in 
the mountains of the soulh. h snlall forcc quartered there 
might maintain its authority in the districts of Sabzwar, 
Farmh, I.nusll, EaIt\\x, Gulistan, ~ o ? l r ,  and Sakltar, 
Girdi~eli k i n g  the central point lound which converge 
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- these localities-information," he empl~atically adds, " for 
the English and the Russians ! " God grant that our 
countrymen may profit by the hint ! 
I may add that thc road from Giraneli Lo H e r i t  runs by 
Ab-i-IC~irmal~ and S h i h  Jahkn, and joins the Sabzwar road 
a t  Kash Jabran, a few miles nbuve Sabzwar itsclf. 'The 
distances may be thus computed fsom Ferrier's journal. 
Prom Kash Jabrlin t o  Shdh Jnhin about nine hours cala- 
van Journey, or about zo miles; (som Shah Jnran to 
Girdneh 56 miles. T h e  country during the greater 
part of the way is descril~ed I))? Ferrier as \\fell woodccl and 
a b o ~ ~ n d i n y  i n  game, notwithst~nding an almost entire de- 
liciency of \sates. 
I return now to the routc by Farm11 and Sabzwdr. T h e  
distancc between those two piaces is eighty miles. " 'l'hcre 
are," wi tcs  Cnptain hlarsli, L L  no villages-a vast jumble 
of vdleys nncl hills, with small plains, inhabited only by n. . 
no~nadic pcople. Each p l x e  has its name, but if the 
lrnvellcr finds tents a t  the same place twice h e  is lucky." 
Captain Marsh accomplishecl the journey in three clays, by 
IClilish, Kilnmilsha, and L)nr\vizni. At each of these 
l~laces he found water. Inclexl, after the first 25  miles, 
the tr;iveller follows, \\fit11 a few deviations, the valley of 
the liild-i-hclrashkin. R e p - d i n g   his river Furrier ob- 
serves thal: a n  army marching from H e r i t  in  Lhe summcr 
m o n ~ h s  should follow its course, as the commander \vodd 
then bc frec fsom ansiely regarding thc supply of w l e r  fur 
his mcn and cattk. 'The hint should not b: forgotten by 
an army which should niarch to  Hcrit. 
Snbzwdr is cighty miles from Iicrlit. 11 lies at thc ex- 
tremity of a large oblong plain, ten or Lwclve milcs in 
circumference. T h e  fort, pret~ily situated, is not lormid- 
able. ' l ' l~c country arouncl it is well cul~i\.uted, a n d  
abounds in flocks and herds. \\'atel. and supplies a1.e 
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almnclant. A Hincld, who visited i t  in  1823, compared it, 
for fertility, with the best parts of Hincllistin. 
'The road bct\veen Sabzwir and Herit needs no specinl 
description. I t  is good and level and passable for wheeled 
cxrr-iages of all descriptions. SuplJies of all kinds are 
abunda11 t. 
T h e  following are the stages-easily, if considered ad- 
visablc, to be cliviclecl :- 
Sabzwdr to IGsh Jalmin-21 milcs. Midway is a. water 
reservoir, now in ruins. At ICdsh J n l ~ i n  the direct road to 
Kandahar bmnches off, talcing the route by GirBneh. 
T o  Adrasl~kdn-I I iniles, about a mile on Lhe Sabz\\lrir 
side of the river of the sanle name. 
T o  S1i:ili Beg or Bad - 23 iniles. Five miles after 
crossing the liucl-i-Adrashkin the traveller rcnc:lm the 
Rud-i-Gaz, n rapid stream, fiftecn or twenty yards broad, 
whose wnlers flow into the Adrashkh a little to the 
west of the village of that name. Six miles further the 
ruined cwavansarai of Mlr Allah is reached. I t  is sur- 
rounded by cultivatiol~, and n finc stream of water runs 
under its ~ralls. Six and a half iniles f~lrthcr, again, thc 
traveller passes n spring of sweet water on the left of the 
road. 'I'hc d\vnrf reed, which provides sufficient foclder for 
horscs, is here nbnnclant; but the food of man has to bc 
carricd. Watcr is plentiful at ShBh lkg.  
To  Mir Ddild-12 miles. T h e  traveller desccnds from 
Slid1 Xeg. The dcscent is regular and gradual. 'l'lle 
coontry is now uninhabited and uncultivatecl. Red and 
grcy partridges al~ouncl. There is an artificial arrangement 
for thc supply of water at Mlr Ddlicl, but ~~ncler Afghiin 
rulc i t  h:ls been but little cnrcd for. 
r 7 
.lo Hcl-it-18 miles. A good view of the city is 
obtainable from the last-namecl station. l'lw traveller 
p~.ocecds Ly a good road, ro milts, LO Rozeh 13Lg11, a royal 
garden-in older~ days planted with Scotch hrs of great 
size and beauty. Little morc than 4 niiles further on, 
the I-Ierirtid is reachcd. Thc breadth o i  the river at this 
point is n l~out  n hundred and fifty yards. I ts  bed is hcare 
hollowed out, and its waters run in fifteen separate chan- 
ncls, twelve fcct wide and very deep, enclosecl between two 
embnnl<ments Cornled of the earth tnlcen out for the esca- 
vntions. TO t l ~ c  south of the rivcr is a line piece of 
pasture-land formerly thickly studdcd with gardens and 
villages. 
I thitll< that, considering Lhe clifiiculties of the ground 
and  the necessity for carrying all his supplies with him, our 
general would be well satisfied if hc could accomplish this 
distance in four mcelts. 
Gr:unting, then, for thc sake of argument, that thc com- 
mander of thc British expeditionary force were to set forth 
to  relicvc Heri t ,  threatened by the Russians, on the loth 
.4pril nest, he could not hope to rcnch that plnce Ixfore 
the a z ~ i d  May;? And bc it remembered, he  woulcl nlarcll 
a t  a time of year when the hcat is the nlost terrific, and 
the water is most scarce. 
What are the chances of I-Icrit being able to hold out 
against n ICussian army for three ~ n o n t l s  ?
I - h i t ,  it may be said, has held out against a Tksinn 
army aided by Russians, for tcn ~nonths. 'That which has 
becn acconiplished once may be accomplished :&in. 
I shall show, on the evidence of the Inan nlost capable 
to give an opinion, on [he evidcncc of Rlclrecl Pottinger 
himself, that s l ~ c h  a contcnlion, hornever pleasant it may 
' l ~e ,  cannot Ix sustxinccl. 
I n  the first place Russians with ~ h c i r  nlodern arms 
of inipro\wneld arc inlinikly superior to the Persian 
army of ~838-g, with its flints nrd its popguns: in Lhc 
second, Elclrcd I'ottingcr dcclarccl Lllat the siege of IS-$-g 
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failed solely because the place was not scientifically 
attacked. 
I t  may be taken for grantcd that the defences of HerLt 
a r e  certainly not better than they were in 1838-9. They 
have been occasionally battered since, but they have never 
been repaired. \\re may have, then, an absolute conviction 
that the account given by IG-tyc;* of the state of the forti- 
fications of H e r i t  in 1838 is not underpainted in its appli- 
cation to the present day. 
" The city of Hcnit, it has been said, stood within solid 
earthen walls, surrouncled by a wet ditch. T he  Tour sides 
were of nearly equal length, n little less than :L mile in 
cstcnt, hcing ~o\vards the four points or the compass. T h e  
inost clevatcd quarter of  the city \\!as the north.east, fronl 
which it gradually sloped down to the south-west corner, 
where it attained its lowest descent. 'The real defences of 
t h e  place were two covercd ways, or fnlusc-brnics, on  the 
cstcrior slope of the embankments, one within and the 
othcr without the d i ~ c h .  T h e  lower one \ws  on the level 
of t l ~ c  surrounding country, its parapet partly covered by a 
inound of earth on the counterscarp, the accu~rlula~ion of 
rubbish from the cleansings of thc ditch. On the nor~hern 
side, surroundecl by n wet clitch, Lhc citadel, once Known as 
Llie I<ilal~-i-tlkt.ynr->lIdi~i, but now as the :\rk, overlooked 
the  cily. Ruilt entirely of good brick rwsonry, wit11 lofty 
I-amparts n11d numerous towers, it was a place of consiclcr- 
ab le  strcngth ; b u t  now its defences, long neglected, wcre in 
a wretched state of repair. lizdeed, W!ILW, in 1837, t i d i~gs  
oJ //It nd7~nr~c of the Pclsinn a r q  ~.cnc/rcd Henit, the 
7(1/10h e.v/e~z/ qf the Jortt&-n/iuns zum C I W N I ~ ~ ~ ~  in1110 dmzy." 
'['he italics are mine. 
Such was, such is, Hesat. Uct, being so, it succc.ssrully 
rcsisted n Pcrsian nrmy, aided by Russian officers, for ten 
. * History -or the War. in Arghnnistan." By Sir J. W. Ihye ,  
? '  
months. Upon that subject Ict us hear the opinion of the 
one Englishman \vithin ils \valls, of the man of \vliom 
Kaye wrote : " Thc inclomitablc courage of Eldred Pot- 
tinger saved the belcagr~erecl city." 
" I t  is my lirm Ixlief," mrotc tliat gallnnt Englishman 
in his journal, " that Malionled Shrill " (the Shlih of Persia) 
'(might have carried the city by assault the very first day 
that he reachecl HerAt, and that even when the garrison 
gained confidence, and were flushecl with the success of 
their sorties, he might have, by a proper use of the means 
at his disposal, taken the place in twenty-four hours." 
That opinion, the opinion of a conlpetent artillery officer, 
who successf~~lly defended the crunlbling ramparts, appears 
to me to be decisive of the question. I t  is clear that 
under ordinary circomstances HerLt could not, if attacked 
now, resist a Russian force till the end of May. The only 
chance of her being able to do so would be the prescnce 
behind her ramparts of Lumsden and his companions. 
Lumsden is an experienced officer, and he has a very 
gallant following ; but it seems to me, that i f  the Russians 
are proviaed with guns of the modern type, even the skill 
and courage of Lumsden and his co~npanions could effect 
little, if it be true, as has  been asserted, that the city can 
ke commnncled by n hill in its vicinity. 
The reply, then, the reluctant reply, Lo the first query 
that Herbt, if a:tncked nonr, could not hold out till the 
encl of Mny, disposes, it seems to me, of the three 
questions raised by the iPiim. For, if the existing 
Russian force in the Transcaspian regions can take Herdt 
before an English force could arrive before tliat city, and 
if, whilst the English force \Ifas advancing Rr~ssian rlcin- 
forcements were likewise being pushed fon~ard,  it seems 
clear that the Power which has possession of the poitlt 
d'nppxi must occupy the position of vantage. For whilst 
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the l?,nglish have to traverse 514 miles, over a barren 
country, all 1i;ud-mucl~ing, carrying their sapplies,  he 
Russians havc Lo rnm.cl1 along an cnsy road fronl Kizil 
Arvat, only 5 2 3  milcs to Iierdk, drawing thcir supplies all 
the may, irom the northern frontier of Persia. 'I'hnt 
northern part of Persin is, by the testimony of Nnpicr and 
other eye.witnesses, a l r e d y  n Russian province, possessing 
ngents in every village. T h e  march, then, of the Russian 
reinforcemenfs from K i d  Arvat Lo I-Ierit, Lhougli nine 
miles longer, is n easier march to nccon-~plisli than Lhc 
mnrch of Lhe Bri~ish force irom Lhe Pishin Valley to thc 
snmc l~lacc. 1Jnder ordinary circu~nsLnnccs, tlicn, thc 
Russian fidvance force, far from being isolated, will bc 
supported by n main body as  strong ns thc ndvnncing 
English army, before that army could reach HerAt ! 
Nor is thc argument regarding supplies more tcnn1)lc. 
T h e  base of Russia for supplies will be  the northern 
frontier of Persia, between two and three hundred miles 
from H e r i t  ; the English base for the same+l,orpose would 
be the country beyoiid the  Indus, six hundred miles 
distant. 
I n  connection with this subject-, and as  s h o ~ \ ~ i n g  how 
much belter prepared Russia is for her great spring than 
the onter world has any idea of, I annex here n letter 
written by Sir Edward Ilalnley in reply t o  one of the 
arguments nsed by  he Z h c s ,  upon which I Iiavc coin- 
nlentcd :- 
'[Seeing how inexpedient it is," wrote Genei-a1 Hamley 
on the zznd March, " to  underrate a n  enemy, perhaps you 
will allow me n few worcls of comment on your contributor's 
account of the Army o f  Lhe Caucnsus last Friday ; by which 
I sl~all also hope to justify my view of &he necessity of 
concentrating our resources on a. war will1 Russia, if such 
is to be. Accepting your contributor's description of that 
arnly, and his estimate of the number of men \\rhicIi it 
brought against the Turks in  Armenia in IS;;, still t l ~ t  
forms no nieasure of the forces \\~liicli Kussia could now 
assenihle on the Caspian. ,For in 1577 the vast home 
army of Russia was entirely occupied in operating against 
the Turks on the Danube. I t  is now disposable for the 
reinforcement of the Army oC the Caucasus. Troops 
enlbarkecl at Odessa woulcl reach Batoum in h r o  days, 
the Caspian in three, and the present end of the Trans- 
caspian Railway at Bani within the week. Nor wot~lcl the 
severance of the com~nunicntion across thc Ulnck Sen 
prevent thc tmrlsit, for many railways cross Russia to 
debouch 011 thc Volgn, which forms a vast highway to the 
Caspian. Tlil~s, the trial of strength would be not between 
the Artny of the Caucasus and the Army of Indin, but 
between the forces which the t\vo Empires could bring to 
bear in the theatre of war. 
Furthcr, during the war of 1877, Persia, as n neutml, 
asse~rrbled an a tny  of 40,000 u c n  for thc protection of 
her own soil. If that army wcre directed against us, i n  
alliance with Russia, it would inarcb by excellent roads 
mithih the Persian frontier to Meshed and the FIeri Kud. 
I f  therc is anything i n  the task that would thus be set us to 
nr~~horize thc I~elicf that, besides dealing with it, we could 
also maintain :I British force of the present slrcngtl~ in 
Egypt, I shall rejoice to hear of it, but I have failed to 
discover it." 6 
'The argument of this lctler is unanswerable. I t  goes to 
confirm my conviction that unless an 1Snglish force can 
rcacli Herdt before Russia, take possession of that city, the 
entire province, which has been for ages the b111mnrk of 
India, will be formever lost. 
What, meanwhile, is our position in India? We can 
&pose, in that country, of a regular force, inclusive of the 
troops which hnve been lent to Englnnd for thc Soudnn, 
o f  61,736 European, and 125,695 native troops, count- 
ing oficers. The following table shons their component 
parts :- 
i r y  . .. - I i S 3 5  
Cavalry . . 18,824 
Infantry . . 101,926 
Sappers and Niners . . . 3,110 
-- 
Total 125,695 
BRITISH 1\~.\1\', INCI.UDING OFFICERS. 
Bcngnl, hlatlrns. Bom11:ly. Total. 
Artillery 6,209 2,qgr 2,786 = I 1,486 
Cavalry 2,868 956 478 = 4,s02 
Engineers ~ C I  4 3 48 = 292 
Infantry 29,222 8,2 17 8,217.= 45,656 
---- 
38,500 11,707 11,529 = 61,736 
This is the pence establishment, a total of 187,431, to 
guard India, and, we mill hope, to maintain I-Ierdt. Of 
colirse it may be greatly increased. I t  is satisfactory to 
learn that Lord Duferin has already issued orders that two 
hundrcd men,shall be added to each regiment, and equally 
so that enlisting has again become popular in India. It 
is an additional satisfnction to feel that the destinies of 
India are in the hands of a mnn who POSSCSSeS the absolute 
confidence of the English people. 
The esact mode in which tllc nrnly availnble for Iicld 
service may be employed must depend an circumstances. 
England Itnow that her generals on thc spot, if Irft Lln- 
fettered, will conquer even the impossible. But they may 
read, as every one may study, with advantage, thc words 
uttered last May on the suhject by our most accon~ylished 
strategis1 :- 
" I will suppose Russia," said Sir I~clwnrcl Hamley, " to 
have made her nest step-a step which need surprise no- 
body; many Indians look on it as alrencly virtually accom- 
plished-and occupied Heri t .  IVe know when she will 
do this-in a moment of perplexity to England. As to 
the 11ow, perllaps by first occupying it with a Persian 
garrison (not to alarm us too much), and afterwards, by 
some subsequently announced Treaty, replacing that gnrri- 
son wit11 Russian troops. This may easily he done before 
we are aware, espccinlly if  we follo\v the ph11 of rcspccting 
Russian susceptibilities so far as not w c n  to kccp ourselves 
informcd of \vllnt shc niag I,: cluing, And it \\,as 1 fcatnre 
of Skobeleff's plan of invasion, now beconie absolutely 
feasible, ' to org&e masses of Asiatic cavalry, and hu1Iing 
thcm on India as our vanguard, under the banner of blood 
and rapine, thus bring back the t i~ncs of l'amerlnne.' We 
may therefore wake up to find this programme in execu- 
tion, with I.<ussian troops to any estent massed along the 
line of the 'l'mnscaspian railmay, ready to support those in 
front. Now, on our side, we have of late increased the 
force at Quetta, and planned a system of local defence for 
Beloochistin ; but our comparali\,ely insignificant field 
force is 220 miles from the Helmund. 'I'hat js  onc case. 
The other is that we had a strong British Governor in 
Kandnl~ar, and n strong British force on the Helmund and 
on the road to Kabul-the railway completed to Icandahar 
-in case of a movement from Turkistan against Kibul,  a 
force 011 our side on its way to occupy that city, if not 
already there, and new recruiting grounds open to us amid 
\varlike populations. Surely there can be no question as 
to which of these two sets of circumstances mould give us 
N 
most influence in Afglxinistin, most powcr LO oppose Russi:~, 
and to maintain conficlcnce in India. And we must 
reme~nber thnt four years ago we could l ime done this and  
more than this. The \vhole country \vas going to pieces 
for want of strong rule. \\re were actually hunling for 
rulers. We set up one at  I G i l d ,  :1nd auothcr at  Iinndahnr, 
who was soon afterwards removecl, and thc ~vholc country 
placed under the present Amir. Berore and sincc that 
cvent Lhe unwavering theory of successive Covc'rnmcnts of 
Indi :~  has I~ccn  Lhnt lhc Amir is to be kcpt Srom Russian 
influence, and to I x  n~ainlninccl and supported in nlliancc 
with England. 1 3 ~ 1  when wc ask \ h t  steps h a w  been 
talten for carrying this Lheorp into practice, I fcar \re shall 
not find much that is salisfaclory. Pcrhnps Lhc ntuiost we 
could in prcsent circun~stnnces pronlisc ourse l \~~s ,  in mcet- 
ing n Russian advance, would he that a f ~ c r  l~cavy l i g h h g  
and vast cspenditurc wc sl~oulcl succeccl in gaining Lhose 
positions whic11 nrc now open LO our grasp, and our 
presence in n~hicli knight obviate the risk 13 war.'> 
' I  I have said nothing about a Eritish occupation of 
Her&. Yet that t o 3  was open ko us four years ago, and 
not  only open to us, but contemplated, in certain conlin- 
gencics, by the Government of India. I f  I refrain from 
speaking of it i t  is because I fear R L  the outset to excite 
thc opposition, nncl possible refmsal to consider any forwnrcl 
movement, pf those who are already hampered by t l ~ c  
opinions they formerly expressed. I nm aware, too, of the 
strong reasons thal exist against straining our resources by 
embracing points so  distant in our  first operations. But  I 
\ \dl  confess that a s  a n  alxtract ~nilitary plan for the defence 
" " Ancl hcrc T may nicnlion Lhnl, sincc [his papcr was printcd, I 
linve seen cvidcnce Ihnl most o f  Ihc v i e w  hcre?rt forth arc shnred by 
no Indian Officer whosc nnnlc w o ~ ~ l d  be at once admitted as of almost 
clrcisive inflnence in the queslion." 
of India under present conditions, and supposing sufficient 
additional troops to bc forthcoming, t ln t  wllich most 
strongly recolnmends itsclf to  my  mind is a strong Eritish 
Government at  I<andahar, wielding an army whose nd- 
vanced troops should be at  ICribul and Ilerrit, 1,aucd on 
I<urrachee, with milnray communica~ion at  least 1 h c 1 ~ : c  to 
I<andah:~1-. I I~elieve it  is consiclerctl ~ h n l  great r~nrt  of 
such an army could bc supplied from our prcscnt Indian 
forces. Honlevel; I will not enlarge on this plan, Lllough 
I imagine it  is what n strong Ponver, ~hinlting more or 
security than espense, might be cxpectecl to adopt. 13ut, 
assuming lllat wc wish to kccp our hold on this ~rnmpart of 
India, i t  is urgently neccssnry to take s t c p  while the 
Russian preparations are still u ~ i d e ~ e l o p e d .  ]Ye must at 
once obtain such a seltlement or its boundary as I linve 
endeavoured Lo sketch. And military reports on tlic whole 
counlry, 1r0111 llik frontier to posilions sccuringr or com- 
manding Hcrht, ancl thence. to  thc Helmund, should bc 
framed forthwit%. Our ignorance of a11 Lhis is, considering 
its imporlance, nstonishing. l\'liile Russian ofticinls linve 
explored 1111 Lo and beyond Her& and  elsewhere along the 
AT~hhn and Indian frontier, our own oficers liave been 
discourngccl, indeccl prohibitecl, from obtnining personal 
kno\vlcclgc of those rcgions, so that thc scanty information 
1 Iinvc been able to give al,out Llic~n is from 1ho:c who 
acquired it almost. by s1c:~lth. An cstremr carc not to 
wound, b y  sho\ving suspicion, the innocent candour ot' 
those guileless bci~igs, Russian statesmen, appears Lo liave 
been our ruling motivc, and is probably dignilicd by h e  
name of diplomacy. T h e  frontier is most iniporkml to us, 
yct- no oric can s ;~y  wlierc tllc lixmlier is. In  n fiw ycars 
wc may bc 1 i ~ h t R 1 ~  on tllc I-lelmund, 01. the FTcri-r~itl, yet 
we know nothing or the military featr~res of tlic rcgion." 
One word in conclusion as to the composilion of the 
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Anglo-Indian army. Of thc P,~.itish troops I need say 
nothing ; but with respect to the Indians I am glad to be 
able to express my nbsolute conviction that a Silt11 regiment, 
led by British officers, is quite the equal of a Russian 
regiment; that a Gilrkha regiment, similarly led, is like- 
wise, at least the equal of n Russian regiment ; that the 
Gdrknhs of Nepil, led by British officers, are equally 
a s  able to meet the shock ; that the Indian Irregular 
Cavalry can successf~~lly dare the Cossack to any en- 
counter. The rnatcrinl, then, of the force which inay have 
t o  meet Russia on the frontier of India is all that can 
b e  desired. T h c  only fault is that it is so small. I 
repent, then, the advice which has recently been so strongly 
urged upon the Governrncnt by the one strategist who 111s 
never been at fault: I would urge thcm to abandon the 
position in the Soudan, whcre-to use the words of 
Louis SV. at the battle of Laffeldt in 174;'--'' England fights 
for all a n d  pays for all," to the  advantage of the "all," 
and  to transport the arnly employed there'to the spot in 
India where the clearest interests of our country are 
threatened. I t  n,ould be necessary to stipulate, if this 
policy were carried out, that the General-in-Chief should be 
left behind. Lord Wolseley might replace the heroic 
Gordon in a new I<hartoum. We have yet, in India, in 
Roberts, in Charles hIacGregor, in Donald Stewart, in 
Mncpherson, and in othcrs also on the spot, men mho have 
proved, on  the hardest and most trying of fields, that 
"whilst no military qualification is wanting, the fount of 
honour is full a n d  fresh within them." I n  England, too, in 
the able and cultivated co~ninander who stormecl Tel-el- 
Kebir, who has studied the question of thc Indian frontier, 
in a way such a s  n o  man but  Charles ;lIacgregor has studied 
it-in Sir Edward Hamley-we possess a leader the com- 
peer even of such-men a s  these ! 
No cause was ever a d \ m ~ c e d  by exaggeration. The cause 
I am pleading in this chapter is the calm of the 12nglish 
people. Before I conclude i t  I shall show how their pros- 
pelity is bound LIP in the maintenance of our Indian 
empire; ho\v the loss of that magnilicent dependency 
would nrfect the position of every man, every woman, and 
every child in these islands from the highest to t l ~ e  lowesl. 
Convi~~cecl as I an1 that Lhe occupation by Russia or I-Ierat, 
the outlying fortress which covers India, would be l l ~ c  pre- 
lude to an invasion of India, I shall indicak thc pulpow 
which has promptccl the Russian general on the spot to 
n~altr: that sudden attack on the ATghnns or Panjcleh which 
roused all England to indignation on the morning of 
Thursday, the 9th April. And, that I may not be accused 
of exaggeration I shall, in clescribing that attack, quote the 
words wed in the House of Conmons on Thursday 
evening by one who has lost no opportunity of declaring his 
faith in Russia : who, addressing his present constituents in 
18;g, declared that he had " n o  fear of the territorial 
extensions of Russia, no fear of them rnhat&w; " that he 
thought " such fears old women's fears "--I shall quote 
the words used by the Prime Minister of England. 
I n  a previous chapter I showed that when the Eritish 
Commission~r, Sir Peter Lumsden, arrived, in nccord- 
ance with an ,+rrangement agreed to by the Govern- 
ment of the Czar, a t  Panjdeh, h e  was not met there by 
the Russian Commissioner, but that, shortly after his 
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arrival, 1211ssi:in Lroops ssizcd t l ~ c  posts, imporhnl, LXC;ILISC 
, 
vnlunld- for :~g;~ressive purposes, of l'ul-i-Khitun, Zul- 
f.~g:u; nncl I'ul-i-IGshli; that the British Government had 
nclclrcssed scrious remonstrances to St. Petersl~urg on the 
subjcct; nnd thnt, niter a very slight discussi~m it hncl been 
amnged between the two Governn~cnts that l<ussin sho~~lcl 
retain the posilions her troops had occupied, pending the 
definition of the frontier by the Commissioners of thc two 
n:~linns. 'I'he nrrnngc~ncnt \V:H generally regarded ns :L 
~~nsnlisl~~clory almngcmcnt fur Ihgl:~ncl, 1,111 i t  h;ld 
h e n  n i d e  I J ~  the I!rilisll (h-crnmcnl ,  ::ml the Ihitisl~ 
peoplc, wilh n great den1 of smouldering disgust, 2nd will1 
a strong conviction that they were being duped, were 
oldigcd to await the result. 
'The Ministers of Great Dritain duly co~nmunicatecl this 
agreement to Sir Petcr Lurn,sclcn. I t  mny be presumccl 
thnt L I I C  Minislers of Rossin likewise duly con~mllnicatetl 
thc :I~I-ccmcnt to tJicir gcnerd on t l ~ e  spot-the gencriil 
curn~nar~cling t l'ul-i-lCislili, Gencral Romcroff; although 
thnt gcncraliinfor~ued Captain Ynte Lhnt he had not rcceivecl 
it. \\'hcthcr he receivccl i t  or not, is n mnltor bchvccn 
hi~nself nntl his Go\wnrner~l. I t  is clear that the Ministers 
of Ruisin arc rcsponsilde to the hfinis~ers of England for 
the due olxer\~nncc of thc arrnngemcnl made IvAwccn the 
two ~ d o n s .  From Ihosc klinislcrs must the l-lritish 
Gc;\:ernmcnt dclunnd reparation. 
On the mor:ing of 'I'hursclay, thc 9th April, Lhe public 
were startlcd by an  announcement imde in the Shzadrzl-d 
newspaper ~ h n t  he agree~uent between thc two countries 
had been violaled, and violated by Russia; that Russian ' 
troops hnd made n premeditated attack upon the Afghins. 
Sccond editions of the other 1:lorning papus confirmed 
the news ivhich the Skrmhrrd had been the first to 
annou~~cc .  
T h a t  s m n c  evening tlw P r i m e  Minister of Great B r i t a i n  
b 
csplnincd the m a t t e r  i n  t l ~ c  1To11sc o f  C o ~ n m o n s ,  A f i c ~  
s o m c  i n t r o d u c t o r y  remnrlts, hc snid :- 
In  Ihe first plncc I l w c  nrc two t h i n g  n~l~niltccl-namely, [lint all 
:~ll:~cl; w;is nindc on tlie Afghhs  I y  the 1Zussin1is :111d that llic 
Afg1i;ins were clefentctl. On h o s e  two points l l~crc is no d o ~ l l t  
--clclcnlcd, ns we nrc inl'orn~etl, nficr n gnllnnl fifil~t. l ' l ~  
1:ussi:i11 nllcg;itio~is :ire 11minly ~ I I C S C .  I \\.ill 1101 a t t c ~ i ~ p l  to give 
tl1r111 in sl.ricL form, I)ut the l l o u s ~  1n3y depend npon tlic SIII>SL:IIIC~ 
o i  my recital. T h e  Russians nttnchcd the Aigh611s, ns they sMe,  
artcr being provoked 1)). acts o l  lioslility so termed-the nature c~l' 
wliicl~ wc arc not distinctly inforl~~ecl of--on (lie part o i  tlw Afgliins. 
When Ihc fighting mas over rlie liussi:i~~s rctirctl. They rc~iretl,  
according Lo n p h m x  usctl in one tlocu~ncnt, to their prcviow 
pohiliuns, nccortling Lo Lhc other t locumc~~t,  lo  lhc lcft ~ J R I I ~  rd I ~ c  
l<liushk. Tlicsc two phmscs lnsy I,c csacOy eqnivnlcnt. I am nol 
prq)nrcd lo sny lhcy arc nol, In11 1 incntion tlicni 1)oLIi I~ecn~lsc lhry 
arc ilsctl in the two accounts n , l~ ic l~  Inve veaclicd us. IL is next 
nllegcd that I5q$sli olficc~s directed tlic AfgliRns willioot lnl<ing part 
i n  t l~c  :ic~ual ~ ~ i g . i g ~ ~ i i c ~ i l ,  ant1 linnlly it is stnlctl that Llic R u s s i n ~ ~  I:l-rlii. 
~ii:i~iclcr sent mi cscor~ lo protccl thc Euglish oiliccrs nltcr I l~c A(gli:in.; 
wJrc dclcalccl, Imbthnt tlic Eoglisli oniccrs I d  thcn~selvcs lclt Ihe 
ground mlicn t l~c  escorl nrrivctl, so llial Llicrc ~ 1 . ;  110 o c c n h ~ ~  lc r i l  lo 
act. Tlicse are 111e principal allcgnlio~is tlinL Iinvc reacl~etl us :IS tlic 
nllcptinn:; of tlie Rnminn Govemnian~. 
'l'hc tlntc of t l ~ c  cngngenien! is l l ~ c  30th of h,I;ircl~, a11el licrlinps I 
niny say lhnl l l~c  wrlicst i~ilelligence o l  tlic ~ilosl ninterial of the facts 
I am about Lo recite only rcncliccl Lord Granville and myself llik 
i o i n  \Yell, i ~ o r  1 conic to Llic :~l lcpt ions made I)y Sir I'cter 
Lo~iiscle~i and uur own ofilccrs, to wl~icb I ~iectl scarcely s:ry 111.1t, n 
111aUer of coorsc, wc g i w  credit, ancl \vliich undo~~blcclly call fnr very 
w grnvc altcnlion. In  the first plnce i t  is slatctl Ilnt no rorward I I I C I V ~ .  
nicnt of :illy kin11 wns ninclc I)y tlic A r g l ~ i i ~ i ~  I~efure or since L I W  ~ y t l r  or 
h1:vcli-Ll~c I jtli of hfarch Ir ing the date of tlie Lclcgrnm I s l~al l  now 
rccitc. On  Ilic 29th of AInrcl~ we wcrc infor~ncil-nr~d \\then I sny 
" urc" I spenl; of Sir Peter I,unistlt.n's t c l c y r n ~ ~ ~  scnt lo u ~ - \ \ ~ c  a c r e  
inforliietl Lhnl, notxillist:~nrli~~g tlic l<ussiar~ assurances of thc 17th of 
AIarc11--this is liw sul~stancc of thc tclcgm~ii which Ihc Ilonsc will 110 
clcrubt recognize, l>c?nusc it was t l ~ c  sul,slnlice of tllc stnlc~iicnl ~ n a d e  
I,y nlc in this ltousc mid sclil Lo St. P e l e r s I ~ ~ r g  and rccognizctl thcrc, 
and rctorncd llicncc \\MI a ccrlnin ndtlition stntcd in this 1-louse nt llic 
time-on thc 29th of March we wcre infor~nrtl by Sir Pclcr Lunisrlcn , ' 
that, " not\vithstanding the Russian nssurnnccs of tlic 17111 of h,I;lrcli 
that thc Russinn forccs woeld not ntlvnnce from the position they Lhcn 
occupied provicletl h e  t\fgh6ns should not ndvnncc nor attnclr Lhem, 
o r  nnless some cslrnordinnry circuinstance sho111tl happen, such :IS n 
clist~~rbnnce in Pnnjtleh, thc Russinns n.erc drawn np in force nl~nost 
within range of tlic AfgIi5n posi~ion, though the :\fgh;ins lint1 neithcr 
attacked nor ndvanccd, and I'nl~jdch was perfectly quiet ; " that crcry 
ende:~vonr was heiag n l d e  by the Russiens-this is in the nature of n 
g ~ n r r n l  slntement-to induce thc ATgltBns to bcgin h e  fight ; nntl ~ h n t  
t h e  Russian forces hncl nttempletl to forcibly p:iss througlr the Afgliin 
pickcts. Thc nest point is III:IL ,111 the fnilurc of tliosc nlle~ii[)ts 
Captain Yale ~nc t  Llic chief of  tlic I<ussinn slnfl' 11y :11~poinlnicnt, nntl 
vTns informed that 110 SIIC!~ n r~~nnge~~ien t  :IS 11131 referred lo in tht  
telcgrnm of thc 17th hInrcll ns lo thc non-ndmnce of thc I lussin~s 
hnrl been rccei\~ccl. ( "  011.") This has hecn n~nde the sabject of 
proper cornmunicnlion. Nest ,  lhnt the chief of llie st:iff, whose Iinme 
I do not recollect, would not give mi :lssurnncc to C:lpt:~in Vatc ~ h n t  
thc AfghAns would not be attncked withont prcvio~~s noticc, ar~tl he 
clnimcd thc light to turn out the Afghdn posts whenever thcy  night 
inconvenience the Russians, wilhout rcfercnce lo m y  third p l y .  
Thnt, of count, must lx taken in conncclion mitli the statement imne- 
clintely precetling-that he h ~ d  not receivcrl from St. Pclersbnrg :n -  
structions correspontling with the telegrnnl of the btli AI31th. S C S ~  
w e  lenrnt that on the  29th of March Sir Peter Lumsdcn tlesirctl Cnp~nin 
Yntc again to see Lhc h s s i n n  comlnnntlcr nntl e&ct an n~nic:~llle 
nrransemcnt if porsildc. \Ire Icnrnt, on the 7th or-april, thn( tlo\vn to 
the  30th of &Inrch tlic Aighins li:~d ~nndc  no fnr\~wtl movcnicnt I x h e  
o r  sincc that tclcgrnm of the 17th of March. On  thc 7th of April \re 
also lcar~it that Cnptnin Yale hntl, on the 1st of April, sent n note from 
n point which hc had reached with all the IIritish ofticrrs and escort 
safely on the previous day a t  S I1.Jr. on thc way to GoIran. It stated 
thnt the Russiihs hntl attnclml 2nd dcfentcd the Afghlins, nntl hntl 
occupied Panjdeli on the 30th. The Afghhs weresnid to hnvc fought 
gnllnntly nntl to hnve lost hcnvily, two compnniei being killetl l o  n 
mnn in their entrenchn~rnts. The  s~~rvivors  rttrcnted along the 
h'Iaruchnk road. T h e  British ofliccrs w r c  ncutral in the engngcmcnt. a 
T h e  I-1011s.e will not he snrprised when I say, speakins with mcnsurccl 
words in  cil~cumstnnccs of grcnt grnvity, that to ns, upon the stntements 
I have recitctl, this nttnck l m r s  the nppenr:\ne? of nn nnprovol;ecl 
aggression. (Cheers.) \Ire hnvc nslted for explnnntions from the 
Russian Govcrn~nent. Therc has not yct been Linlc to receive such 
esplnnations. W e  shall cndenrour to  arrive at  a just conclusion on the 
facts. But before receiving our con~n~unications ycstertlny, sntl tolio~i 
we had not the iniportnnt conimunications or this morning, but somc- 
thing preliminary in the sanw direction, the British A~nbnssndor nt St. 
Petersburg reported to us last night at forty ~ninutcs pnst five in these 
words :-" The  Minister for Foreign ARi~irs expresses his earnest hope 
and that of the Emperor that this unhappy incident may not prevent 
the continuance ot the negotiations " (laughter) ; and he also reported 
a stntemcnr of hI ,  tle Gicrs that the Rnssinns re!ired to Lheir previous 
positions and did not o c c ~ p y  P;injdch. I may say thnt I h a w  Itritl 
these stalements before the House ns being the incomplete a ~ i d  partial 
statements which the very short time thnt hns elapsed sincc the rcccipt 
of the news aloue enables me to offer, and they are as much as onr 
public cloty will permit us to mnkc ; and I think I may say that thcy 
comprise lhe whole of the ~natcrial stntcments of fact which have 
rcachctl 11s upon this important, and for the nlonient I may say \ w y  
pninful, niattcr. 
Later on, during the s a m e  cvening, the Prime Minister 
srlpplemented the above statement with nnothel.. H e  
said :- 
" I had intendetl, e i~hcr  on the motion to report progress or on the 
actual report of tlic resolutions with the Speaker in thc chair, to men- 
tion that 4nce I 4 p o l w  at the comn~encemcnt of the cvening a telc- 
gram has been received from Sir Peter Lnnisden, which conveys what 
I m y  call a qnalilica(ion of one of the statenients which 11c had made. 
The statenicnt I niacle on the authority of Sir Pcter Lnnisden was, as 
will be reniembered by the IIousc, because I repented it twice, that 
the Afghbns had not mndc nny ncl\*nnce either before or  a h  the 
arrival of the telegram of the I 7th of Mnrch. Bat Sir Petcr Lumsden 
stales to us in n latcr telegram that when the Russians imn~edintely 
threntenetl an attack on the i \ f g h h  position b advancing in forcc to 
Ak Tnpn, the d$hins threw out vedcttcs to t{eir &nt and cxtendd 
tl!eir pickets to Pul-i.I<histi, on the left bank of the I<hi~slik, nntl 
gradually strengthened it u n ~ i l  on the 3otli, the bulk of thcir force hnd 
becn transferred across the river. Thnt is t l ~ c  qualificntion which he 
, n conveys. H e  goes on to say that, in his opinion, that does not pro- 
.. perly constitute an advancc, but was the occupntion of a more advan- 
tngcol~s position. But I presume he evidently considers that the 
qnestion might be jaised as to wlint did or did not const i t~~tc an ad- 
\'nnce, nntl he is tlesiror~s thnt the British Governnient shoold be 
placed in the possession of n l l ~ h c  facts. I give the qualificntion to the 
Horrse precisely as Sir  Peter Lan~sden has given it." 

the other. 'l'his territory has I~ecn viol:lted in a time or 
profound pcacc by n Pomcr which, only fifken months ago, 
\\'as far removed from the extremest border claimecl by the 
Afghdns, and \vhich has sincc insidiously crept up to that 
border. 
If such n thing had happeocd in Europe; if, for in- 
stance, France, i n  1867-8, had suddenly pounced upon the 
Duchy of Luxemburg, which had been given lo her by the 
Icing of  Holland, would Germany hnve allo\vt.d il for n 
moment ? T h e  march of a single regiment across rlle border 
o f  that Iluchy \vould have been acccptecl as a declaration 
of war. Why, t h  very claim to Luxemburg made by Napo- 
leon 111. very nearly brought about such n result ! I s  
there, lhen, to be a Inn1 of nntions in Europe, nncl no Inw 
of nations in  Asia? Are \\T to bc swift to rcpel on the 
onc continent, and to turn our f x c  to the smitcr on the 
othcr ? 1 adz this ques~ion becansc wc arc, a t  this moment, 
turning our face to the smitcr on the banks of the Mur- 
ghib, .and unlesg wc s ~ d d c n l y  rccoil, and put down both fcct, 
and, pointing to the frontier of 1872-3, say tu the smiter, 
I! " t h w  far shalt thou .come I N L  no fur the^.," we run the 
I g~~eatcst  risk of losing India. 
- ' l'licse are not empty words: they are words of truth 
nncl solemn warning. Any one who chooscs to rend 
: between thc lines can dctecr: easily eoo ~ g h  the reason for 
the action of Get~crnl Konmroti 'I'o t ose who cannot I 
will csplain it. 
\ 0 
First, let m c  recall to the recollection of the sender the 
general principle o f  the policy of Russin ns described I,y / the stnteoann of this century r h o  knew ller thoroughly, by 
' the lamcnted Lord Pahers ton .  The words are quoted at  
b. pages 38-9 of this volu~ue. Lct the rcndrr apply them to 
the action of General Komaroff and the excuses made by 
M, de  Giers, as that action nnd those excuses hnvc been 
st:ltrcl by Mr. C;lnJstonc. ' I  'l'hc policy of 11ic Kt!:;.ii;111 Go.- ,- " 
ernnient," w o t c  Lord Palmcrston, " 11ns al\vays hccn 10 i!l!sii 
forn~nrd its encroncliments as Elst nnd as far as t1:c . l ,~ ; lhy  01- 
\\.nnL of firmness of other Go\,ernments would nllov; II [v  go.'' 
" I n  Fiirtlicrnncc of this policy the Russian Gove~!itii~xiit Iwr: 
nl\vnys two strings to its bow-moclerate Iaiigu;!~:~ ;.!id ( , i s -  
interested professions nt St. Petersburg and :lt L . \ > I I * \ u ~ I  ; 
active aggression by its agents on the scene of opei ' t~loi i~.  
If the aggressions succeed locally tlie St, P e t e ~ d ) ~ ~ ;  Gi!\ crii.- 
Incnt nclopts them -2s  n fni/ nuwv/i wliicli i i  ;ilc' ill,L 11: 
tcncl, I ~ u t  c:i~inot in l i o n o ~ ~ r  reccdc from. 1 1 ~  i l l : '  ;OI-.I; 
agc~ils fail they arc disavowerl and recal ld,  ;c111i thc 
Inngiingc previously licld is appcnlcd to ns a p.::of' ki1i1.1. tllu 
.. - 
agents have overstepped their instructions." j 5  i: 1) I A ; ~ I ~  
to descri1)e more esnctly, with more nbsolutc 1 ~ "  ~.i,l<i, i l l : '  
courses wliicli Russia is now pursuing nt L,o~~rll.)n, ! :;t 
Petersburg, and on the Murgl~db ? She lias ; ~ t i r ~ i ~ ~ ~ ( i  L!IC 
agg:essions made by Komnroff as fnih acco~up/ci : r i l i c  li;~q, i f  
\\.c may believe the St. Petersburg correspondent of  LIIC.  'TJMS 
( I I April), collfen-ed decal-nlions rind ~d~i~f f~nJ . ,  Bv Id<: : I  : 7 / ~ l i ,  
?@ON Z ~ S C  r~/,yngea'; while she lias been assuring u:; .2i x. 
-: 
Pctcrsburg that such aggressions wcre made i'g. slut.. d hcr 
instructions. She ncloptecl t hose xggressions !~~~;.:uisc o :x  
Minislers had not tlie " pluck :'-there is no bt~ler  word h ~ r  
it, and it is n rigbt good English wol.d--to Lzll ht.1. tl?::: 
unless she r-tiredithere would be war ! 
?h For., let us consider, \vhy is Russia r n a k i n ~ ~   hi^ s i ~ r i ~ l g  
just a t  this particular moment ? Sh7i1mls fhc ~ J ; C I  OY- / / irrr '~. 
'J'o gain that city is the end and aim of nll her ; ~ - ~ ~ \ ~ l ~ ~ n c l , ; s ,  
- 
Her i t  is comparatively weak now; her fortifica;icj~,s ar,: i n  
disrepair; there is n o  English force within live !~~in.circL , 
miles of it. I f  Russia can only get possession o i  L'I; 5.: nc~i':, ' 
no power on earth will ever take it from her. Thr. pla;:is 
and the valleys follow the city. I f  she can only g2.!11 Hcriit 
now she gains a new base w!lere she  can rest and wait for 
the opportunity to pounce upon India. 
Yes ; that is the cause of these aggressions which in 
spitc of their being disavowed a rc  invariably accepted ; 
is the meaning of the smooth words which serve to 
In more and nlore tituc for I<omaroK and ~\likhanoff! ?
\\'hilst Russia is protesting in Lontlon, her generals arc 
: ~ c l v a ~ ; t ~ ~ n ~  iown the I<hushk, the hlurghdb, and the IIeri- 
rlid. H e r  secret purpose is to seize H e r i l  before India is 
ready, before British troops can be  sent to the scenc of 
action from the Soudan-to seizc it, to for~ify it, and to 
use it as a liltnace to India ! 
\\'hat tllc effect upon India of the acquisition of Herdt 
by Russia vorrld be, I descrihcd in languay to which I 
can add littie, in n paper I \\rote for thc l'driotic Ahso-  
cialion in 1879. \\'hat, I asked then, will mean thc ocou- 
p t i o n  of Russia by I l e r i t ?  I added : 
It will mean sinlplp this: that thc gatcirny lcnding into our Ind ian  
Empire has been c?cLIpied h y  our cnenly. It will mean that hence. 
forth thcrc will lie no peace for the people of India,  110 security for 
trade, no money for improvemen~s. The English in Indin will lire 
unclcr a conlinoa! Il~rext-not at lirst of invasion, I x ~ t  of thc intrijiw 
&,ewhich corrupts their native soldiers, which wins over their native 
allies, which mtkrs every man doublh~l of the niorronr. In a word, 
!voultl I~ecomc of her ?evcnues thcn?  Ind~~stry, the cause of thc 
aenl lh  or nations, wo111d Ix pnralyzetl, and a few years wol~ld witness p n national bankruptcy. . 
r 
,' ,, I n  a word, the occupation of H e r i t  by Russia would be 
a permanent menace to India. \ - Another attempt is now being made  by Russia to hood- 
/' - wink our minislers, and again have our ministers been 
Irpodwinked. They have accepted the assurances from 
St. Petcrsburg that no reply can be received froifi ( : L i ~ c ~ . : ~ l  1 
Komaroff for seven or eight days. Now, on t1ii.i l;oi,:l. : 
have receivcd a com~nunication from a gentlenwi >.VL i f  
acquainted with thc Trans-caspian rcgioas, whi~:it hr. k t .  
permitted me to use. H e  writes : . " T h e  Doily .'I; ~ t ; y : ? ~ ~ . ' ~  
i s  right in stating that the Russian ' telcgrxph l i t i t  ~ L ~ . . ! C I I ~ . ' ~  
t o  \vithin 1 2 0  nliles o f  the Russian posts near 1'.7111t?4. 
A s  the Russian couriers are compelled to travel 3.1 >l :.if  
of ten miles nn hour ~t is clear that it would I::, 11.k~- 11111 
[welvc lioul-s to rcccive despntclics from St. l'L.~i~r.-ln!tg." 
'l'l~c causc of this dcccit is obvious: il: is lo gait1  ti!^!.. I ra  
carry out the nefarious design against Heri t  ! 
I n  a hostile criticism on the lirst ctlition of li~;.; !U ~ k ,  
the writer, n Blue-ril~bonitc, rc~narltecl that ti~crt.  y , : . ~ +  :I 
large and  growing number of Englishmen \vlirs ::.<Y#. i i t -  
clincd t o  regard India a s  a dcad weight on the ! w r i j r l c  . , I '  
thcse islxnds. I t  is scarccly neccssnry to relily I , ,  I i lc 
ignor;~nt folly displayed in such n remark, but ns t ! l t ' i ,  :O.I~ 
many \vho are not aware of the manner *in 11 ~ l i r : l l  i;.:.,l: 
islands benefit by the connection, I think a ussl!~i i s l i t  [!v:.- .-- 
wi!l bc served if I conclude this :cl~:lptcr wit11 :\:I ~r \ t t nc t  - 
from a lecture delivered on thc subject in LIIC Ll~e..~l.rc ,:L. ,. 
the Society of Ark on the 4th hlnrch, 1881, by c!l!r (I: ihc 
mwit acconlpl ish~d and  instructed of mcn, SI r. . I .  11. 
Rlaclenn. It is . ~ a ~ d l y  neccssnry," said Mr. hlnc:l~.:i~~ i n  
~ l i c  body L. his [dnlirnblc address, " to  insis1 111nli tllc. hh I -  
obvious nlnterial gains \\thich accrue to Englanil f rnw [.hi. 
possession of an Eastern Empire. :\ simple i:i\;~m~iaLIon 
of the117 will suffice. I n  the lirst plncc it is n2f sli;:!~~ :..(!- 
vanlage to us h a t  thc Government of India ' d ikbu l . : :~~  in 
this country 16 millions slerling a year, out of tl:c. rIhvcllrrc,- 
. I 
collected lrom Indian taspnyers. T h c  English ~ i ~ t i o l ! .  . ,  
is trrlc, does not take this money li.o~n the pcopIc r ~ f '  I nilid. 
\ \dhout giving them something in exchange for i 1 . j '  ,iftr'r 
- 
staling the nature of the eschmgc Mr. bhclenn ~llus con- 
tinued : 
".Tl~c indircct gains of private entcqwisc io India arc also very con- 
siderablc. Dritish India ranlts now with France, Gcrmany, and the 
Ufltcd Shtcs  among o w  bcst custo~iicrs. Tlie Unitcd ILingdom sup- 
ies her with three-Lfdis of hcr wholc i~nport  of mcrchanrlisc. . . . . 
-'@<br do E ~ d i s l ~ n ~ e n  nlake lirofik only 011 ~ I I E  import i n &  into India. 
'?> Thc g p ~ ~ c r  p o r h n  o l h  export trade is controlled by E11glir11 I~ouscs, 
-<-(I in Prcsicl~ncy ~ O W I I S  ; ant1 four-lifrlrs of the shipping cn~ngcd 
(in ~ 1 1 ~ :  f d l ~ w i n g  coinn~el.ce of 111dia belongs to I!:~~glisl~ owncrs. If 
- . / ~ I I  trncc the sale of n bnle of India11 cotton csposccl Tor snlc in tlic 
Li\.crpool ~~lar l te t ,  you will prol~alily lind that in all its s~~cccssirc  
htagcs, after hcing jirown and picltcd I1y thc nativc cldtivator, it has 
> been ~ n d e  rcntly and l ~ r o u g l ~ l  to llic marltct 11y I<nglisl~ cnliilal n 1 ~ 1  Inllour. 1\11 English agcnt llns sclcctecl i t  in tlic producing rlislricl ; it 
113s bccn cnrrictl down lo ~ l l c  sen-coasl by ;L railway c o m p n ~ ~ y  worlting 
with Englisl~ capital ; an English mercantile firm in I!omlriy has 
liressctl it, ant1 sold t l ~ c  I i l l  or csc11;ungc against it ~ lu .u~~gl l  an 
Ilngli4i Iroker to nil l<nglish Ixinl< ; n ~ i d  i L  I I ~ S  IIC'CII ~ ~ : I I I S ~ O ~ ~ C I I  
from 13o1nllny LO Livcrpiml on Ilonril :un English stenlner. So, 
again, with rcgnrd to the piccc goods trntlc from this country. 
it is cntil-cly linanccd and ~ n n n a ~ c d  I)y En!ji>ll~ncn till (he I n k s  
\ P ~ S " I ~ O  the hnnc?s of thc nnlivc rlcnlcrs iu the I~naanr o r  l<o~nl)ny. 
Yo11 will rcadily calcnlntc Ilow many dilt'crcnt ~irolils tlrii vast Irade 
' 
nhic l~  niay bc vnluetl nL n h~~nclred nlillions sterling, yicltls Lo all their 
classes of English n~anufaclurel-s, merclmnts, bankcrs, n~iddlen~cn, 
i ~ C ~ ^ s l i i l ~ l i e r s ,  ngineers, and othcr ~i~cchanical  experts. And when you 
ndd to such ~ncrcnnlile gains Ihc ~xi\ 'ntc rcn$'hnccs sent!?onlc by 
E l~g l i s l~  tr;idcsn~en : ~ n d  p r o f ~ l s h i a l  nlen scttl' d in 111ilio..hwl lip tlw 
civil and nlilitnry servanls of thc Crown, p o ~ ~ c n  ; realize ' 'ow inmcnsc, 
in tile aggegatc, mast LC tllc contributions wl~icl \oar  g' .at tlcpcntlcncy 
an1111ally lnakcs LO the \venlth of England. 'l'l~crc I'. not :I town, i t  
Inny I,e said wilhoul esnggeralion t l~a l  there is no1 wen  a Iiamlct, in 
this country in \vliich Lhc fructifying influence o( Lhc capitnl Ilu~s nc- 
quircd is not felt, althongh it may not bc always rccogniscd ; and I do 
not Itnow any indastry in the United K i ~ ~ g d o m ,  smnll 01. great, which 
\ \voul~l not suilcr loss, if the conneclion \villi India were llrokcil oL i '  \ n These are smne of the henefits resulting to England / <rrosl her connection with India. H o w  thc connection is 
;;ppreciated hy the native princes and people of India, 
++ , ,  
even by those who, likc Nepil ,  do not acknowledge the - , 
sovereignty of the Empress, has been made ahundnntly ' 
clear by  thc spontaneous offers of assistance wliiuh the - 
Inere threat of Russian invasion has evoked. ' Nothing i s  
more manifest than that connection \rill be endangere&,if 
Russin be allowed to take Herdt. We must not disgui. 1 
*4k4 from ourselves the fact that a loyalty which is fixed as long 
as \I-c are \4ctorious is not always p r o d  aga: .. ' . ? - ' a y ~ ~ ~  
coursc of adversity. I n  his eloquent nccoun , > i '  ilic Iii11 
of J a ~ n c s  II., 3I:lcaulny has dcscribecl ho\v the Prince who -1 
glibly uttered his 'est-c~~~.possil,k:~' as he learned tile defeition 
of  one great 1101)le after mother, took an opporhaiity 
shortly altcrw:irds of decamping himsclL Thxe rt.niairis, . : 
thcn, tlic great question-the qucstion llle most inl'jwrtant 
of all-how to preserve 1icrdt for Afghinistin. Rcr'orc 
this all other questions sink into insig~~ificnnct:. I n  the 
prcseencc of a n  enemy 5 3  unscrupulous it is n qucstion .- 
.. ' 
beset \ v i ~ l ~  difficul~ies. 'She very act of repairing the 
crumbling wnlls or the town might, on , t ! ~  I .;-i:lr.ij : l ~  
adopted by the wolf towards the I;uilb, be dewc!nr,cd tf 
Russin ns an act of hostility. Yet, a t  all haznrtis and with 
all specd it should be nttempted ; ~~ieanwlii!p, we must A , 
conceapate all oub available troops in thc Pishin \Yd!c>, 
ready f&q prornp~&dvn~~ce.  
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